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Downveiling refers to the shift by Muslim
women to less concealing and conservative
forms of Islamic dress – or to changing em-
bodied religious practices – and is indicative
of the complexity and dynamism with
which socio-religious change occurs in con-
temporary societies. It points to a transfor-
mation in Egypt's Islamist trend.
A fourteen-year resident of Cairo, I first
became aware of downveiling in the mid-
1990s when a number of acquaintances
from diverse social and professional back-
grounds began shifting to lesser degrees of
veiling, and even sometimes 'unveiled' or
eliminated their head covers altogether. My
understanding of this practice was anecdo-
tal until I began conducting research in
schools on the Islamization of education.
While schools are by no means the only – or
even necessarily the most commonplace
arenas – of downveiling, they provide a
compelling social context in which to trace
this practice which is increasingly observ-
able throughout urban Egyptian society.
Schools as contested cultural
s p a c e s
The past two decades have witnessed the
increased Islamization of public spaces and
social institutions, one manifestation of
which has been the Islamization of the na-
tion's schools. Numerous government and
private schools have institutionalized Islam-
ic practices, such as enforcing an Islamic
uniform (zayy Islammy). Schools often re-
quire female students, staff and sometimes
even students' mothers to don a head cover.
Veiling has multiple gradations and ranges
from a h i j a b, a scarf that covers the hair and
is pinned under the chin, to a k h i m a r, a sub-
stantially longer nylon scarf that drapes
over the torso and arms, to a n i q a b, a face
veil with ankle-length dress.
The Ministry of Education (MOE), in its at-
tempt to curb the Islamization of schools
and as part of a larger state strategy to con-
trol and monitor the Islamization of public
spaces, politicized the issue of Islamic uni-
forms. In 1994, the MOE enacted a minister-
ial order prohibiting girls from wearing the
h i j a b to school at the primary stage (grades
1-5), requiring that students at the prepara-
tory level (grades 6-8) provide written per-
mission by their guardian if they wear the
h i j a b (thereby giving the parents rather
than the school authority over the girl's reli-
gious attire), and forbidding teachers and
students from wearing the n i q a b on the
grounds that it presents a security risk by
concealing the wearer's identity and pre-
vents teachers from effectively teaching
since it covers the face.
The new uniform regulation was strongly
contested in the press and courts, but was
ultimately ruled constitutional in a case that
reached the Supreme Constitutional Court,
and was therefore enforceable. To ensure its
compliance, MOE inspectors and state secu-
rity forces were dispatched to schools
throughout the country; guards stood out-
side school gates to inspect students' attire
and to prohibit anyone in defiance of the
regulation from entering their school. Many
school communities reacted to the state's
actions with outrage and some unveiled
students even took on the veil in protest.
However, over the longer term, the new reg-
ulation served as a catalyst for many who
had been wanting to downveil, as will be il-
lustrated in the case of a private Islamic
school in Cairo.
The state as a catalyst for
shifting socio-religious
practices 
Since its establishment in 1981, the
school uniform for girls from first grade at a
'private Islamic school' in Cairo, a fee-pay-
ing general school that incorporates Islamic
rituals and symbols into its daily life, con-
sisted of a long blue-grey smock, pants and
a mini-k h i m a r. The school's founder and di-
rector, Sheikh Mohammed, selected this
uniform so that the female child would get
used to comporting herself according to
the teachings of her religion because, as he
proclaims 'in Islam there is no grey, every-
thing is black or white. The h i j a b is a re-
quirement, not a choice.'
In 1994, the sheikh initially resisted imple-
menting the new uniform regulation, con-
vinced that he, not the government, was re-
ligiously in the right. However, when faced
with the possibility of the MOE taking over
his school's administration, he eventually
eliminated the headscarf for girls at the pri-
mary level. Nevertheless, with the parents'
cooperation, the veil remained mandatory
for girls at the preparatory stage. Despite a
pervasive sense among staff, parents and
students, that the government was unjustly
interfering in the school's internal policy
and in their private lives, an unexpected
shift occurred among a number of them:
they began modifying their own style of
dress by downveiling.
The older students (ages 11-14) were the
first to downveil. Backed by the law, the
overwhelming majority of girls immediately
substituted their uniform k h i m a r for a sim-
ple headscarf and, in an act of defiance
against school policy, decided among
themselves to replace the regulation grey
smock uniform, which they described as
'ugly' and 'old-fashioned', for a more 'nor-
mal' and attractive uniform of a tailored
long grey skirt and white blouse. Thereafter,
members of the school staff also began
downveiling. Two senior administrators –
school disciplinarians and tacit role models
– gradually substituted their dark ankle-
length skirts for shin-length cotton skirts,
and, in gradations, replaced their thick
nylon k h i m a rs that extended down to their
thighs, with shoulder-length scarves. They
had both begun sporting the k h i m a r j u s t
prior to being employed at the school in the
early 1980s, in part to show their commit-
ment to working in an Islamic environment,
but also because they could not justify
wearing a lesser degree of clothing than the
children under their authority. When the
primary school children ceased wearing the
k h i m a r and the preparatory girls down-
veiled at their own initiative, the need to
dress religiously on par with the students
no longer existed. A number of their col-
leagues, over time, also modified their dress
to less concealing and more functional
forms of Islamic dress.
The general tendency among the staff to-
wards downveiling has had the effect of
hindering others from upveiling or adapt-
ing 'higher', more concealing and virtuous
forms of Islamic dress. One senior teacher in
her mid-40s has been expressing a desire to
upveil from her current k h i m a r to the n i q a b,
a form of dress which she believes to be a
religious obligation. However, with her
peers substituting their k h i m a r s for simpler
and shorter headscarves, she is not encour-
aged to upveil and is not only putting it off,
but is even practising her own downveiling.
She recently began wearing loose-fitting
pants instead of a skirt under her k h i m a r,
Copious studies on Islamic resurgence throughout
the Muslim world deal with new veiling, a socio-reli-
gious practice which has been explained as a form of
both resistance and submission to patriarchy, an as-
sertion of cultural authenticity, a reaction against
Western imperialism and local secular regimes, a
genuine desire by women to live more piously, and a
practice born out of economic necessity.
While there is a degree of plausibility in each of these
theories, especially when taken in tandem, another
dimension should be added to the debate on new
veiling, and that is a subtle and seemingly growing
tendency among many urban Egyptian women to-
wards what can be called 'downveiling'.
D o w n v e i l i n g :
Shifting Socio-
Religious Practices
in EgyptMi dd le  EastL I N DA  H E R R E R A
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The question of whether political Islam should be interpreted as a
truly successful movement in the Muslim world has been matter of
debate for nearly a decade (See 'Vingt Ans Après…' conference in
Paris p. 3). Those who speak of its failure tend to argue that Islamist
groups have failed to realize their goal of Muslim unity through the
revival of the u m m a as a political entity and, on the national level,
find great difficult in creating a workable alternative to nationalist
or other political trajectories. Whatever ones' viewpoint on the
issue of failure or success, the impact of political Islam on politics in
Muslim countries and beyond is undeniable. This is partly due to
the perception of the phenomenon as a threat to dominant
ideologies and structures by its opponents. It is clear that political
Islam, both as a discourse and a practice, is
established in an increasing number of Muslim
countries, but the ways in which Islamic notions
exert themselves and relate to local political
infrastructures varies greatly. The political
discourses of many Muslim countries are
experiencing a shift towards a more religious-
oriented vocabulary. Opposition movements in some of the few
truly Islamic states have also internalized Islamic motifs. In
countries such as Iran, where the state system is to a large degree
moulded by the clergy, opposition movements have as yet little
alternative but to articulate their aspirations in terms of religion.
This process may have facilitated one of the more dynamic
intellectual and societal discourses in the Muslim world, but its
dynamism is limited in terms of political reform (Kian-Thiébaut, p.
23; Alamdari, p.22). In sharp constrast with Iran, nearby
Afghanistan witnessed the demise of any kind of national debate
except that of contending militia organizations, such as the Taliban,
in which tribal allegiances are inextricably intertwined with
individualist loyalties (Shahrani p. 20-21).
Their use of religious imagery as well as the seemingly cynical
uses of Islamic symbol in some other states, indicates that
consistent reference to Islamic metaphors is part and parcel of
current political parlance. However, political symbolism may
merely represent a mechanism for disciplining the populace by way
of rituals which are evidently devoid of meaning (Wedeen p. 25).
Muslim activists, for instance in the Comoros Islands, are on the
alert for – what would be in their eyes – improper appeals to divine
principles by those in power (Chanfi, p.16).
One of the main effects of the emergence of political Islam is that,
in effect, religion was reinstated as a key instrument of political
action. As an instrument, it also now serves groups which are not
considered 'Islamist' or 'fundamentalist', including the more
heterodox Muslim groups, such as Alevism (Massicard, p. 29).
The increased political participation of what have historically
been seen as traditional groups seems to have become a global
phenomenon. It may be that these groups have finally adapted
themselves to the general conditions of post-colonial rule and are
regaining lost ground. Sufism has been part of the Muslim
response to the challenges of modernity from the outset (Yavuz, p.
7). The present developments may be partly explained by the
renewed attraction that Sufism holds for the
emergent urban classes. This trend appears to be
global, affecting national politics in countries as
far-reaching as Senegal (Samson, p. 28) and
Indonesia (Howell, p. 17), albeit in variant
manifestations according to established local
political cultures.
A new academic debate about the use and function of the so-
called new media is emerging. As a result, a fresh body of literature
on Islam is becoming available, including 'digital age' versions of
time-honoured institutions like f a t w a-giving (Bunt, p. 12). The new
media are limited in relevance, given that the vast majority of
Muslims have little or no access to them. Having said that, cyber
discourses and satellite images are affecting the lives of an
increasing number of Muslims, particularly the youth. For diasporic
communities, the Internet may be used as an aid for the creation of
a virtual homeland (Khosravi, p. 13). The increased relevance of
both old and new media is becoming apparent in countries like
Mali, where women’s religious organizations have created their
own niche in the broadcast media (Schulz, p. 27).
This N e w s l e t t e r offers a bird's-eye view on various other topics in
the lives of Muslims over the globe, including matters of health
(Hoffer, p. 8) and death in Western Europe (Andrews and Wolfe, p.
15). The complexities of carving out space in host societies for the
identities of immigrants, whether in Switzerland (Haenni, p.31) or
Argentina (Brieger, p.) remain an important field of research, one
on which the ISIM is currently designing a project entitled the
'Production of Islamic Knowledge in Western Europe' (to be
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The ISIM solicits your response to the ISIM
Newsletter. If you wish to contribute to the
Newsletter, style sheets may be obtained upon
request from the ISIM Secretariat or on the ISIM
website. In order to offer update information on
activities concerning the study of Islam and Muslim
societies, along with news on vacancies, grants,
and fellowships, the ISIM relies on its readers. The
information will be made available on the ISIM
W e b s i t e .
The ISIM Newsletter is a tri-annual publication of
the International Institute for the Study of Islam in
the Modern World (ISIM). Responsibility for the
facts and opinions expressed in this publication
rests solely with the authors. Their views do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute or its
supporters. The ISIM Newsletter is free of charge.
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D I C K  D O U W E S E d i t o r
Summer Academy: 'The Local Production of Islamic Knowledge'
ISIM Master Class: ' Ke y Issues in Human Rights'
A N N O U N C E M E N T S
The ISIM invites applications for the
ISIM Master Class 'Key Issues in Human
Rights' by Professor Abdullahi An-Naim
(Charles Howard Candler Professor of
Law, School of Law, Emory University).
The class is to be held for 12-15 PhD
s t u d e n t s .
D a t e s : 27-30 November 2000
T i m e : Daily from 11:15 to 13:00 and
from 14:15 to 16:00
V e n u e : In Leiden, to be announced
Course Outline
O b j e c t i v e :
In addition to giving a general intro-
duction to human rights, this course
will focus on key issues (economic and
social rights, and rights of the child) in
order to emphasize the evolving and
far-reaching implications of human
rights to global social, political, and cul-
tural development.
D e s c r i p t i o n :
During the first two days, the course
will cover the concept of human rights
and their universality and cultural/con-
textual relativity; give an overview of
the main treaties and their implemen-
tation; and discuss the role of non-gov-
ernmental organizations, all with spe-
cial reference to Islamic societies. The
third day will focus on a discussion of
economic, social, and cultural rights,
and the fourth day on children's rights
issues, in a comparative national con-
text (European and developing coun-
tries). Professor C. Flinterman and Pro-
fessor F. van Hoof of the SIM, Faculty of
Law, Utrecht University, will lead the
course discussion on Wednesday and
T h u r s d a y .
Course materials:
Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, I n-
ternational Human Rights in Context:
Law, Politics, Morals, 2nd edition. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 2000. A detailed
outline, prescribing specific readings
from this book will be distributed to
successful applicants at least four
weeks prior to the course for advance
r e a d i n g .
F e e :
The fee for the master class is 
NLG 750.- Fee waivers may be 
granted in certain cases.
A p p l i c a t i o n s :
The ISIM invites PhD students wish-
ing to participate in the master class to
send a brief curriculum vitae and an ex-
planation of why they wish to attend to
N.M. Dessing at the ISIM by 1 Novem-
ber 2000.
The Working Group Modernity and
Islam and the ISIM, in cooperation with
Yildiz University, are organizing a joint
Summer Academy on: 'The Production
of Islamic Knowledge'. The Summer
Academy will be held in Istanbul, from 3-
14 September 2001, under the direction
of Prof. Martin van Bruinessen and Dr
Altan Gokalp. In a multidisciplinary ex-
change between the humanities and the
social sciences, supervised by a group of
internationally-renowned scholars from
various disciplines, participants will be
given the opportunity to present their
projects and to discuss new research as
well as issues of theory and methodolo-
gy relevant to their field of study. Travel
and accommodation expenses will be
offered to the participants.
Theme: The production of
local knowledge
With the expansion of Islam through
conversion and migration, Islam has
taken root in many parts of the globe.
With this spread to a large variety of so-
cieties and cultures, Islam has under-
gone a dual process of universalization
and localization, a process which is still
ongoing. Its universal message was –
and continues to be – adapted to local
needs. This also holds true for areas in
which Islam was introduced in the mod-
ern period, in particular Western Europe
and the Americas. Divergent historical
trajectories have meant that each region
may have its own distinctive Islamic
practices, discourses, and infrastruc-
tures. Diasporic communities, in the
West as well as in predominantly Muslim
countries, add to the complexity of the
interplay between local and transna-
tional contexts in which Islamic knowl-
edge is produced. The new media – and
some of the old ones as well – play a cru-
cial role in this production.
Conditions of application
The programme addresses postgradu-
ate (doctoral) and postdoctoral re-
searchers in Islamic as well as relevant
area studies, history, anthropology, law
and social science. The researchers' work
should be clearly relevant to the theme
as described above. A broader outline of
the theme, including sub-themes, can
be found on the websites of the ISIM
(www.isim.nl) and the Working Group
Modernity and Islam (http://www.wiko-
berlin.de/). The working language of the
Summer Academy is English. A complet-
ed application form (either to be re-
quested from the ISIM secretariat or
downloaded from the ISIM website), ac-
companied by a curriculum vitae, a five-
page outline of one's current research
project with a brief summary thereof,
and two letters of recommendation
from university faculty members should
be submitted, in English, by 15 January
2001 to: 
P.O. Box 11089, 2301 EB Leiden, The Nether-
l a n d s
Tel: +31-71-527 79 05 
Fax: +31-71-527 79 06
E-mail: douwes@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
The working group Modernity and
Islam (Arbeitskreis Moderne und Islam)
is a research network of Berlin universi-
ties and extra-university institutions
committed to promoting a deeper un-
derstanding of Muslim societies, their
cultures, history, and social and politi-
cal orders.
For information, please contact:
Georges Khalil, Arbeitskreis Moderne und
I s l a m
Geschäftsstelle: Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin
Wallotstraße 19, D – 14193 Berlin, Germany
Fax: +49-30-89 00 12 00
E-Mail: khalil@wiko-berlin.de
C o nfe r ence  Re po r t
From 21-24 June 2000, a group of international schol-
ars met in Paris to discuss modern Islamist move-
ments in a conference under the (translated) heading:
'Twenty Years After …'. The idea was to review and as-
sess the 20 years of the studies of Islamist move-
ments, taking the Iranian Revolution of 1979 as a hy-
pothetical point of reference. These movements, col-
lectively known as 'Political Islam', have been used
synonymously with terms as varied as 'fundamental-
ism', 'alternative modernities', 'Islamic revivalism',
and so on. It has been perceived as a 'threat', a force
opposing Western culture in the 'clash of civiliza-
tions'. The more militant groups, with their calls for
'jihad', are often – and erroneously – considered rep-
resentative of Political Islam as a whole.
'Vingt Ans Après …' 
An Assessment 
of Modern Islamist Movements 
A number of scholars have come to the
conclusion that Political Islam has been
less successful than expected in attain-
ing some of the main aims, in particular
the revival of the umma as a viable po-
litical entity. The conference dealt with
the varying assessments of these
movements in these years. For most of
the scholars, who have been studying
these movements for the last twenty
years, the conference provided an oc-
casion to share their personal recollec-
tions and concerns about the past and
future of their fields of research on the
s u b j e c t
The international conference 'Vingt Ans
Après …' was jointly organized by the Pro-
gramme Doctoral du Monde Musulman
(PMM), the Institut d'Études Politiques in
P a r i s , and the ISIM. Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy
and Muhammad Khalid Masud chaired the
conference. The sessions were organized by
region. Andrée Feillard, together with Mar-
tin van Bruinessen and David Camroux, cov-
ered the Southeast Asia. Masud chaired the
session on South Asia: The m a d r a s a s of Pak-
istan were dealt with in a paper delivered by
Mariam Abou Zahab. Muhammad Qasim
Zaman also gave special attention to Pak-
istan in his paper on the religio-political ac-
tivism of the Sunni ulema in the contempo-
rary Muslim world. William Maley and Pierre
Centlivres both dealt with the Taliban. This
series of papers on the Afghan context be-
came more visually manifest when excerpts
from a documentary called Inside Afhgan-
i s t a n by François Margolin were shown.
Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut and Farhad Khos-
rokhavar gave presentations on the trans-
formations in post-Islamist Iran and the
Iranian intellectuals of the 21s t century, re-
spectively. The situation in Turkey was ad-
dressed by Ruşen Çakir, with a view to the
Welfare Party (RP) under Erbakan, and by
Elise Massicard who spoke about the Alevis
of Turkey. For the Palestinian context, the
p o s t -i n t i f a d a period was evaluated by Jean-
François Legrain. Mona Harb-el-Kak and
Bernard Rougier presented the situation in
Lebanon, where the Hezbollah both com-
petes with and complements the govern-
ment. Patrick Haenni and Ahmad Moussalli
addressed the situation in Egypt. The as-
sessment of the Islamist movements in
Egypt 'Twenty Years After …', according to
Moussalli, was that arguments are made ei-
ther in cold war or essentialist terms, neither
of which further the understanding of the
Islamist movements. His hypothesis was
that Islamism has not yet begun. Gérard
Prunier and Saeed Ya'qoub then gave an
overview on the situation in Sudan.
Mamoun Fandy's focus was on the relations
between state and society in Saudi Arabia,
under the heading of 'cyber resistance', i.e.
the Saudi opposition between globalization
and localization. Renaud Detalle addressed
the historical context of the Islamist move-
ment in Yemen, which Bernard Haykel sub-
sequently evaluated in his role as discus-
sant. Gudrun Krämer gave an overview on
the cross-border activities of the Muslim
Brotherhood, also with a view to problema-
tizing the hypothesis that political Islam has
failed. Martin Kramer linked in with the pre-
vious presentation, as he dealt with the pat-
tern of the sudden rise (or internationaliza-
tion) and fall (or localization) of the Islamist
movements. The attempts at mass mobiliza-
tion in North Africa on the part of the Is-
lamist movements were addressed (specifi-
cally in the Algerian context) by Gilles Kepel,
and (for Morocco) by Mohammed Tozy. On
the last day, Xavier Bougarel introduced a
series of papers on the post-communist
world, starting with his own presentation on
Islam and politics in the Balkans. Nathalie
Clayer specifically focused on the Albanians
of the former Yugoslavia. The issue of Islam
in the former USSR was problematized by
Aleksei Malashenko. The final paper pre-
sented at the conference was Dale Eickel-
man's contribution on mass media, the In-
ternet and the emerging public sphere. He
affirmed that the new media have trans-
formed the ideas and practices of religious
and political authorities throughout the
Muslim world. Olivier Roy then gave a gen-
eral synthesis and chaired the closing de-
b a t e .
The discussions and debates initiated in
the conference will continue on the ISIM
website: http://www.isim.nl/  ◆
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Wo r ksho p  Re po r t
The workshop on 'Family and Family Law in Asia and
the Middle East', convened by ISIM and the Working
Group Modernity and Islam (30 June – 1 July 2000) at
the Institute for Islamic Studies, Free University of
Berlin, aimed at creating a network of scholars and
scholar-activists currently based in the West, who
employ a social science methodology and perspec-
tive in the study of family law, its history, its regional
developments and its interpretation by courts.
Family and Family Law 
in Asia and the Middle East
The two-day workshop was divided into a
series of roundtable discussions, each ses-
sion assigned to participants, who used
their own research questions and findings
as well as pre-circulated reading material to
enable a comparative and interdisciplinary
d e b a t e .
The first theme was devoted to 'Western
Historiography of Family Law in the Middle
East'. Bettina Dennerlein expounded three
major paradigms that stand out in Western
literature on family law in the Middle East,
and contrasted them with discourses about
family law in the region itself. The three par-
adigms reflect the development of the com-
plex relationship between the state and the
family, varying from a patriarchal-national-
ist, to a contractual-individualized ap-
proach. These developments are visible, for
instance, in the shifting definitions of mar-
riage and the effects on the position of
women and their active participation as so-
cial actors.
The second theme concentrated on the
'Marriage Contract and its Registration'.
Léon Buskens approached the topic from
three different perspectives: f i q h, state leg-
islation and practice, with the example of
Morocco. The radical shift from oral to writ-
ten marriage contracts, and the legislative
measures towards homogenization and
central registration of the contracts, as illus-
trated by the most recent version of the Mu-
dawwana, are clear manifestations of the in-
creasing control that the state exerts over
the family. However, people still find space
for their own perception of the rules and
practices regarding marriage.
Annelies Moors discussed the increased
practice of registering token dowers in the
marriage contract among urban and rural
Palestinian women, whose motives and ef-
fects vary according to time, setting, level of
education, profession, and so on. The prac-
tice is further closely inter-linked with socio-
economic developments and the changing
view on what a 'good' marriage involves,
with an increasing emphasis on the conju-
gal aspect of the marital relationship. An-
other important feature of the token dower
is its symbolic meaning regarding a
woman's autonomy, which can be seen as
an important sign of modernity.
The third session covered the issue of
marital offences and violence in the family.
Tazeen Murshid argued that acts of domes-
tic violence against women in South Asia
are usually linked to the male perception of
'possessing' the female body, and embed-
ded in conceptions about honour and prop-
erty relations. Occurrences of violence can,
moreover, gain ground because they are
often sustained by public institutions such
as the law, the courts, and the police. The
discussion evolved around questions such
as: what constitutes illegal cq. illegitimate
forms of violence in the family? How can
legislation ensure the protection of women?
What is the link between private and public
violence? Do court verdicts reflect the of-
fence or put the women on trial?
The fourth theme was related to illegiti-
macy, the topic of research and professional
concern of Jamily Bargash. The Sunni f i q h
literature shows a large degree of elasticity
in arguing around the possible status of an
illegitimate birth. Although the erasure of
natal descent and the fiction of parenthood
is not allowed, in practice this was solved by
employing h i y a l (legal devices), such as the
k a f a l a (lit.: gift of care), through which a
child could attain an accepted social status.
The codification of Maliki law and the com-
pulsory registration of marriages and births
have, however, created gaps between law
and social practice. For instance, through
the fixation of a specific period for pregnan-
cy, no room is left for the fiction of the
'sleeping child', thus generating an un-
precedented social stigma for both the 'ille-
gitimate' child and its mother.
The final theme on divorce, legal activism
and reform was jointly presented by Lynn
Welchmann, Abdellahi An-Naim, and Ziba
Mir-Hosseini, scholars who combine their
academic approach from an 'insiders' per-
spective with effectively partaking in legal
reform programmes, especially in Palestine,
Iran, and Egypt.
By the example of practices of t a l a q ( d i-
vorce) in Palestine, Welchman illustrated
that codified law and the institutionaliza-
tion of courts can also positively affect
women's position, e.g. by making certain
apprehensible (m a k r u h) moral duties legally
enforceable on men, or conversely by apply-
ing administrative measures to discourage
men from divorce.
Mir-Hosseini explained how the various
re-codifications of civil and family law in the
2 0t h century have constantly challenged
Iranian judges to reconcile in their decisions
between f i q h, popular s h a r ica, and the
codes, and how women equally make use of
s h a r ica in their strategies before the court.
Her co-directed film 'Divorce Iranian Style', a
vivid illustration of her argument, was
shown to a larger audience at the conclu-
sion of the workshop.
Illustrated by a field study about the initi-
ation, trajectory, and debates around the
latest Egyptian Family Code, carried out for
his 'Islamic Family Law Project', An-Naim
also confirmed that no sustainable social
change can take place without addressing
the issue of s h a r ica. How then to harmonize
s h a r ica with the official codes, on the one
hand, and social reality on the other? What
does this imply for the nature of Islamic
family law (Can it still be called s h a r ica? Who
determines it?), and for the conception of
the state (Does it act autonomously or as an
agent of other social forces?)?
These questions will be further explored
in the second Islamic Family Law workshop
which will take place in March 2001 in Flo-
rence, Italy.  ◆
Laila al-Zwaini is projects officer at the ISIM.
Annelies Moors
and Lynn
W e l s h m a n
participate in 
the workshop.
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IS IM So undi ng B oa r d
After Beirut and Cairo, the ISIM held its third Sound-
ing Board Meeting in Jakarta from 14-16 August
2000, in close with cooperation with the Center for
the Study of Religion and Society (PPIM). Through
these meetings, the ISIM aims to forge links with aca-
demic institutions in the South that are actively en-
gaged in the study of contemporary developments in
Muslim societies. Moreover, they provide an oppor-
tunity to discuss current and future research plans
with academics and intellectuals.
Religion and Economic Practices
in Southeast Asia
The three-day programme comprised a
workshop (August 14) and visits to the rele-
vant institutions (August 15-16). The primary
objectives of the workshop were consulta-
tion and discussion of the possibility of con-
ducting a larger conference on religion and
economic practices in the Muslim world.
Scholars and experts from Indonesia, as well
as from Australia, Singapore, Thailand and
Malaysia, participated in the discussions. The
choice of topic was prompted by the intense
economic activity experienced in Southeast
Asia in the last decades of the 20t h c e n t u r y ,
which has earned a number of economies in
this area the sobriquets of 'Tiger' and 'Drag-
on'. Although the boom was followed by a
dramatic crash, most economies in the re-
gion appear to be steadily recuperating. In
many discussions, economic mechanisms in
Southeast and East Asia were partly ex-
plained by reference to Asian values. Among
Muslim populations, particularly in Malaysia,
notions of what is called 'Islamic economics'
became a topic of public debate. In Malaysia,
and to a lesser degree in Indonesia, some of
these principles (particularly in the fields of
banking and finance) were put into practice,
thus following earlier experiments in the
Muslim Middle East and Pakistan.
In his keynote speech, Dr Abdullah Saeed
presented an overview of the Muslim dis-
course on Islamic economics. He reviewed
the diversity of attitudes and approaches to
modern issues and problems in the field. He
argued that the basic tenets of Islamic eco-
nomics merit further critical research. Dr
Karnein, keynote speaker of the second ses-
sion, reviewed s h a r ica-based economic activ-
ities in Indonesia. Both speakers highlighted
the tensions between legalist and more soci-
ety-oriented approaches to the issues of
Islam and economy. The representatives of
banks, insurance and welfare agencies all
stressed that expert s h a r ica committees be
formally involved in their activities in order
to guarantee religious rectitude in accor-
dance with s h a r ica requirements. A practi-
tioner present felt that it was important to
stress that s h a r ica-based economic activity in
Indonesia was not simply a pious effort, but
was in fact market driven. This is because a
growing group of devout Muslims find it in-
creasingly difficult to seek the services of
non-Muslim financial institutions. Nonethe-
less, it was generally recognized that the
s h a r ica-based economic institutions are still
in their initial phase and as yet only play a
marginal role.
The various issues suggested as possible
themes for a forthcoming conference can be
summarized as follows:
– Islamic economics as a discipline: In recent
decades Islamic economics has begun to
be included in the curricula of universities
in various Muslim countries. Several theo-
ries, models and legal instruments were
offered by the Islamic economists as alter-
natives to the modern economic theories.
Its efficacy as a discipline, however, is dis-
puted – as is the term as such.
– The tensions between s h a r ica and state law
with respect to economic practices.
– Islamic economics and the global econo-
my: To what extent do global economic
conditions allow space for experiments in
the field of Islamic economics? 
– Hermeneutics of Islamic economics: The
problematic in interpretation of the au-
thoritative sources (Qur'an, s u n n a a n d
f i q h ), which lie in the question of prefer-
ence of legalism over societal orientation.
In all approaches, case studies of actual
practice are to be included, varying from
grassroots welfare organizations to more
formal institutions, like Islamic banks and
m u s h a r a k a c o m p a n i e s .
In addition to the workshop, several insti-
tutions were visited; among them were IAIN,
the Dompet Dhuafa of Republica, Takaful In-
surances, the Bazis (Badan Amil Zakat Infak
dan Sadaqah), and the s h a r ica branch of
Bank Indonesia.  ◆
A c t i v i t i e s
In cooperation with the Scherpenzeel Media Founda-
tion, the ISIM held its first Journalists Day on 5 June
2000 in Utrecht. Aimed at journalists with an interest
in contemporary Islam, the main topic of the day was
political Islam in the Middle East and Central Asia
with a special focus on Iran and Afghanistan. The
Journalists Day was unique in that it brought togeth-
er scientists and reporters who work in the same field
and under similar circumstances, though often with
different goals. The input of the speakers – Salah
Negm, Olivier Roy and Nazif Shahrani – gave sub-
stance to interesting discussions, although it became
apparent that scholarly and media discourses do not
always coincide. Bertus Hendriks (Radio Nether-
lands) chaired over all sessions.
ISIM Journalists Day
The programme consisted of two main
parts: the first being a closed morning work-
shop dealing with political Islam and the
second being an open forum on the Middle
East and Islam in the Dutch media. Political
Islam was chosen because it tends to domi-
nate the media as well as recent academic
studies. Iran and Afghanistan also offer a
broad view on the subject, as recent devel-
opments here prove the diversity of political
I s l a m .
The afternoon sessions were directed in
particular towards students from the
schools for journalism and offered two
video-contributions: a public relations
video of the Al-Jazeera channel and a short
presentation on television coverage of Mid-
dle Eastern events by Jelle Visser (TROS
Closing panel
– Hans Jansen (Leiden University, HP/De Tijd)
– Jan Keulen (Scherpenzeel Media Foundation/
University of Groningen)
– Moustapha Oukbih (freelance/De Volkskrant)
– Carolien Roelants (NRC Handelsblad)
Broadcasting, Hilversum). A journalists'
panel (in Dutch) concluded the programme.
The cooperation between the ISIM and
the Scherpenzeel Media Foundation in or-
ganizing this event resulted from their
shared goal of rendering non-Western soci-
eties more accessible to Western audiences.
The Scherpenzeel Media Foundation was
founded to improve the media representa-
tion of the South. The following issues were
discussed: How can foreign Muslim political
culture be rendered accessible to a wider
audience, without becoming oversimplified
and stereotyped? To what extent do jour-
nalists make use of the expertise of scien-
tists, and vice versa? How are Western jour-
nalists and academics perceived in the
countries concerned? 
As the chief editor of Al-Jazeera channel in
Qatar, Salah Kamel Negm presented a prac-
tical and up-to-date contribution on Middle
Eastern media. He discussed the expecta-
tions a Western journalist and a Middle East-
ern journalist may have with regard to the
authorities and the populace in Middle East-
ern countries. How can both types of re-
porter function efficiently in areas where
the prevailing rules and attitudes towards
the press are unfavourable and censorship
prevalent. He concluded his talk with tangi-
ble field experience of Al-Jazeera in Iran and
Afghanistan – the channel just having
opened an office in Kabul.
Less aimed at the practice of journalism,
but more on the manifestation of political
Islam in the Middle East, was the contribu-
tion of Olivier Roy (Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)). Roy argued
that the wave of political Islam that seemed
to have engulfed the Middle East at the end
of the 1970s did not lead to the emergence
of a new unified Islamic block. Instead of re-
alizing the re-creation of a Muslim u m m a
above nations and ethnic groups, as the Is-
lamist movements claimed to fight for,
these groups turned into 'Islamo-national-
ist' movements. 'Empowerment led to prag-
matism', according to Roy, because the
more Islamist movements integrated into
national politics, the more they lost their
ideological radicalism. However, one must
not draw the conclusion that normalization
of 'Muslim politics' automatically leads to
the disappearance of ideological radicalism.
There still remains enough space for outcast
and uprooted militants who cannot identify
with a state or nation, such as Usama Bin
Laden and his network of itinerant militants
who travel from one jihad to another. But
Roy does not see in this group a strategic
threat, because they are unable to root their
fight in a society. Nazif Shahrani (Indiana
University, USA) elaborated on the very spe-
cific case of the trajectory of political Islam
in Afghanistan, culminating in the rise of the
Taliban movement (see p. 20-21). Turaj
Atabaki (Utrecht University) gave a short
note on the way the European press cov-
ered the developments in Afghanistan from
the Soviet invasion to the Taliban take-over.
Paul Aarts (University of Amsterdam) and
Jan Keulen (Scherpenzeel Media Founda-




by a student of
j o u r n a l i s m .
P a r t i c i p a n t s
– Amin Aziz (Bank Muamalat)
– Masdar F. Masudi (Pusat Pengembangan
Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M))
– Murasa Sarkaniputra (IAIN Jakarta)
– Bakhtiar Effendy ( P P I M )
– Azyurmardi Azra (IAIN Jakarta)
– Eri Sudewo (Dompet Dhuafa)
– Karnaen Perwata Atmajda 
– Jamhari Makruf ( P P I M )
– Hussin Mutalib (University of Singapore)
– Abdullah Saeed (Australian National Uni-
v e r s i t y )
– Imtiaz Yusuf (Assumption University,
B a n g k o k )
– Muhammad Khalid Masud ( I S I M )
– Dick Douwes ( I S I M )
– Mulya Serigar (Bank Indonesia)
– Nasirwan (Bank Indonesia)
– Hani (Dompet Dhuafa)
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B o ok  Pr esenta t i o n
M U H A M M A D K H AL I D M A S U D  
The Tablighi Jamacat founded by Mawlana Muham-
mad Ilyas (d. 1944) in a rural setting in Mewat, India, in
the early 20t h century spread over the entire globe in
less than a decade. With its centre in Delhi, the Jamaca t
currently operates in more than 80 countries. Attend-
ed by millions, its annual conference has now become
the second largest Muslim congregation after the Hajj.
Travellers in Faith: 
Studies of the Tablighi Jama cat 
as a Transnational Islamic Movement 
for Faith Renewal
In the absence of official writings and the
movement's abstinence from media publici-
ty, academic studies on the Tablighi Jamacat
have been completed only by participant ob-
servations – a phenomenon confirmed by the
many Master's theses and PhD dissertations
from universities in the UK, France, South
Africa, Malaysia, Germany, Pakistan and the
Netherlands during the last two decades.
Travellers in Faith, which stemmed from pa-
pers read at a workshop on Tablighi Jamacat,
held in London on 7-8 June 1990, offers stud-
ies on the Jamacat in India, Britain, France,
Germany, Belgium, Canada, Morocco and
South Africa.
Studying the historical and social growth of
this movement in India, its transnational
transformation and the development of its
ideology, particularly on the questions of con-
version, gender, religious diversity, organiza-
tion, communication, adjustment with the
local environment and personal transforma-
tion, the volume offers fascinating informa-
tion about contemporary dacwa in Islam.
Transnationalism and travel are two distinct
characteristics of this movement. It adopted
transnational travel and physical movement
as a means of dacwa. Reports about the gath-
erings of the Jamacat in the news media carry
pictures of the Tablighis walking on the road-
side with bedding on their shoulders or riding
the trains in spectacularly large numbers.
Groups of Tablighis knocking at neighbour-
hood doors, inviting people to come out to
the mosque, is a common sight in South Asia
and in many countries of other regions. The
most important and frequent activity of an
adept of the Jamacat is going out for God's
sake.
A combination of time and space, 'travel' has
a special meaning in the Tablighi discourse. It
is a physical movement from one's present
space (house, city, and country) to other areas.
It is comparable with the concept of Hijra, both
in the sense of migration and withdrawal. It is
travel within one's self. One temporarily mi-
grates from d u n y a (worldly pursuits) to d i n ( r e-
ligious concerns), a favourite dichotomy
among the Tablighis. It is a migration from cor-
ruption to purity, withdrawing from worldly
attachments to the Path of God.
Reform of self becomes feasible when one
travels out of one's present environment. Stay-
ing in one's usual setting hinders the ability to
discriminate between what is vital and what is
trivial in one's life. This temporal withdrawal
enables one to give up the trivial (tark la yacn i) ,
one of the fundamental principle of the
J a m acat. While going out, meeting others and
speaking to them, one is urged to continually
address oneself. Knocking at others' doors,
one is expected to arrive at one's own
d o o r s t e p s .
A Tablighi crosses several types of frontiers
in this journey. For example, the boundaries
of gender disappear as the Tablighi assumes
certain roles and modes of behaviour that, in
his original setting, belong to the opposite
gender. He also travels across the frontiers of
ethnicity by becoming aware that he can
transcend national, geographical, and lan-
guage boundaries. But he also becomes sen-
sitive to the bond that creates an 'imagined'
boundary, bringing the global Muslim com-
munity closer together. Finally, the transna-
tional linkages reaffirm the Tablighi's convic-
tion of the legitimacy of his dacwa.  ◆
Wo r ksho p  Anno unc eme nt
The Application of Islamic Law 
in Muslim Courts
Historical studies of the administration of jus-
tice and accounts of the actual practice of the
courts are also lacking. The time has come for
serious study of the application of Islamic law
in Muslim courts.
It is for this reason that the ISIM and Cornell
University are co-organizing a workshop on
'The Application of Islamic Law in Muslim
Courts', to take place in October 2001. The
workshop is to be convened by Muhammad
Khalid Masud and David S. Powers.
Call for papers
The papers are expected to focus on select-
ed court judgements. Although the workshop
is not limited to any one particular country or
period, the more readily available judge-
ments mostly belong to the modern period.
Nonetheless, papers dealing with court judg-
ments in the pre-modern period are also wel-
come. Papers should briefly describe the
background (namely the case, the parties in-
volved, the qadi, his training and appoint-
ment) and the application of Islamic law with
Students of Islamic law sometimes observe that Islamic
law is not law in the proper sense. This observation pri-
marily refers to the distinction between 'jurists law'
and 'judge-made law', the latter being the only proper
law. The observation also reflects that our knowledge
of Islamic law is derived more from studying the fiqh
texts on legal doctrine than from the actual workings
of the qadi courts. One may wish to research the actual
qadi judgments, but will quickly notice that few critical
studies of these judgments are available.
reference to actual judgements and cases.
Some of the questions and themes are out-
lined below, but contributors are free to de-
velop their own approach to dealing with
these issues.
The papers should be approximately 30
pages in length (9000 words), including
notes. Where possible, each essay should pre-
sent a translation of a relevant and exemplary
document or documents (e.g. court judg-
ment, appointment of a qadi, text of a con-
tract).
Themes and questions
The following is a suggested list of themes,
the treatment of details being left to the au-
thors. Although the list is open to discussion,
actual court documents must be used in dis-
cussing the chosen theme.
The themes are as follows:
– Qada: What are the nature, authority
and the jurisdiction of a qadi? How
does his training and affiliation to a
madhhab influence his judgement?
What is his relationship to the state?
How is he appointed? What is the
nature of his relationship with other
legal authorities like the muhtasib? 
– Procedural Law: What constitutes
proof? What are the court
procedures? Is there a distinction in
procedure with reference to different
cases (e.g. criminal, obligation,
inheritance, etc.)? What constitutes
evidence? Witnesses? Oath? Written
documents? Circumstantial evidence?
Medical findings? What are the
requirements relating to the
qualifications of witnesses? Is cross-
examination allowed? What
constitutes idhar and iqrar? Is the
court bound by a certain procedure?
– Composition of the courts: Is it a
single judge court or more than one
judge? Who are the judicial officers:
advisors, mushawars, muftis, Clerks,
police, executionists? Is there a
plurality of courts? Are there different
types of courts? How are they
distinguished? Is the distinction based
on jurisdiction, procedure, laws, or
persons? How are they related with
each other? 
– The court case: How does the
development of the litigation
(khusuma) take place? How the claim
is defined in the court? Is there a legal
representation of the litigant? What is
the process of summons? How and on
what basis the parties are defined as
claimant and defendant?
– Judgement (hukm): Is the judgement
written? Dictated to someone? How is it
preserved and delivered to the parties?
What are the form, contents and
structure of the qadi judgment? Does
the judgement explain the reasons for
the judgement? Does it mention any
sources? Are they scriptural texts, fiqh
texts, local customs? 
◆
Abstracts should be sent as soon as possible to the
ISIM, the final deadline being 20 January 2001, to
which a reply will be sent by the end of April. The full
papers of participants will be expected by 15
September 2001. The precise date (in October) and
venue (in The Netherlands) will be announced on the
ISIM website: www.isim.nl
Inquiries can be addressed to:
Prof. Dr M.K. Masud




Tel: +31-71-527 79 05
Fax: +31-71-527 79 06
E-mail: isim@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
Travellers in Faith includes 
the following chapters:
– The Growth and Development 
of the Tablighi Jamacat in India
Muhammad Khalid Masud
– Tablighi Jamacat and Women 
Barbara D. Metcalf
– Construction and Reconstruction of
the World in the Tablighi Ideology 
Mohammad Talib
– Ideology and Legitimacy
Muhammad Khalid Masud
– The Transformation of Tablighi
Jamacat into a Transnational
Movement
Marc Gaborieau
– Close Ties and New Boundaries:
Tablighi Jamacat in Britain and
Germany 
Elke Faust
– Sequences of a Quest: Tablighi
Jamacat in Morocco 
Mohamed Tozy
– Tablighi Jamacat in Belgium
Felice Dassetto
– Foi et Pratique: Tablighi Jamacat in
France 
Gilles Kepel
– Worlds 'Apart': The Tablighi Jamacat in
South Africa under Apartheid (1963-
1993)
Ebrahim Moosa
– A Movement or a Jamacat? Tablighi
Jamacat in Canada 
Shaheen H. Azmi
Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jamacat as
a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal
Editor: Muhammad Khalid Masud
Leiden: Brill, 2000
ISBN: 90-04-11622-2
Muhammad Khalid Masud is ISIM Academic Director.
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A t e l i e r
The ISIM atelier, 'Africa and Islam: moral discourses
on Islam and the construction of identities in local,
national and transnational perspectives', will take
place from February to May 2001. The focus will be
on the dynamic relationship between supposedly
global processes like Islamic resurgence, seemingly
uniform Islamic and Islamist discourses, and the con-
struction of local identities and transformations from
the perspectives of local groups and communities.
Africa and Islam: 
Moral Discourses and
Construction of Identities 
One of the challenges of this atelier, in
which researchers from the South and the
North will participate, is the possibility of
formulating a research proposal with re-
searchers from different African areas. Such
a proposal could further develop method-
ologies in an interdisciplinary perspective.
Emphasis is placed especially on analysing
texts in relation to contexts.
Resurgence of Islam
In the last decades, both the popular
media and academic works have focused on
the so-called resurgence of Islam. In these
discussions, emphasis has been on areas
that are traditionally associated with the
Middle East, including North Africa, while
large parts of the Islamic communities out-
side this area (e.g. Sub Saharan Africa) are
often ignored. In 'peripheral' regions, chal-
lenges posed to Islamic communities by
processes of modernity, modernization and
globalization in some cases differ from and
in others resemble processes taking place
elsewhere in the Islamic world. One such
issue is the Islamic resurgence also referred
to as fundamentalism, political Islam, or Is-
l a m i s m .
Islamist movements make use of 'moral
discourses' which prescribe the 'right' atti-
tudes, beliefs and conducts of Muslims.
Similarities in rhetoric within these dis-
courses which occur in different parts of the
Islamic world might suggest uniformity
both in the way they construct Islamic sub-
ject positions and in the meaning of Islam in
everyday life. Nevertheless, differences in
historical background have their bearing on
current political, social-economic and cul-
tural processes, and in turn influence the in-
teraction of local groups with these Islamic
d i s c o u r s e s .
When studying Islam in Africa, Orientalist
debates intersect with ideas related to
'Africanism'. The imagery related to Orien-
talism/Africanism results in diverse and pe-
culiar notions and presuppositions among
scholars about the ways in which Islam in
Africa has influenced local communities
and the formation of group identities.
T e x t u a l i t y
Related to the problem of Orientalism/-
Africanism is the implicit association of
Africa with oral traditions. Though the latter
are unmistakably of great importance for
the dissemination of all kinds of knowledge,
the existence of written traditions in various
Islamic societies and the centuries-long ex-
istence of Islamic Universities in Africa
should not be ignored.
Another assumption related to the ne-
glect of textuality is that syncretism of Islam
with local oral religions is seen as character-
istic of 'African Islam'. Moreover, this local
Islam, perceived by scholars as accepted
and practised by all members of certain Is-
lamic communities, is presented as homo-
geneous and static. Deconstruction of these
presuppositions is necessary in allowing for
greater understanding of simultaneously-
occurring globalizing and localizing ten-
dencies. Comparison of phenomena in spe-
cific contexts, and specific historical peri-
ods, is vital to understanding perceptions,
interpretations, and reflections on Islam by
diverse groups in African societies.
C o n f e r e n c e
During the 3 months of the atelier, two
scholars from the South will be invited for
more in-depth discussion, study, and analy-
sis. Towards the end of that period (April
2001) a conference will be held with the (yet
provisional) title: 'Standing on
heaven/pulled into hell: Islam, globaliza-
tion, and the construction of multiple iden-
tities'. The conference also takes as point of
reference the transformations occurring all
over Africa due to the processes of 'global-
ization' and 'modernization'. The main
question is to what extent Islam and Islamic
principles form part of processes of con-
structing identities of social groups in the
face of current political, economic, social
and cultural changes. How do different
groups relate to Islam? Can new social
groups be detected and how does Islamic
identity converge in these new configura-
tions? What other identities are of impor-
tance to understand the processes of iden-
tity constructions in Islamic societies and
communities? What are the similarities and
differences when comparing these process-
es of identity construction in different parts
of Africa, and in different eras? 
The outline of the conference is set, but as
the coordinators of the atelier want it to be
a conference with discussions on new
themes and current issues, they will leave
room for input from other colleagues, espe-
cially those working in Africa. The final pro-
gramme will therefore be formulated once
the major research topics of conference par-
ticipants have come to the fore.
Format of the atelier
The atelier is based on current research
conducted by José van Santen, coordinator
of the atelier, who has vast research experi-
ence in Islamic Northern Cameroon (since
l986); and Karin Willemse has conducted
fieldwork in Darfur, Sudan, since l985. Two
researchers from the South will be added as
soon as possible.
The main mode of exchanging ideas and
experiences will be the workshops, held
once every fortnight with members of the
atelier and other invited scholars. They will
be organized by contacting members of dif-
ferent networks both in the Netherlands
and abroad.  ◆
Those interested in participating in the regular
discussion may contact the ISIM or one of the
o r g a n i z e r s :
– José van Santen, Department of Cultural
Anthropology, University of Leiden 
E-mail: Santen@RULfsw.Leidenuniv.nl
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ISIM MPhil Programme in Islamic Studies
E D U C A T I O N  A N D  T R A I N I N G
The one-year ISIM MPhil programme in Islamic
Studies was inaugurated in November 1999. The
first group of ISIM MPhil students obtained their
degrees on Monday, 24 July 2000, with a gradua-
tion ceremony in the historic Academy Building in
Leiden. The ceremony was followed by a reception
at the Hortus Botanicus. The academic quality of
the MPhil students as well as their enthusiasm and
hard work greatly contributed to the success of
the programme in this first year. A group photo-
graph of the students and the titles of their theses
can be found on the ISIM website under the link
'Education and Training'.
Seven students, from Germany, Pakistan, Sudan,
Taiwan, the USA, and the Netherlands, were ad-
mitted to the MPhil programme in 2000-2001. Pro-
fessor Johan ter Haar (Department of Languages
and Cultures of the Islamic Middle East, Leiden
University) delivered the opening lecture on 'Re-
cent Developments in Iran: Progress in the Persian
Style'. This year, the programme consists of eight
courses and a thesis. A number of scholars from
abroad, including Professor Maribel Fierro (Conse-
jo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid),
Professor Abderrahmane Lakhsassi (Université
Mohamed V, Rabat), and Professor William Roff
(University of Edinburgh), will contribute to the
programme. The dates of their lectures will be an-
nounced on the ISIM website.
The MPhil prospectus for 2000-2001 and an appli -
cation form for next year can be found on the ISIM
website; a paper copy may be obtained from the
ISIM office. The deadline for applications for the
MPhil programme is January 1 of the calendar year
in which one wishes to begin the programme. ◆
ISIM PhD News
The first ISIM PhD students, Welmoet Boender and
Gerard van de Bruinhorst, started their research in
September 2000. Welmoet Boender's research pro-
ject is entitled 'The Role of the Imam in Turkish and
Moroccan Mosque Communities in the Netherlands
and Flanders', and is supervised by Professor Sjoerd
van Koningsveld (Faculty of Theology, Leiden Uni-
versity); Gerard van de Bruinhorst's project is enti-
tled 'Animal Slaughtering and Sacrifice in a Modern
Islamic Society: Textual Knowledge, Ritual Practice
and Collective Identity in Tanga (Tanzania)', and is
supervised by Professor Léon Buskens (Faculty of
Law, Utrecht University, and Department of Lan-
guages and Cultures of the Islamic Middle East, Lei-
den University).
PhD Students' Conference
The ISIM held a conference on 14 June 2000 for
PhD students at Dutch universities working in the
field of Islam and Muslim societies. The conference
was attended by 40 PhD students of the universities
participating in the ISIM, as well as the Erasmus Uni-
versity of Rotterdam, the Free University of Amster-
dam, and Tilburg University. The morning session in-
cluded lectures by Muhammad Khalid Masud on
'Islam or Muslim Societies? A Question for the Stu-
dents of Islam in the Modern World', by Sami Zubai -
da on 'The Idioms of Democracy and Civil Society in
Modern Islamic Discourses', and by Professor Martin
van Bruinessen on 'Ulama and Muslim Intellectuals'.
Four PhD students presented papers on their re-
search in the afternoon session: Karin Willemse on
'One Foot in Heaven: Gender, Islam, and the Con-
struction of Multiple Identities in Darfur, West
Sudan', Paul Schrijver on 'Governmental Policies to-
wards Islamic Education in Sudan', Clementine van
Eck on 'Honour and Honour Crimes among Turkish
People in the Netherlands', and Oussama Cherribi
on 'Moroccan Imams in Amsterdam'.
This one-day conference for PhD students will
take place twice per year. It aims to promote com-
munication and the exchange of ideas among
Dutch-based researchers. If you wish to be kept in-
formed of the PhD students' conferences, please
contact Nathal Dessing (dessing@rullet.leide-
nuniv.nl) at the ISIM.
Key Issues in Human Rights: 
Master Class by 
Professor Abdellahi An-Naim
Professor Abdellahi An-Naim is the principal lec-
turer and convenor of a master class for PhD stu-
dents on 'Key Issues in Human Rights'. The course
will take place in Leiden from 27-30 November 2000.
It will cover the concept of human rights and their
universality and cultural/contextual relativity. Fur-
thermore, it will offer an overview of the main
treaties, their implementation, and the role of non-
governmental organizations, with special reference
to Islamic societies. (See for the announcement of
the masterclass p. 2).
The ISIM invites PhD students who wish to partic-
ipate in the master class to send a brief curriculum
vitae and an explanation of why they wish to at-
tend to Nathal Dessing (dessing@rullet.leide-
nuniv.nl) at the ISIM by 1 November 2000. The fee
for the master class is NLG 750.- Fee waivers may be
granted in certain cases.  ◆
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M o d e r n i t y
H A K A N  Y AV U Z
One of the defining conflicts of modern Turkish life is
the great tension between society and the state. This
tension has been articulated in terms of the conflict
between Islamic social movements and the state ide-
ology, Kemalism. Alberto Melucci argues that social
movements constitute an active resistance that
seeks to free everyday life from colonization by cen-
tral government so that individuals may realize their
unique potential and assert their collective identity.1
This aptly describes the Nurcu movement, an Islamic
faith movement based on the writings of Said Nursi
(1876-1960). Nursi suffered persecution at the hands
of the Kemalist elite and was eventually exiled. Even
his dead body posed a 'security threat'. After his
death, his body was exhumed by military coup lead-
ers in 1960 and reburied at an unknown location.
Being Modern in
the Nurcu Way
Why did Said Nursi and his followers repre-
sent a threat to the Kemalist State? What are
the major characteristics of the Nurcu move-
ment? How has the Nurcu movement re-
mained the most powerful faith movement
in Turkey? The following seeks to answer
these questions.
A challenge to Kemalism
In order to understand the perceived
threat of Nursi to the state, it must be under-
stood that in Turkey, Kemalism is as powerful
as Islam; it is Turkey's official ideology, func-
tioning as a state religion. Therefore, a move-
ment that strengthens Islamic identity is a
challenge to state ideology. Said Nursi,
founder of the Nurcu movement, stressed
the significance of reading and writing. His
works, known as the Risale-i Nur Kulliyati ( T h e
Epistles of Light), were believed by him and
his followers to be bestowed by God and
were thus considered semi-sacred. The writ-
ings of Nursi have three interrelated goals: to
raise the consciousness of Muslims; to refute
the dominant intellectual discourses of ma-
terialism and positivism; and to recover col-
lective memory by revising the shared gram-
mar of society, Islam. Responding to the pen-
etrating impact of positivism in the Ottoman
educational system and the total collapse of
the Islamic educational system, Nursi tried to
demonstrate the compatibility of science
and religion, freedom and faith, modernity
and tradition. He updated the idioms of Islam
in terms of the dominant universal discours-
es of science, human rights, and the rule of
law. In sum, the Risale-i Nur constitutes an al-
ternative basis upon which Muslims can
build their personality, and redraw the
boundary between the state and society.
The writings of Said Nursi
There is no clearly articulated political de-
sign in the writings of Said Nursi; the purpose
is rather to protect Islam from the fanaticism
of traditionalist religiosity, and modern
knowledge from unbelief. His writings con-
stantly try to build a Muslim personality that
is pious and modern; tolerant but firm about
the core virtues of Islam. Nursi's books were
his refuge and have become the avenue to
fulfilment for soul-searching Turks. Mehmet
Kırkıncı, a prominent second generation
Nurcu, has referred to Said Nursi's works as
the 'light' which helps to overcome the dark-
ness of Anatolia. Nursi's books are the 'home'
in which many Muslims find their self-identi-
ty. As Kırkıncı claims, 'I free my loneliness
through these books. I examine myself and
my history within and between the lines of
Risale-i Nur. '2 In a way, these books have be-
come the architects of the Anatolian Mus-
lims' heart and soul.
According to his writings, there are three
ways of acquiring Islamic knowledge: the
Qur'an, the Prophet, and the universe which
he usually refers to as the 'Grand Book of Uni-
verse'. He used the laws of nature to explain
the power of a creator. By replacing the text
with ulema (or sheikh), Nursi tried to respond
to the fragmentation of religious authority in
Islam. In response to the prevailing tendency
toward scepticism and the discursive shift
from a religious to a secular worldview, Nursi
attempted to develop a new conceptual ter-
minology that would bring religion and sci-
ence together. According to John Voll, Nursi
tried 'to see connections between science
and religion', rather than refuting the laws of
science. Nursi stressed the multi-layered
meanings of the Qur'an and taught that na-
ture had no meaning in itself but rather signi-
f i e d mana-yı harfi, the existence of order and
the presence of God. He always supported
freedom of speech and considered it the nec-
essary framework for genuine faith. He tried
to protect secular education from unbelief
and religious education from fanaticism by
reconciling faith and science.
Although Said Nursi was reacting to an
originally European materialist philosophy
and atheism, he was very careful not to reject
Europe i nt o t o. He differentiated between the
good and bad institutions and practices of
Western civilization. Nursi expected to trans-
form society by raising Muslim conscious-
ness. He had always felt himself in g u r b e t ( e s-
trangement) and explained how he over-
came this sense of isolation through dynam-
ic belief, trust, and patience. Belief, for Nursi,
was the guide that shapes the individual life.
His struggle in life offers a powerful model for
other Muslims to follow in overcoming lone-
liness and alienation by becoming conscious
of God.
Nursi, as a native Kurd and pan-Islamist,
witnessed the collapse of the multicultural
Ottoman Empire, the formation of the Kemal-
ist republic, and a decade-long experiment
of democracy. A discussion of Said Nursi is, in
effect, a discussion of the modern history of
Turkish society. Nursi embodied the varying
strategies – whether engagement, withdraw-
al or opposition – employed by an Islamic
movement in response to oppressive Kemal-
ist policies that sought to wipe out the col-
lective memory of Anatolian Muslims. Nursi,
by abridging a shared Sufi tradition and con-
temporizing Islamic concepts for the Anato-
lian Muslims, sought not only to preserve but
also to update Turkish memory in new public
s p a c e s .
Nursi's teachings have helped to create a
neo-Sufism in Turkey. His books have freed
Islamic knowledge from the hegemony of
the ulema and have thus democratized this
knowledge. He popularized science by re-
framing it within Islamic idioms. Nursi repre-
sents the seismic shift from the t e k k e ( S u f i
lodge) to text, and from oral Islam to print
Islam. Although his ideas evolved within
N a kşibendi and Kadiri Sufi t e k k e s, his thought
transcended the traditional framework of
questions and answers. His writings reach
the most dynamic and refined level of Anato-
lian and Ottoman Sufi Islam. Most of Said
Nursi's teachers belonged to the Khalidi
N a kşibendi order, but he also read the writ-
ings of Abdul Kadir Geylani, the founder of
the Kadiri order. He was heavily influenced
by the writings of Nakşibendi leaders, such as
Ahmed Sirhindi of India and Ahmed Ziyaed-
din Gümüş h a n e l i .
After identifying the enemies of Islam as ig-
norance, fragmentation, and poverty, Nursi
presented education, hard work, and con-
sensus as a solution. Nursi's Islam is personal
Islam. Even his understanding of sharia r e-
flected this personal commitment. In I s a r a t -
ül Icaz, Nursi defines sharia as way of deter-
mining right from wrong, good from bad,
and licit from illicit through consciousness
rather than force. In other words, a just soci-
ety is not built by force, but by righteous men
and women.
D e r s h a n e s: sites of Islamic
modernities 
The Nurcu movement represents a dynam-
ic conceptualization of the interaction be-
tween modernity and religion. The move-
ment can be considered modern in that it es-
pouses a worldview centred around the self-
reflective and politically active individual's
ability to realize personal goals while adher-
ing to a collective identity. It seeks to shape
local networks and institutions in relation to
the global discourses of democracy, human
rights, and the market economy. In this
sense, we may say that Nursi is the founder of
modern religious discourse in Turkey. The
Nurcu movement has responded effectively
to the search for identity that has been a
salient characteristic of Turkish politics since
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Through
religiously rooted and socially shaped net-
works, the Nurcus (participants of the Nurcu
movement) have sought to establish a sense
of community within a laic state. The Nurcu
reading circles, or d e r s h a n e s, have become
the institutions that integrate the individual
into society and polity. They can be analysed
as textual communities formed around
Nursi's Risale-i Nur K u l l i y a t i .3
The word d e r s h a n e in modern Turkish can
refer to a special apartment floor or a one-
floor building and a congregation of people
who meet there to read and discuss the writ-
ings of Nursi. This process of discussion is
called s o h b e t (conversation) and generally
takes place after work or on Friday evenings.
Although almost all conversations start with
the writings of Nursi, they take different di-
rections and most likely end with political or
business exchanges. The Risale-i Nur b e-
comes a basis for conversation and provides
a shared vocabulary to discuss socio-political
events in and outside Turkey. Conversation is
an important aspect of Turkish socio-political
culture, and the d e r s h a n e s are central to
Nurcu identity as they facilitate the forma-
tion of close relationships among followers,
who form bonds of trust and civility. As infor-
mal networks of people, ideas and capital,
d e r s h a n e s help to institutionalize a pattern of
conduct in society.
Before the 1983 economic liberalization in-
stituted by Turgut Özal, Nurcus met in pri-
vate homes. With the help of newly accumu-
lated capital, the Nurcus began to buy sepa-
rate buildings where they could assemble
and discuss social issues from the perspec-
tive of the Risale-i Nur. These d e r s h a n e s led to
the emergence of a new Nurcu elite and gave
greater visibility to the new Anatolian bour-
g e o i s i e .
Continued on page 14
Said Nursi 
in 1952.
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H e a l t h
C O R  H O FF E R
In search for Islamic healers, inquiries made at
mosques and Islamic organizations revealed a strik-
ing contradiction. In these places, it is generally said
that the activities of these healers have nothing to do
with Islam. Direct contact with Islamic healers
through healthcare workers, however, revealed that
they themselves are of the opinion that what they do
fits fully in the Islamic tradition. In actual practice,
the formal taboo on Islamic healing methods is often
ignored at the informal level.
Religious Healing
M e t h o d s
among Muslims in 
the Netherlands 
A division is often made between 'official
Islam' and 'popular belief' in Islamic societies.
It is understood that the term 'official Islam'
refers to the belief as propagated by the
ulama and imams in mosques – representing
the orthodoxy. On the other hand, 'popular
belief' consists of, ostensibly, pre-Islamic ele-
ments, local customs and traditions. In prac-
tice, the drawing of the boundary between
the two is problematic in that it depends on
the perceptions of those involved. In the
course of time, diverse theological arguments
have been put forward by the (Sunnite) or-
thodoxy to delineate the boundary between
Islam and popular belief. The fundamentally
monotheistic character of Islam is empha-
sized. Thus, practices such as fortune telling,
magical rituals and saint worship are labelled
pre-Islamic, bidca (unlawful innovation) and
shirk (idolatry). However, in the common reli-
gious perception of many Muslims, so-called
official Islam and popular belief go hand in
hand. For them, there is only one Islam, name-
ly the one that they themselves experience.
The theological argument used against, or
for, popular belief also has sociological and
ideological traits. The habit of orthodox
scholars of labelling practices of popular be-
lief as 'pre-Islamic' can thus be seen as a form
of marginalization and as an attempt to pro-
tect their own interests and positions. Those
who have limited or no access to the domi-
nant religious system may resort to alterna-
tive religious interpretations and beliefs.
Apart from reformist tendencies, practices of
popular belief are viable alternatives. Popular
belief can thus be a part of the struggle of in-
terests between different religious and politi -
cal groups.
The dichotomy between Islam and popular
belief is arbitrary and capricious. Whether or
not the division is made, and where the bor-
der is drawn, depends on religious (theologi-
cal) interpretations in combination with so-
cial and political factors. In practice, this im-
plies that Islam is given different forms in dif-
ferent societies under the influence of local,
social, political and economic factors. In the
course of the history of Islamic societies, cer-
tain variants of Islam have dominated over
others in conjunction with the power struc-
tures. Following Bax, it can be said that a
struggle exists between religious (sub-
)regimes that alternate power positions.2
Islamic Healing Methods in the
N e t h e r l a n d s
The relationship between Islam and popu-
lar belief in Islamic societies offers a vital
background for understanding the recent
emergence of Islamic healing in the Nether-
lands. The term 'Islamic healer' can be under-
stood here as one who bases his or her work
on power inspired by Islam (for example, an
inherited healing gift, which is said to go
back to the Prophet Mohammed); has an Is-
lamic vision with reference to the work of
healing; and describes himself or herself as a
healer either informally (via family and ac-
quaintances) or formally (via advertise-
ments). Islamic healers differ from regular
healthcare workers in their views on certain
illnesses and problems. They distinguish be-
tween illnesses with natural (physical or psy-
chological) causes and those with supernat-
ural causes (the evil eye, magic, or j i n n s) .
From the viewpoint of Islamic healers, peo-
ple consult a doctor for the former, an Islam-
ic healer for the latter. An important element
in the treatment by Islamic healers is the use
of Qur'anic verses which they believe to be-
stow b a r a k a, blessing power. They use these
verses for faith healings and the making of
amulets. Most Islamic healers are of the opin-
ion that they may not ask for money for their
work; they believe that Allah is ultimately the
One who heals – not the therapist.
Islam and popular belief in the
N e t h e r l a n d s
The ambivalent relationship between 'offi-
cial Islam' and 'popular belief' also manifests
itself among Muslims in the Netherlands. In
the absence of Islamic scholars, the imams, as
the religious officials in the mosques, propa-
gate the official doctrine here. In contrast, Is-
lamic healers can be considered exponents of
Islamic popular belief. However, despite their
official reticence, individual conversations
with 31 imams revealed that the majority
considers the techniques of Islamic healers
permissible – and some even applied these
techniques themselves. Although imams, as
representatives of official Islam, may not
openly associate themselves with practices of
popular belief, they apparently deviate from
this rule when practice necessitates. Thus, the
formal taboo on Islamic healing methods ap-
pears to be ignored at an informal level.
How can this apparent contradiction be ex-
plained? Apart from their personality and vi-
sion, the social position of imams in Dutch
society plays an important role. As a part of
the institutionalization of Islam in the
Netherlands, certain views and interests of
the Islamic orthodoxy from the countries of
origin are making their entrance. In conjunc-
tion with the formation of Islamic institutions
such as mosque councils, interest groups and
educational institutions, a Sunnite orthodox
elite is developing – an elite which is appro-
priating control over the Islamic inheritance.
A struggle between 'Islamic sub-regimes'
also presents itself in the Netherlands. Re-
cently, Dutch publications have been ap-
pearing (available in Islamic bookstores), in
which, in accordance with strict orthodox
views, the belief in the power of j i n n s a n d
saints, for example, is considered s h i r k ( i d o l a-
try). At the same time, the emphasis is placed
on the fundamentally monotheistic charac-
ter of Islam, which is expressed by the con-
cept of t a w h î d. 3
These developments imply that given the
official Islamic disapproval of the practices in
question, imams cannot permit themselves
to be openly associated with these practices
because of their religious and social posi-
tions. With regard to their appointments,
they are after all dependent upon either the
authorities in the countries of origin or on
local mosque councils. Imams, however, are
also involved in common practice in which
they are confronted with the unorthodox
views of believers, for example, through re-
quests to write amulets or to perform certain
rituals. Sometimes, they fulfil these requests
in an informal way. It can be argued that
imams personally experience that the theo-
logical/normative division between official
Islam and popular belief does not exist in the
common belief system of some Muslims in
the Netherlands.
Islamic healers in the Netherlands find
themselves in a completely different position
than that of the imams. Their thinking and
practices are determined through a combi-
nation of societal needs, individual motives,
social interests and religious interpretations.
Islamic healers meet specific needs of their
patients centred on the conferring of mean-
ing and offering help to persons who have
run into medical and social difficulty. In con-
trast to imams, who are the representatives
of official Islam, Islamic healers pay homage
to religious viewpoints that are related to
popular belief. There are two aspects to be
found in the ways in which they legitimize
their work: first, the power upon which they
base their work; second, an Islamic vision.
Three types of Islamic healers can be defined
with respect to the former: healers with an in-
herited gift (for example, as a descendant of
the Prophet Muhammed), healers with a
teacher (for example, as a member of a Sufi
order) and healers who have taught them-
selves. As to their visions, all healers refer to
passages from the Qur'an and the h a d î t h.
Most healers state that payments in return
for their treatments contradict the religious
basis of their work. They may, however, ac-
cept a 'reward' for their work, something that
occurs frequently.
Islamic healers consider their work to be in
harmony with Islam. For them, no division
exists between that which they do and Islam-
ic doctrine. It has been argued that, given the
absence of shrines of Muslim saints, popular
Islam will have difficulty taking root in the
Netherlands, since saint worship is one of the
main pillars of popular religious belief and
p r a c t i c e .4 However, another important pillar
of Islamic popular belief has been over-
looked: namely, the ideas and practices of Is-
lamic healers and their patients. Their activi-
ties are manifestations of the gradual devel-
opment of Islamic popular belief developing
in the Netherlands.  ◆
N o t e s
1 . It is difficult to indicate how many Muslims in the
Netherlands use the services of Islamic healers. In
a number of studies, it has been concluded that
approximately 5% of the Turkish and Moroccan
population consults Islamic healers. There are
doubts as to the accuracy of this figure (not
everyone admits publicly to visiting an Islamic
healer and the belief in Islamic healing methods is
also dependent on the situations in which people
find themselves.) It can, however, be stated that a
minority of Muslims in the Netherlands uses these
services (Shadid & Van Koningsveld (1997),
Moslims in Nederland. Minderheden en religie in een
multiculturele samenleving. Houten/Diegem: Bohn
Stafleu Van Loghum, p. 198) 
2 . Bax, M. (1985), 'Religieuze regimes en
staatsontwikkeling: Notities voor een figuratie-
benadering', Sociologisch Tijdschrift 12 (1), 
pp. 22-47.
3 . See, for example, translations of works by M.
Ashour (1986) and I. Hoesien (1998), the latter 
was published by the El Tawheed foundation.
4 . Tennekes (1991), 'Een antropologische visie op de
islam in Nederland'. Migrantenstudies 7(4), 
pp. 18-19; and Nico Landman (1992), Van mat tot
minaret. De institutionalisering van de islam in
N e d e r l a n d . Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, pp. 190-191;
1992b, pp. 34-39.
Cor Hoffer is a post-doctoral researcher at the 
Centre for Ethics of the University of Nijmegen




m e a s l e s .
Amulet 
against the 
evil eye or j i n n s.
In the period from 1990-1994, Cor Hoffer conducted research
regarding Islamic healing methods in the Netherlands on as-
signment from the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports.
The study was primarily oriented towards aspects of Islamic
healing methods that are of importance to healthcare policy.
The findings of the research were published in the book: I s l a m i c
Healers and Their Patients: Healthcare, Religion and Giving Mean-
i n g , Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1994 (in Dutch).
With the financial support of the Netherlands Organization
for Scientific Research, Hoffer successfully defended his PhD
thesis at Leiden University in February of this year: Popular Belief
and Religious Healing Methods among Muslims in the Netherlands:
A Historical-Sociological Analysis of Religious-Medical Thinking
and Actions. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis, 2000. (in Dutch with a
summary in English.) On the basis of interviews and observa-
tions, he collected data regarding 39 Islamic healers (34 men
and 5 women) and 65 of their patients. In addition, he conduct-
ed a written questionnaire among 227 patients.1
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1 . Parts of this article are adapted from an earlier
work by the author: 'Images of Village Women in
Turkey: Models and Anomalies', pp. 199-223, in:
Zehra F. Arat (ed.) (1998), Deconstructing Images of
'The Turkish Woman', New York: St. Martin's Press.
2 . The author's research in two agricultural villages in
the Kayseri province began in January 1986, when
the late Paul Stirling, British anthropologist, hired
her as his research assistant to continue his
longitudinal study of the villages since 1949. The
author's native language, Turkish, facilitated her
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N C I R L I OĞ L U
A large body of literature on gender relations in rural
transformation points out women's disadvantaged
position in market production and in the mechaniza-
tion process of agriculture, more specifically in capi-
talist transformation. Feminist literature concerning
the concept of patriarchy is similarly extensive and fo-
cuses, amongst other issues, on the emergence of Se-
mitic monotheisms stemming from Abraham (namely
Judaism, Christianity and Islam), in which women's
status rapidly declined. In both groups of literature,
ethnographic descriptions run the risk of particulariz-
ing asymmetrical and exploitative gender relations in
the studied communities, while in the case of Anatolia,
for example, there is nothing particularly rural, Turk-




A n o m a l i e s 1
'Reality' is infinitely complex and full of con-
tradictions. Models, whether they be de-
scriptive or causal, are simplifications of that
reality at different levels of abstraction, for
different purposes, and to be used in differ-
ent contexts. Models are meant to be effi-
ciently expressive, straightforward, decid-
edly 'parsimonious,' and consistent repre-
sentations of reality. In some ways, writing,
including ethnographic writing, is like
model production, as it is a selective process
of simplification. The trouble, of course, is to
account for the anomalies that are left out
of our clear-cut models, yet are well and
alive in 'reality'.
The case of village women in Turkey is a
good example.2 There seem to be two pow-
erful models for 'village women'. Both make
sense in different contexts; both leave out
important elements of 'reality', and both
may be (and are) used (and abused) for dif-
ferent purposes. One model portrays 'the vil-
lage woman' as insightful, wise, powerful,
and confident; the other as overworked, un-
dervalued, ignorant, and submissive. The
view of women as powerful stems from Ke-
malism, which focuses on village women's
participation in the labour force since the
Ottoman period when upper class urban
women were confined to the 'private do-
main'. The view of village women as down-
trodden is probably more common, not only
in the media but also in social science litera-
ture. It is interesting to note that the same
themes are used in the construction of both
images, albeit with different implications
and consequences: gendered division of
labour, illiteracy, separation of public-pri-
vate domains, and Islam.
The two Kayseri villages where research
was conducted for this study provide ample
ethnographic evidence against both of
these models. Although division of labour by
gender defines what men and women are
culturally expected to do, it is by no means
rigid. Depending on the household compo-
sition, men and women may do each other's
work, and villagers understand that the con-
ditions override the norms. Moreover, the
norms do not yield clear-cut explanatory
models. Both men and women are involved
in farm work, as long as they have rights over
land, and the so-called public-private di-
chotomization does not explain the gender
division of labour in the village. Other di-
chotomizations such as 'production versus
reproduction' or 'paid versus unpaid' work
for market exchange and subsistence, re-
spectively, are not applicable to the situa-
tion either. It is perfectly acceptable for both
men and women to be involved in paid
work, and in the case of some households,
carpet weaving, which is predominantly
women's work, is the only source of income,
making women the only bread-winners
while men are involved in unpaid work in
subsistence agriculture. Furthermore, long-
term fieldwork has suggested that village
women's work is not undervalued, contrary
to arguments in the literature.
Illiteracy, used synonymously with igno-
rance, is usually considered as a major de-
pravity in most social science literature,
which holds that it incarcerates women into
submission. Education, then, is seen as a
consciousness-raising, liberating force. Simi-
larly, Islam is associated, whether it be im-
plicit or explicit, with the 'backward' and 'tra-
ditional' image of village women, while it is
implied that their urban sisters have sur-
passed those 'primitive' stages. Underdevel-
opment in Muslim societies, women's subor-
dinate position, their covering and restricted
formal education, are portrayed as functions
of Islam. The irony is that, while the early Re-
publican images of 'powerful village women'
were linked with isolation from Islamic influ-
ence, those of 'subordinate village women'
are associated with the persistence of Islam-
ic influence in villages. It does not take long-
term ethnographic fieldwork, however, to
realize that there is more to both education
and status than basic literacy and schooling.
Likewise, what passes as Islam is highly di-
verse and negotiable, very much dependent
on the bargaining power of those involved.
Numerous ethnographic accounts that
focus on the relative power of 'the village
woman' through division of labour and spa-
tial segregation further her ambiguous
image. Her informal power in the 'domestic
sphere' and control over the household in-
come are seen as evidence of her access to
significant power resources. Her au-
tonomous social organization outside of her
husband's network is seen as countering the
image of powerless village women.
The problem with these representations is
their selective use of ethnographic evidence.
Because the images created in these models
present consistent patterns, they, at the
same time, create anomalies, namely every-
thing that remains outside the patterns. The
exceptional cases, however, would not be la-
belled anomalous if there were no models
that defined the norm. In other words, if sta-
tistically infrequent cases are excluded from
our models, those models will not represent
a reality that is able to accommodate the so-
called anomalies.
Unfortunately, these models of village
women in Turkey, whether they portray
powerless, helpless, subordinate images of
women or emphasize 'women's power', are
equally detrimental and disregard inequali-
ties. They not only misrepresent village
women in Turkey, but are also politically
damaging. Neither ignoring nor dwelling
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S c i e n c e
M U Z AF F A R  I Q B A L
The Center for Islam & Science (CIS) is dedicated to a
creative exploration of the Islamic view of science
and to a renewal of links with the intellectual tradi-
tion of Islam. The CIS supports research and activities
aimed at enhancing our Islamic and scientific under-
standing of nature and the human condition. Recog-
nizing an underlying unity in all domains of knowl-
edge, the CIS does not construe 'Islam' and 'science'
as two unrelated entities that need to be artificially
linked through an external methodology. This funda-
mental unity stems from t a w h i d (unicity of God), the
foundation of Islamic epistemology. The CIS, there-
fore, recognizes, honours and builds its vision and
strategy on this unifying principle. Accordingly, it
considers the physical world (the subject matter of
natural sciences) a part of the hierarchy of beings
which must be studied in relation to other parts as




The Center takes the religious, cultural and
historical matrix in which science operates
as a fundamental component of scientific
inquiry and hence an integral part of its op-
erative methodology. Lying outside the do-
main of experimental science, these deeply
rooted theoretical constructions inform all
branches of contemporary science – from
cosmology to genetics and from neuro-
science to artificial intelligence. The Center,
therefore, pays special attention to these
epistemological underpinnings and ex-
plores the foundations of contemporary
science from an Islamic perspective in rela-
tion to these deeply imbedded precepts. In
particular, the Center is interested in exam-
ining the underlying principles of those
branches of contemporary science which
have direct bearing on our notions of the
cosmos and the human person.
CIS considers the reconstruction and re-
newal of the Islamic scientific tradition a
fundamental aspect of its mission. Taken as
a whole, this tradition provides the frame-
work for articulation of Islamic perspectives
on contemporary issues. The CIS, therefore,
endeavours to renew links with the tradi-
tional sources that once gave birth to and
nurtured the Islamic scientific tradition. The
Center considers the renaissance of the Is-
lamic tradition of learning as the key ele-
ment in this process of renewal, for it was
this tradition of learning that had given
birth to the Islamic scientific tradition.
Based on t a w h i d, this tradition of learning
takes God as the source and origin of all
branches of knowledge. The Center, there-
fore, carries out and supports activities that
use an integrated approach to learning
both the transmitted as well as the intellec-
tual sciences (culum al- caqliah wa culum al-
n a q l i a h) .
The Center serves as a catalyst for this
process of renewal through objective stud-
ies that focus on the broad matrix in which
the Islamic scientific tradition was born,
and through study projects that focus on
the relevance of this tradition to the con-
temporary issues dealing with the notions
of cosmos and human person. The Center
also considers articulation of Islamic per-
spectives on contemporary issues a part of
this process of renewal and hence it sup-
ports activities that seek to inform the gen-
eral public and engage academic commu-
nity in creative ways which explore con-
temporary science from Islamic perspec-
t i v e s .
CIS takes for its motto the Prophetic sup-
plication, 'O God, show me the nature of
things as they really are.' This prayer, which
reverberates throughout the history of the
Islamic intellectual tradition and which was
encapsulated by the 10t h/ 1 5t h century Per-
sian poet and scholar cAbd al-Rahman Jami
(d. 1492) in his Lawacih (Flashes of Light),
eloquently captures the raison d'être of the
Center for Islam & Science: 'O God, deliver
us from the preoccupation with worldly
vanities, and show us the nature of things
as they really are. Remove from our eyes the
veil of ignorance, and show us things as
they really are. Show us not the non-exis-
tence as existent, nor cast the veil of non-
existence over the beauty of existence.
Make this phenomenal world the mirror to
reflect the manifestation of Thy beauty, not
a veil to separate and repel us from Thee.
Cause these unreal phenomena of the Uni-
verse to be for us the source of knowledge
and insight, not the causes of ignorance
and blindness. Our alienation and sever-
ance from Thy beauty all proceed from our-
selves. Deliver us from ourselves, and ac-
cord to us intimate knowledge of Thee.'
Research and publications
The research and publication plan of the
Center grows out of its fundamental goals.
The Center envisions two distinct but com-
plementary series of publications.
The first, 'Islamic Perspectives on Contem-
porary Science', explores those fundamen-
tal contemporary scientific notions that
seek to redefine our understanding of the
nature and purpose of cosmic and human
existence. This involves, but is not limited
to, investigation of ideas, theories and con-
cepts, which have arisen through advance
scientific research in areas such as cosmolo-
gy, evolutionary biology, neuroscience and
genetics, from Islamic perspectives.
The second series, 'Studies in Islamic sci-
entific tradition', is designed to produce
contemporary editions of major works from
this tradition. These are not mere reproduc-
tions or translations; rather, the aim here is
to provide scholarly editions of these clas-
sics for a creative rebirth of the ambience in
which these works were produced in the
first place.
Bibliographic resources
The CIS is compiling bibliographic re-
sources to facilitate research on all aspects
of Islamic scientific tradition. These periodi-
cally updated web-based resources include
annotated bibliographies of major works,
book reviews, biographical studies and
databases designed to provide global ac-
cess to a wealth of literature that has hither-
to remained inaccessible. Interlinked sum-
maries, annotations and cross-references fa-
cilitate the use of these databases. Work is
also in progress on a source guide to the
available translations of the classical works
which deal with various aspects of Islam and
s c i e n c e .
Conferences / workshops
The CIS organizes and supports confer-
ences and workshops to promote academic
research and scholarship on various dimen-
sions of Islam and science. These confer-
ences and workshops are geared towards
the emergence of a fraternity of scholars
and scientists who are interested in the
goals of the Center and who wish to interact
and collaborate on various projects.
Branch offices
Envisioned in the strategic plan of the
Center is a network of branch offices in vari-
ous regions of the Muslim world. The objec-
tives of these branch offices are (i) to estab-
lish closer ties with various institutions and
scholars of that particular region and (ii) to
produce material suitable for local needs.
This will include translations of various CIS
publications, sponsorship of regional semi-
nars, and workshops and conferences.  ◆
Muzaffar Iqbal is the founder and president of Center
for Islam and Science (CIS) and Director for the
Muslim World for the Science and Religion Course
Program (SRCP) of the Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences (CTNS), Berkeley, USA.
E-mail: muzaffar@cis-ca.org
The Center for Theology and 
the Natural Sciences (CNTS)
mission of the Center for Theology
and the Natural Sciences (CTNS) is to
promote the creative mutual
interaction between contemporary
theology and the natural sciences.
The Center for Theology and the
Natural Sciences (CTNS) strives to
bridge these two disciplines. CTNS is a
non-profit international membership
organization dedicated to research,
teaching and public service. It focuses
primarily on the relation between
contemporary physics, cosmology,
technology, environmental studies,
evolutionary and molecular biology
and Christian theology and ethics. 
As an affiliate of the Graduate
Theological Union (GTU) in Berkeley,
California, CTNS offers courses at the
doctoral and seminary level in order
to bring future clergy and teachers to
greater awareness of this important
interdisciplinary work. 
Founded in 1981, the Center is
supported by grants and donations.
Members receive the quarterly
scholarly publication, the CTNS
Bulletin, the quarterly CTNS News,
and discounts on CTNS-sponsored
conferences and audio tapes.
Founder and Director: 
Dr Robert John Russell, CTNS 
Information: Center for Theology and
the Natural Sciences
2400 Ridge Road
Berkeley, California 94709-1002, USA
Tel: +1-510-848 81 52
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On the London subway a passenger recites verses
from the Quran. He does so in a low voice and smiles
as he recognizes the divine words of his faith. The
verses were reproduced in a book, entitled The Bible,
the Quran and Science, a pseudo-scientific work
claiming to examine the Holy Scriptures in the light
of modern knowledge. This book by the French con-
vert to Islam, Maurice Bucaille, is popular in Muslim
countries as well as among Muslims in Europe and
North America. It is commonly referred to and even
recommended by Muslims almost anywhere in the
world when discussing matters concerning Islam and
science. However, in most cases, the person recom-
mending it has not read the book him or herself. In-
stead, someone he/she trusts, at the local mosque or




The book by Maurice Bucaille belongs to that
apologetic genre of literature that attempts
to Islamize knowledge, science, technology
and education. In contemporary European
and North American Muslim environments,
more or less apologetic literature on the rela-
tionship between science, knowledge and
Islam is flooding the market. Literature and
pamphlets on the Islamization of these phe-
nomena are present in almost every Muslim
bookshop. In general, the literature is written
in English and the authors are primarily Mus-
lims from Europe, North America, Malaysia,
India and Pakistan. The fact that these discus-
sions are mainly carried out in English points
to it as the language of communication
among Muslims worldwide.
Since the 1960s, discussions of Islam and
science in the European and North American
contexts have been dominated by the Iran-
ian-American scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr,
the Malaysian academic Sayyid Muhammad
Naguib al-Attas (who claims he was the first
to introduce the concept of 'Islamization of
knowledge'), the American-Arab scholar Is-
mail Raji al-Faruqi (d. 1986), the British-Pak-
istani author Ziauddin Sardar, the Iraqi-Amer-
ican scholar Jabir al-Alwani and the Pakistani
Nobel Prize laureate Abdus Salam (d.1996).
Yet they represent a variety of ideological
and philosophical outlooks that have differ-
ent aims.
In the study of the many relationships be-
tween Islam and science and knowledge, it
can be suggested that we are witnessing an
evolving 'discourse'.1 That is, if discourse is
seen as a constantly changing practice that
redefines basic terms primarily concerned
with power relations, a number of presuppo-
sitions that constitute the foundation for a
new discourse on Islam and science and
knowledge can be found. Of course, there are
differences, but the common premises are
focused upon here.
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n
The participants in the discourse imagine
the contemporary world as fragmented. The
world needs to be put together in a system-
atized way, totality under the unity of 'Islam'.
Firmly rooted in an organic world picture, the
participants criticize science and social struc-
tures in Europe and North America and con-
trast them with an idealized 'Islam'. They be-
lieve there is nothing wrong with Islam, but
that the problem is that Muslims do not prac-
tice it. Islam is understood as an objective re-
ality. Through a correct interpretation of the
revelation (the Quran), human beings can
gain understanding of the true meaning of
the world. Hence, the work of interpreting
the Quran is seen as an ongoing activity.
The idea that existence has a meaning (a
teleological dimension) influences the partic-
ipants' view of history. They all turn to history
to find the true norms and values of Islam.
The idea is to return to the early history of
Islam and interpret it (allegorically) with the
'Muhammadan' society of Medina as the
norm. The aim is not to establish a copy of
the so-called Medina State, but to transfer
the conditions, the norms and values of the
state to the present time. The result is an
anachronistic projection of contemporary
conditions and problems onto history. In
their perspective, the conditions of post-
modernity are assimilated and internalized in
the framework of Islam. At the same time,
their contrasting views of how to interpret
the early history of Islam, as well as their in-
terpretation of Islamic terminology and its
Quranic grounding, reveal their differences.
In the practice of science, a Muslim scien-
tist should strive towards Islamization. The
stress on this obligation links the perfor-
mance of the individual to the greater jihad,
the endeavour of every Muslim in the service
of Islam. The participants use the principle of
i j t i h a d (reinterpretation) to the extent that
the discourse can be characterized as a strug-
gle concerning the meaning of Islamic terms.
All participants strive to appropriate the vo-
cabulary of the Quran and they all use a form
of realism in the philosophical sense of the
word. Words in the Quran are dealt with as if
they had an objective and eternal meaning.
The basic idea in using Islamic terminology is
to evoke 'Islamic' feelings, associations, and
memories, in order to make Muslims support
that particular form of Islamic science and
knowledge. At the same time, a scientific vo-
cabulary is appropriated and mixed up with
the Islamic terminology.
T r a d i t i o n
Most of the participants do not have a for-
mal religious education. Their loose connec-
tion to established scholarly traditions makes
room for relatively independent interpreta-
tions of the sacred sources. They also hold a
trump card by their ability to print and dis-
tribute their books through international
publishing houses or through their own or-
ganizations. In order to spread their mes-
sage, they all utilize the means of consumer
culture – a culture they paradoxically often
criticize. All of them share a fierce critique of
the traditionally educated religious scholars,
the u l a m a. Their attitude can be designated
as anti-clerical. The religious scholars are
stereotyped as a negative and reactionary
force within Muslim society.
Their conceptual innovations not only af-
fect Islamic but also scientific terminology.
The meaning attached to the term 'the West'
has a similar purpose. This stereotype is
strongly emphasized. The aim is to fabricate
a dichotomy between the culture (and sci-
ence) of Europe and North America and the
culture and science of Islam. Contemporary
science is seen as a 'technocratic wasteland',
a phenomenon that has nothing to offer hu-
manity but alienation and enslavement.2
That science is perceived as provisional, tem-
porary, questioned, re-examined and for-
warded by a multitude of methods and theo-
ries, all of which is regarded as weak and un-
stable. 'Science' is objectified in the sense
that a specific Islamic science means a divine-
ly ordered activity founded on a variety of in-
terpretations of the word t a w h i d (unity). Dis-
ciplines cannot, therefore, ideally contain a
set of different methods. There has to be one
method that can be utilized to arrive at defin-
itive answers. The 'single method of science'
is based on the Quran, and as a consequence
science that contradicts the word of God will
not be tolerated. However, the question of
determining which research goes against
Islam is not settled, i.e. judgements and
agreements on which research may be seen
as Islamic varies over time and space.
A l t e r n a t i v e s
The construction of an Islamic alternative
to modern science is characterized by an ar-
bitrary use of a variety of sources and an ap-
peal to the ideas of such disparate thinkers as
the American philosopher Paul Feyerabend
and the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb. Often,
a writer will back up his or her views by re-
stricting the references to other people who
share the same idea and belong to the same
ideological position. This is an important
strategy because it reveals the artificiality
and pseudoscientific character of the dis-
course as well as the nature of the basic
struggle to authoritatively define Islam.
O u t c o m e
These ideas constitute the basic core of the
project known as the Islamization of science
and knowledge. They constitute a founda-
tion for understanding modern science, and
they create a framework for comprehending
research on phenomena like DNA and post-
modernity. But what has come out of more
than 30 years of discussion on the establish-
ment of a specific Islamic science? In Muslim
countries, a number of Islamic universities
have been established. In most cases, 'Islam-
ic' signifies a university founded on a model
containing religious education, on the one
hand, and technology and the natural sci-
ences, on the other. In more repressive coun-
tries, an 'Islamic' social science seems to be
unwanted. In contrast, within the European
and North American contexts, one finds a
number of educational institutions focusing
on religious education, while attempting to
establish 'Islamic' social sciences.
On a more abstract and global level, the re-
sult of the discourse is a huge mass of litera-
ture. But the ideas put forth have little sub-
stance and the critique expressed concern-
ing the content of, for example, an 'Islamic
anthropology', offers little to distinguish it
from any other anthropology.3 It appears
that in the social sciences, but especially in
natural sciences, the Islamization process has
to do with ethical perspectives, the use and
abuse of research results, the role of the sci-
entist in society, choice of research area, etc.,
and not so much with research methods and
theories. Moreover, Western Creationists
have influenced the Muslim discourse to the
degree that some Muslim organizations have
more or less cooperated with Christians rep-
resenting a Creationist view. For example, in
Turkey one can find authors who claim to be
'Muslim Creationists'.
The discourse on the meaning of Islam in
relation to science and knowledge has also
created a group of free-floating intellectuals.
Muslims like Sardar, Nasr and representatives
of the International Institute for Islamic
thought (IIIT) belong to an international Mus-
lim jet-set going from conference to confer-
ence or government to government present-
ing their form of 'Islamic' science. Somewhat
humorously, they can be seen as prolific indi-
viduals parading on a global 'Islamic' catwalk
constructing a Muslim intellectual fashion of
the day. And it comes as no surprise that
Nasr, Sardar and the IIIT have all been to
Malaysia as advisors of some sort in the build
up of Malaysian Islamic institutions.
One of many conclusions regarding the
pursuit of these individuals and institutions
concerns their interpretations of Islam, espe-
cially how they produce and communicate
'Islam'. Their activities suggest that the idea
of a geographically located Muslim world, or
of a centre and periphery, becomes obsolete.
It is therefore better to regard the Muslim
world as one of practices, ideas and thought,
a discursive world constantly in flux, chang-
ing through interpretations and reinterpreta-
tions of Islam. In addition, in spite of the fact
that the discourse on the Islamization of sci-
ence and knowledge has not been successful
in terms of building clearly 'Islamic' educa-
tional institutions or research facilities, the
discourse has filtered down to the local level
and become internalized among Muslims all
over the world. Perhaps it is more important
that the discourse serves Muslims, like the
man on the subway, with a confirmation of
their religious identity than viable new edu-
cational institutions.  ◆
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What makes a web site 'Islamic'? Significant issues
emerge in answering this question and delineating
Muslim cyberspace, associated with identity, lan-
guage, patterns of behaviour, and the utilization of
textual and ideological sources. In addition, the
cyber Islamic environment may be shaped by the ap-
plication of 'Islamic' symbols, images, sound files,
and different conceptual approaches towards defin-
ing 'appropriate' Internet interfaces. These compo-
nents illustrate diversity with respect to interpreta-
tive, cultural, political, and linguistic concepts asso-
ciated with Muslim identities.
Interface Dialogues:and 
the Online F a t wā
The extent to which the Internet has an im-
pact on Islam in the modern world is difficult
to quantify, given the different global levels
of individual access and utilization, as use of
the web continues to expand. There is cur-
rently an assertion for position in cyberspace
both amongst parties seeking to establish
themselves as key resources and Internet
portals for Muslims. Research has sought to
interpret these initial phases in the evolution
and growth of Muslim cyberspace in order to
anticipate possible future developments in
the light of new technological interfaces be-
coming available.1 These include the integra-
tion of 'new' technology – such as ADSL, WAP
phones, and the MP3 sound format – in pro-
viding access to Islamic resources.1
Certain 'orthodox' proponents of Islam
benefit from promoting their worldviews via
the Internet, whilst others find that their in-
fluence is threatened. Increased Internet ac-
cess undoubtedly presents challenges in the
form of divergent concepts and interpreta-
tive approaches from outside of established
cultural-religious frameworks. This is not a
phenomenon exclusively associated with the
Internet, but combines with access to other
media (such as digital television) where
forms of censorship and control can be cir-
cumvented. The Internet – via web pages, e-
mail and chat rooms – is already providing a
forum for discussion on significant issues of
concern to contemporary Muslims, and a
platform through which ideas can be ex-
pressed and propagated. Although the Inter-
net has been dominated by the use of Eng-
lish-language materials (this article's focus),
other languages relating to Muslim interests
are now present on the web. For example, in
relation to Arabic speakers, HTML composi-
tion tools in Arabic have slowly improved.3 I n
the Middle East, the use of personal comput-
ers has increased, and Internet Service
Providers have opened up lucrative new Ara-
bic-speaking markets – incorporating 'reli-
gious' web page content as part of their on-
line services.
Groups that may be defined as being out-
side 'mainstream' orthodox Islam are also
making use of the Internet, ranging from the
'homosexual Muslim' activists, 'Queer Jihad',
to various political Muslim platforms and di-
verse popular religious expressions. Whether
intended for a mass audience or a specific in-
terest group, cyber Islamic environments are
influenced by unique technical, aesthetic
and content-related factors associated with
Muslim identity. Some sites may be created
as a resource for daily access to news and
comment, and be associated with ideological
political-religious platforms: for example, the
Taliban in Afghanistan and Jamaat-i-Islami
Pakistan provide regularly updated sites.
Governments are utilizing the Internet in
propagating their own approaches towards
Islam for domestic and international audi-
ences (including the governments of Iran,
Pakistan, and Malaysia). Several web sites
promote their interpretations of 'Islam' and
their translation of the Qur'an as definitive,
linked to specific searchable Qur'an re-
sources that reinforce their specific world-
views. A variety of perspectives compete on-
line to be the authoritative resource for
'Islam' as a whole, a phenomenon that links
the Internet with other historical and con-
temporary trends relating to Islam within
academic, political and/or religious dis-
course. These web sites may be presented as
representative of 'Islam' as a whole, a phe-
nomenon that links the Internet with other
historical and contemporary trends relating
to Islam within academic, political and/or re-
ligious discourse.
The online information
m a r k e t p l a c e
The substantial financial investment in the
Internet by various Islamic organizations and
platforms represents their attempts to secure
online ideological advantages, and indicates
a jostling for position in the information
'market place', although theoretically an indi-
vidual's homepage on Islam can carry the
same weight and interest to a 'neutral' surfer.
This is particularly apparent when approach-
ing issues relating to decision making and in-
terpretation of Islam, and the 'qualifications'
(if any, and if relevant) of those providing on-
line advice to Muslims and others. It may be
difficult to determine the credentials of an
online Islamic 'authority', and this introduces
a significant contemporary issue for Islam.
Within a Sunni context, in particular, it can
present concerns associated with the formu-
lation of f at āwā (sing. f at āwā) or legal opin-
ions produced by religious scholars and au-
thorities. In various Shia contexts, authorities
are strategically investing time and resources
to present their own online conceptual ap-
proaches towards interpretation to a global
a u d i e n c e .
The extent to which a Muslim surfer will
apply or be directly influenced by the Islamic
knowledge acquired in cyberspace is difficult
to quantify. Advice on a key issue might be
solicited on different sites: this may be
through searching database archives of f at -
aw-a opinions, questions and answers – or by
e-mailing a site with a question. One advan-
tage for petitioners and the curious is that
the Internet c a n be anonymous. Issues which
could be considered dangerous or embar-
rassing within a domestic framework can be
presented to an 'authority' – locally, globally,
or indeed from a different cultural-religious
outlook. However, local knowledge is also
significant when decision-making processes
are considered.
Online f at -aw -a
Several Islamic web sites present a search-
able listing of f at -aw-a, and a key word search
should bring the surfer to the subject of in-
terest within the site. The influence of Saudi
Arabian scholars is evident on one of the
most technically proficient Islamic 'advice
sites': Fatwa-Online contained 479 f at āwā a t
the time of publication, with new content
being added to the site on a regular basis.
The site includes content obtained from at
least eighteen scholarly sources, from Ibn
Taymiyyah through to the f at āw ā of Shaykh
Ibn Baz and his former students – well con-
nected to the Saudi Arabian Permanent
Committee for Islamic Research and Fatawa.
The site is searchable, with an easy-to-navi-
gate interface containing ample user assis-
tance. All the materials are in English, and
there are no 'Islamic' images or Graphic
Image Files (GIFs) on the site – conforming to
some Muslim perspectives on 'images' as
well as accelerating its download time. Ac-
cording to the site's counter, it had received
over 30,000 hits from surfers between Octo-
ber 1999 and August 2000. Fatwa-Online's
current emphasis is on translating scholarly
opinion from Arabic resources. 
This indicates an enthusiastic audience for
online f at āwā, and that significant questions
are not answered satisfactorily off-line.
Amongst the guidance available is a promi-
nent selection of materials for 'New Muslims',
together with sections on women's issues,
marriage and worship. Recent topics include:
'Does a new Muslim have to separate from
his wife if she does not accept Islam?'; 'Is it
permissible for a Muslim to visit his Christian
neighbour when he falls ill?'; and 'Is it permis-
sible for a Muslim to offer hospitality to non-
Muslim companions by offering them alco-
holic drinks which Islam has made unlawful
for him?'. An e-mail list informs subscribers of
new topics to be found on the site.
The production of f at -aw -a is not the pre-
serve of Saudi scholars, however; although
their influence is pervasive on other Sunni
sites. Examples emerge from diverse global
contexts relating to forms of decision mak-
ing. Another f at -aw -a site prominent on search
engine listings is the As-Sunna Foundation of
America. This has a list of over twenty f at -aw -
a, drawn from Muslim Magazine, on subjects
ranging from fasting and mosque atten-
dance to more controversial topics, including
'Revealing Intimate Marital Details', 'He
smokes… is he right for me?' and 'My wife
was molested'.5 Some of the titles are linked
to associated sites, such as the Kalimat site
for Muslim women.6 There are hyperlinks
with over a hundred questions and answers,
based directly on questions sent in by e-mail.
These are useful indicators of contemporary
concerns, and present an overview of tradi-
tional topics: 'The Veil in Islam', 'About Ho-
mosexuality', and 'Assisted Suicide' indicate
the breadth of questions received and an-
swered by As-Sunna Foundation staff on
their regularly updated site.7
Whilst many Islamic sites are produced in
the United States, significant English-lan-
guage resources are also produced in other
Muslim minority contexts and provide other
shades of opinion. F at -aw-a in languages other
than English and Arabic can easily be located
on the Internet via search engines (in Farsi,
Malay, Turkish, Urdu, and Thai languages).
For example, within Iran, religious scholars
such as Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri are
asserting their opinions online, despite ef-
forts by the Islamic Republic's government to
suppress 'dissident' views.8 There are a num-
ber of sites containing f at -aw -a in Western Eu-
ropean languages other than English – with
original content, as well as translations.
New notions of community via
I n t e r n e t ?
The extent to which a web site's author's
location is actually relevant can be ques-
tioned, given the nature of globalization and
common concerns of Muslims in diverse con-
texts. Specific Muslim interest groups and in-
terpretative strands can dialogue and form
new notions of community via the Internet.
Traditional routes of authority can be tran-
scended, whilst surfers are also exposed to
forms of knowledge and Islamic understand-
ing beyond conventional boundaries. Those
living in environments hostile to their reli-
gious worldview may find comfort, advice
and inspiration through the content of web
pages. The influence of scholars, and others
giving advice based on Islamic principles, can
extend from their own (micro-)communities
and be placed before a global audience.
Analysis, observation and recording of devel-
opments such as the online f a tw-a in cyber Is-
lamic environments represents a significant
future research area in Islamic Studies.  ◆
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I n t e r n e t
S H A H R A M K H OS R A VI
While exile refers to a glamorous return to the 'real'
homeland, diaspora creates an alternative home-
land, an imagined one. Exile denies 'here' and
mourns for 'there'. Diaspora lessens the unbearable
nostalgia by constructing a community based on the
networks which link the dispersed. Exile emphasizes
a centralized relationship with the spatial homeland.
In diaspora, through the romantization of the
'promised land', emphasis is placed on a cobweb of
relations amongst the scattered. Diaspora suggests
deterritorialization, which does not mean geograph-
ical displacement – as it is for exile – but refers to the
collapse of a fixed link between identity, culture, ex-
istence and a single place. In other words, diaspora is
a deterritorialized World Wide Web.




Regarding diaspora from this perspective, it
is vital to look at how the Internet has re-
shaped the landscape of the Iranian diaspora,
its impact on the relationships within the
Iranian diaspora, as well as between the dias-
pora and the homeland.
The Internet offers more convenient, more
effective and cheaper ways of communica-
tion than any other medium. Moreover, this
relatively 'democratic' form of communica-
tion goes beyond political, religious, or eth-
nic borders. The Internet offers an opportuni-
ty for the creation of a transnational public
space/sphere. It is a social field for political,
commercial, and socio-cultural interactions,
stretching from Los Angeles to the Gulf
states, from Japan to Scandinavian countries,
from Sydney to Tehran.
The significant role of the Internet among
the Iranians should be seen in the socio-his-
torical context of the public sphere in Iran. In
a harsh political climate and under an intense
state control of mass media, the existence of
public spheres – in the Habermasian sense –
in Iran has been obscure and unattainable.
Nonetheless, Iranians, like other peoples, dis-
cuss matters and exchange information in
private meetings (parties), semi-private as-
semblies (for instance, during religious ritu-
als), or in public places such as coffee-houses
and mosques. These 'public spheres', or
rather 'public spaces', are dominated by Mus-
lim, middle-class, middle-aged men. Women,
youth, and other ethnic or religious groups
have, nonetheless, their own 'public spaces'.
As newcomers, Iranians in diaspora find
themselves outside the mainstream public
sphere of their host societies, despite the fact
that the cyber public sphere is – at least the-
oretically – accessible to everyone. Women,
non-Muslims, youth, non-Persian speaking
Iranians and even non-Iranians can partici-
pate in the cyber public sphere. Cyberspace
gives Iranians a chance to enter into and exit
from public discussion anonymously. It is a
virtual public sphere for Iranians, where they
can talk about political issues or taboo sub-
jects such as homosexuality
(www.homan.com) and pornography
(www.iransex.com) without the risk of perse-
cution. It also offers the only opportunity for
harshly split Iranian opposition groups to en-
counter one another. The Internet has, fur-
thermore, managed to bridge the gap be-
tween exiles and the Iranian state – an other-
wise impossible task. While exiles avoid any
'real' connection to the Iranian state, they can
enjoy 'virtual' access to Iran's official sites,
and vice versa.
Transfer of heritage
English, the chief language of the Internet,
makes this cyber public sphere accessible for
the young generation to open dialogue with
the first generation. In the conventional Iran-
ian media in diaspora, the second generation
is generally absent. This new media has be-
come a sphere wherein two generations of
Iranian emigrants face each other. They talk
about their lives, identities, past and future.
'How to be Iranian' is a ubiquitous issue for
debate. In the same manner, first generation
Iranians also see the Internet as a means to
connect with their children and to transfer
their cultural heritage to the next generation.
A case study
The number of Iranian sites and home-
pages online is inestimable and ranges any-
where from chauvinist to pornographic sites,
and from socio-political sites to personal
homepages. To gain more insight into the
role of the Internet in the changing landscape
of the Iranian diaspora, a quick brush-stroke
picture is given here of one of the Iranian
sites.
www.Iranian.com is one of the most serious
online magazines, created by Mr Javid in Sep-
tember 1995. Javid is a journalist in his late
thirties living outside Washington DC. The
site is updated daily with features, news on
Iran, poetry, fiction, photos, letters, and of
course various links to other Iranian sites. 'Di-
aspora' is a popular section in the magazine,
where contributors offer articles, fiction, or
poetry about their diasporic experiences. One
significant potential outcome of this site is an
increasing consciousness of the diaspora.
In the news section, there are links to more
than 150 other online Iranian media, both
from inside and outside Iran (31 radio, 8 TV, 50
magazines, 22 periodicals, 39 dailies). Nowa-
days, one's keyboard is one's café. Iran's
newspapers appear online several hours be-
fore they are available in print in news-stands
in Tehran. Through the Internet, one can ac-
cess Radio Payam, (Tehran's local radio) as
well as Radio Seday-e Iran (a 24-hour radio sta-
tion located in Los Angeles, whose broad-
casts cover only North America). Since a few
years ago, Radio Seday-e Iran has placed its
programme on the Internet. In Stockholm,
daily Iranian local radio stations download
programmes and rebroadcast them on air for
Iranians. Moreover, there is a collaboration
between Radio Seday-e Iran and the Persian
section of Radio Israel. While the latter broad-
casts a selection of programmes of the former
to Iran, Radio Seday-e Iran resends Persian
programmes of Radio Israel in North America
for the Iranian Jews living there. In this delo-
calized diasporic space, where is the home-
land?
The Internet is a more interactive media
than any other of its kind. The Internet offers
an opportunity for immediate feedback. On
www.Iranian.com, this is mostly apparent in
the section of 'Letters',which is updated daily
with a large number of comments and cri-
tiques on features, news, or other materials
published on the site. The letters are sent by
faithful Iranian readers from around the
world. The interaction is even more instanta-
neous in the 'Chat Room', where Iranians par-
ticipate in dialogue in English or Penglish
(Persian + English).
Furthermore, www.Iranian.com has con-
ducted an annual 'man-of-the-year' survey, in
which Iranians could vote to their favourite
candidate. Another interesting cyber-interac-
tion is what I call cyber-movement, a means
through which Iranians are mobilized to par-
ticipate in political activity. This could be to
protest against the Iranian state or to support
press freedom in Iran. For instance, the sec-
tion 'In the Name of Pen' was started to help
an imprisoned journalist in Tehran. Iranians
were asked to send e-mail protests to Presi-
dent Khatami's homepage. Fortunately,
thanks to all protests from the diaspora, the
journalist was freed and reunited with his
family in Germany.
'Nostalgia' and 'Pop-culture' are two photo-
sections included in this site. Here, the 'gold-
en age' of pre-revolutionary Iran is illustrated.
Present-day Iran is presented in the section
'Photo of the Day' through photos received
from readers or acquired from other sites. In
addition to pictures, a large map of Iran can
be brought up on the screen to reinforce the
national imagination of Iranians. To complete
the 'imagination' of homeland, current
weather information of any part of Iran is also
available.
Although the Internet is deterritorialized, it
seems that there is still a passion for locality.
The chat room is named 'Darya Kennar' (sea-
side), and refers to the coast along the Caspi-
an Sea, a very popular vacation resort in the
pre-revolutionary time. Another chat room
bears the name of a popular coffee house in
Tehran, 'Café Naderi', which has been a meet-
ing place for intellectuals and artists since the
1950s. In both cases, one can witness a nos-
talgic reference not only to specific places but
also to specific eras.
The section 'Abadan' is an apparent mani-
festation of this nostalgic gaze. Abadan was
an oil-refinery boomtown, located at the
Iran-Iraq border. The modern Abadan, al-
most a colonial town, was built by the British
after the Second World War. This beautiful
city was entirely destroyed during the Iran-
Iraq war (1980-1988). Mr Javid, himself an
Abadani, has dedicated a section of his site
to Abadan. In this section, former Abadanis
write their personal memories and 'historical
tales' of their hometown. Perhaps this feel-
ing is most transparent in the photo album
of the section. There, old pictures from pre-
revolution time as well as pictures of post-
war Abadan are displayed. There are pic-
tures of streets, squares, hotels and clubs,
but also photos of the Abadan football team,
a student group in the 1970s, and a 'typical
house'. Throughout the section the visitor is
struck by anguish and a nostalgic mourning
for a beloved city, which no longer exists,
but has gained a new virtual life.
Homeland in homepages
(Re-)production of the past is perhaps the
main axle of the diasporic project. Collective
history and culture are the cement which ties
diasporic communities to each other. Cyber-
space is used as a field to preserve this collec-
tive identity, not at least in the usage of sym-
bols. Not identifying themselves with the cur-
rent Iran – stigmatized by fundamentalism
and terrorism – Iranian sites attempt to
(re)construct a Persian profile by using to-
kens, symbols, and signs from the pre-Islamic
cultural heritage. The national anthem and
flag, art, history, and illustrations of land-
scapes are available online. This cyber-muse-
um, like the conventional national museums,
'objectifies' the Iranian culture and history,
making them 'immortal'. Thereby it creates an
'eternal authenticity', which in turn affirms
the durability of the diaspora.
Diaspora, like the Internet, has neither a be-
ginning nor an end. Nobody knows when an
exile turns into a diaspora or when a diaspora
becomes extinct. So is the Internet. Both con-
stitute a waved pattern of sites and links. The
nature of both is an ongoing process, always
becoming, always in between. There is no
final destination on the Internet. There are,
rather, always other links to journey along
and other sites to travel to. Likewise, in dias-
pora, homecoming is unrealizable. The Inter-
net and diaspora defer.
Paradoxically, homeland is the dilemma of
the diaspora. While the diasporic discourse is
grounded on the return to the homeland,
forging an imaginary homeland is the prima-
ry project of the diaspora. The Internet might
be a challenge to this dilemma. While 'return'
does not seem to be realized by Iranians in di-
aspora, 'virtual return' has become a reality
for many of them. Iranians have found a
homeland in the homepages.  ◆
I n t e r n e t
M U N A W A R  A .  A N E E S
The Internet, as a defining technology, is a powerful
information broker. Within its unique architecture, it
encompasses the entire spectrum of information,
communication, and knowledge. That the Internet
may be rightfully equated with the Industrial Revolu-
tion or the Gutenberg invention is a modest claim. In
the rapidly evolving 'virtual' world, Muslims have a
rather insignificant presence. Access to the Internet
remains a function of their disproportionate techni-
cal and economic capabilities. However, as the
transnational flow of free information gains momen-
tum, the Muslim world will be forced to bring down
technical, economic and political barriers to diffu-
sion of information.
Huruf: 
An Interactive Global Portal
Muslim presence on the Internet leaves
much to be desired. Whereas there is a num-
ber of active homepages devoted to Islam
and Muslims, there is hardly a site that de-
picts the Muslim world in the vastness of its
religious, cultural and social heritage. Not a
single one of the sites reflects upon the con-
temporary or the future trends of Islam.
Taking into account the intrinsic value of
the Internet and its inevitable future, a
major initiative towards the development of
a global Muslim presence on the Internet
has been proposed. The conceptual matrix
of this project is envisioned as the first un-
dertaking of its kind for the Muslim world.
Huruf, an Internet-based service,
jointly managed by Knowledge
Management Systems (KnowSys) and
ITLogic, offers a focal point for
informed opinion on the religious,
cultural, social, economic, and
political affairs of the Muslim world,
while encouraging open inter-
civilizational dialogue.
The policy of H u r u f is rooted in one of the
fundamental tenets of Islam: freedom of be-
lief and expression. In editorial matters, it
does not discriminate on the basis of creed
or colour. The portal exists to broaden par-
ticipation of both Muslim and non-Muslim
people according to the norms of civilized
discourse. Disputations are welcome where
no misrepresentation of facts is apparent or
implied. Any expression, whatever the form
may be, amounting to sacrilege, animosity
towards a particular race, ethnicity or gen-
der, ethnic stereotyping or pornography,
falls outside the domain of this portal.
H u r u f greatly emphasizes the importance
of an interactive forum. The Internet is ideal
for such an interactive milieu – as opposed
to a monologue. It is, therefore, proposed
that almost all editorial formats offered by
the portal have an express provision for on-
line user interaction. The portal will be of-
fered in, but not limited to, the following
f o r m a t s :
– Harf al-Awwal: a clearinghouse for the
fundamental sources of Islam available on
the Internet such as the Arabic text of the
Holy Qur'an and collections of a h a d i t h ;
their respective translations; books and
documents on tafsir, sira, fiqh, tarikh,
k a l a m and f a t a w a.
– Harf al-Lisan: an online language aid ser-
vice. It will provide access to learning re-
sources for the Arabic language in addi-
tion to the major Muslim languages such
as Turkish, Urdu, Farsi, Swahili, Bahasa In-
donesia, etc.
– Huruf: An Interactive Magazine: a monthly
online publication. Addressed to common
readers, it will carry a mix of well-re-
searched pieces on current affairs, analyti-
cal articles on topics of enduring interest,
media reviews, conference reports and
miscellaneous features. All contributions
to the publication will remain open to
user interaction, both online and offline.
There will be a print as well as a CD-ROM
v e r s i o n .
– Huruf Review: a quarterly publication
based on a wide variety of reviews of cur-
rently published books. There will be 10-
15 in-depth reviews made available for
online and print or CD-ROM versions.
– Huruf Abstracts: a monthly publication of
abstracts (200-250 words) of selected arti-
cles and other features.
– Huruf BiblioServe: a service responding to
subscribers' requests for both retrospec-
tive and current bibliographies.
– Huruf Alerts: designed as a current aware-
ness service for subscribers, it will be en-
tirely based on user profile and may in-
clude any assortment of articles from the
online publications, with the option of
using material from other sources.
– Huruf Meets: a periodic online conference
on topical issues sponsored by a group, an
academic institution, or a commercial en-
tity. Proceedings of these online confer-
ences will be available by subscription for
online, CD or print versions.
– Huruf Refs: a major referral service in do-
mains such as education, legal aid, health,
finance, and interpersonal relations. It will
serve the global Muslim community and
other users to enhance their networking
c a p a c i t i e s .
An International Editorial Advisory Board,
comprised of eminent Muslim and non-Mus-
lim writers and academicians, is now being
formulated by H u r u f. We expect this Board to
be a mark of distinguished scholarship. We
welcome and solicit suggestions and contri-
butions from all interested persons. ◆
Please address your communication to:
Dr Munawar A. Anees, Editor-in-Chief, Huruf
209 East Windsor Drive
Denton, TX 76209
U S A
Tel: +1-940-381 22 23
Fax: +1-602-532 71 48
Dr Munawar A. Anees is editor-in-chief of Huruf, USA.
E-mail: dranees@huruf.com
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The proliferation of dershanes coincided with
the fragmentation of the Nurcu movement
along class, gender, ethnic and regional lines.
The d e r s h a n e s, formed as textual-communi-
ties, create new public spaces which are able
to empower Turkish civil society. They have
played a crucial role in the evolution and plu-
ralization of Islamic movements in Turkey
and have also been instrumental in the for-
mation of a counter-elite in Turkey. It is sig-
nificant, for example, that dershanes h a v e
been used as dormitories for university stu-
dents. D e r s h a n e s, as urban networks of Sunni
Islam, do not separate religion from everyday
life; rather, they seek to shape everyday life
through Islamic idiom and practice. K ö p r ü,
the most serious journal devoted to the
Risale-i Nur, has a circulation of 5,000 – some
3,500 copies of which go to the d e r s h a n e s.
Print Islam and the emergence of commu-
nities around the text are very much an
urban phenomenon. Increased literacy, an
expanded market economy, and the prolifer-
ation of information technology have not
lead to the secularization of society, but have
rather facilitated the emergence of Islamic
movements. Due to greater access to avail-
able resources and the flexibility of Islamic
terminology, the Nurcu movement is rooted
in urban centres. Its main goal is not to return
to an Islamic past but to Islamicize the pre-
sent by reinterpreting the shared language
of Islam. Nursi helped to create and nurture
an oppositional and insurgent consciousness
within the limited public sphere under the
domination of the Kemalist state.
The strengthening of market forces in Turk-
ish society has turned the d e r s h a n e s into cen-
tres of economic as well as social activity.
People meet to discuss business issues and
disseminate new information to other mem-
bers. In other words, dershanes provide av-
enues for the realization of individual inter-
ests as well as the preservation of a collective
identity. D e r s h a n e s are connected to a specif-
ic group of people and represent religiously
shaped new public spaces that quickly be-
come integrated into the surrounding com-
munity. D e r s h a n e s help to create social ener-
gy – the willingness of human beings to act
from their ideals.
In Germany and Holland, I have visited sev-
eral d e r s h a n e s run by the community of
Fethullah Gülen.4 They fulfill multiple func-
tions and aim to attract Muslim university
students. They are successful among the
Turks and some Turkified Kurds. D e r s h a n e s i n
Europe function as kervan saray where Turks
may enjoy coffee and socialize. They have
the multiple function of disseminating infor-
mation, finding jobs, facilitating new friend-
ships, and allowing access to diverse social
networks. Personal trust and communal con-
trol are brought together. These d e r s h a n e s,
spread across Europe, help Nurcus locate
each other. In some d e r s h a n e s, maps can be
seen on which d e r s h a n e s in other European
cities are identified with green stickers. By
marking the map of Europe with d e r s h a n e s,
Nurcus start to see Europe as a familiar terri-
tory – even a second homeland. Being orga-
nized horizontally, not hierarchically, d e r-
s h a n e s stress solidarity, participation, and in-
tegrity. In a way, they help to build sustain-
able communities. These networks facilitate
coordination and amplify information about
the trustworthiness of other Nurcus.
Being Muslim in the Nurcu way
Being a Muslim in the 'Nurcu way' means
becoming a conscious Muslim in good deeds
and knowledgeable in science, culture, and
business. Recognizing that modernity does
not acknowledge God, the Nurcus want to
overcome this by calling Muslims to rational-
ize the Qur'an and take science seriously.
The Nurcus have been trying to institution-
alize new ethics and 'pious activism' through
a worldly asceticism. Religious salvation, for
Nursi, assumes contemplative action and
hard work. The Nurcu way reconciles reli-
gious contemplation and activism as mutual-
ly constitutive. Nursi defines Islam in terms of
tolerance, love and reason.
After Nursi's death in 1960, due to varying
regional, class, and ethnic identities, the Nur-
cus fragmented into several sub-communi-
ties with different interpretations and posi-
tions on political issues: ranging from a toler-
ant Fethullah Gülen (b.1938) to radical Acz-
mendi groups. Since 1983, the movement
has undergone a division along ethnic Turk-
ish and Kurdish lines. The Kurdish Nurcus
tend to treat Said Nursi as a Kurdish national-
ist, whereas the Turks stress his pan-Is-
lamism. Many Kurdish nationalists interpret
Nursi's exile and persecution as the example
of the persecution of the Kurdish identity.
However, the court cases show that his per-
secution was the result of his struggle to
renew Islam against the social engineering of
Kemalist reforms. Moreover, some Turkish
Nurcus, such as Yeni Asya of Mehmet Kutlular
and the Fethullah Gülen community, reimag-
ined the movement as a 'Turkish Islam' and
nationalized it. When a religious movement
seeks legitimacy in the eyes of laic state,
which either excludes religion from the state
structure or seeks to control it through inclu-
sion, the only method of gaining legitimacy
and support from the state is nationalism. In
other words, religious groups seek to main-
tain their relevance and legitimacy before
the state by stressing their contribution to
nationalism and national culture.
The Nurcu movement, with its 5 million fol-
lowers, is undergoing a transformation: a
process of ethnicization along Turkish and
Kurdish lines; seeing the European Union as
the hope for shaping a democratic Turkey;
and 'going global' through expanding their
networks and internalizing global discourses
of human rights. The modernity of the Nurcu
movement is also a testimony to the cata-
strophic success of the Kemalist project of
creating a European nation.  ◆
Continued from page 7: Being Modern in the Nurcu Way / by Hakan Yavuz
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C e m e t e r i e s
A H M E D  AN DR E W S  AN D
M I C H E L E  W O L F E
It is estimated that the UK is home to more than one
million Muslims from diverse geographical back-
grounds, but of which the cultures of the Indian sub-
continent are predominant.1 Sweden, on the other
hand, is home to an estimated 250,000 Muslims, the
largest groups of which are Bosnian, Turkish and
I r a n i a n .2 These observations take on greater impor-
tance when seen within the framework of the funda-
mental Islamic concept of the u m m a, the united
worldwide Muslim community, which perhaps super-
sedes any notion of nationality or ethnic identity.3 I t
is clear, however, that despite the apparently over-
whelming common attachment to the concept of
u m m a, Islam remains fragmented along both theo-
logical and cultural lines, affecting many aspects of
life – and even some aspects of death.4
Muslim Graves
in Sweden and 
the United Kingdom 
One thing that virtually all practising Mus-
lims in Europe fear is that they might be-
come absorbed into a secular culture. How-
ever, when living in diaspora, religious rites
often become all the more important. Rites,
including death-related ones, serve a vari-
ety of functions. For example, they inform
children of the collective customs from their
religious and cultural background, rather
than the sentiments of the host society.
Durkheim posits that when an individual
dies, the whole of his of her group is affect-
ed and that death upsets the social equilib-
rium, threatening the strength of communal
i d e n t i t y .5 Hence, rites ensure the perpetua-
tion of Islamic identity outside of the home-
land. Subsequently, the need to restore
equilibrium and reinforce communal identi-
ty arises. More often than not, grave mark-
ers are found at the place that marks the
burial of the community's deceased and can
be seen as emblematic symbols which are
imbued with the collective sentiments of
the community. They are reflective re-
minders of the reality of the community,
e r g o, encouraging the make-up and conti-
nuity of group consciousness. Furthermore,
grave markers, as well as recording the his-
tory of the community, demarcate an area
of sacred space – a piece of Muslim earth in
an often profane and alien land.
The following aims to draw attention to
some of these variations and to offer some
preliminary explanations for them, al-
though this material will eventually be lo-
cated within a wider discussion on graves as
statements of both individual and collective
identity. To illustrate these variations some
comparisons are drawn amongst three
cemeteries in the UK, which predominantly
come under local authority control and one
in Sweden, where cemeteries are, for the
most part, both public and owned and oper-
ated by the Church of Sweden.
Saffron Hill: Leicester (UK)
This cemetery is located on the south side
of Leicester and contains the city's only
Muslim burial site. It also boasts a purpose-
built janazgah (funeral mosque). The city's
Muslim community is predominantly Sunni,
originating from the Bulsar district of Gu-
jarat, India (approximately 16,000 people).
There is also a significant Sunni Pakistani
community (approx 4,000) and a
Bangladeshi community (approx 2,000). The
earliest burials appear to have taken place
in the 1970s. The burial area is characterized
by small white headstones, a close-up ex-
ample of which can be found in photo 1. The
inscriptions on these stones are limited to
Qur'anic text, often the first surah, and the
name of the deceased alongside the dates
of birth and death.
Leicester's Gujarati Muslims mostly follow
the Hanafi school of thought, and adhere to
a Deobandi interpretation of this school of
f i q h.6 The researchers were told by a mem-
ber of the community that this style of grave
marker was common to Muslims of the Gu-
jarat and reflected the 'puritanical' ethos of
Deobandi thinking; hence the grave and its
marker are simple and unadorned, bearing
only minimal information on the life of the
d e c e a s e d .
Stapenhill Burton Upon Trent
and East Dundee (UK)
There are approximately 2,500 Muslims in
Burton Upon Trent, mainly of Pakistani ori-
gin. Unlike the Gujaratis of Leicester, their
understanding of Islam is rooted in the folk
traditions of the Barelvi movement7 a l-
though they are also Sunni Muslims of the
Hanafi school. Unlike the Deobandis, the
Barelvis see the Prophet Mohammad as
more than a man, a part of the divine light of
Allah. This doctrine gives rise to a form of
Islam that provides a space for holy men
and esoteric practices and graves appear to
be often more ornate than those found
within Deobandi communities, at least
within the context of the UK.
Dundee also has a Pakistani Barelvi com-
munity of around the same size, and as pho-
tos 2 and 3 show, the grave markers are very
similar in the two cemeteries, both differing
from those of the Deobandis found in Saf-
fron Hill. Within the Muslim area of Dundee
East cemetery, decoration and flowers are
common, as are British style gravestones.
It has also been noted that grave markers
are more likely to denote the social or socio-
economic status of the deceased within the
Pakistani community, and close scrutiny of
photo 3 reveals a grave marker that is con-
siderably taller than those surrounding it.
The grave in this case belongs to a deceased
Pakistani millionaire.
Malmo (Southern Sweden)
Sweden's Muslim community has its roots
in the country's recruitment of labour dur-
ing the early 1960s and 1970s, and also in
the role Sweden has played in receiving
r e f u g e e s .8 This has resulted in the country's
Muslim community being very diverse, con-
sisting of people from Arab, Iranian, Turkish,
Asian, and Bosnian origins. A survey of
Malmo's Muslim burial sites shows patterns
of grave markers that clearly reflect the eth-
nic identity of its deceased, most notably for
the Bosnians.
Photo 4 shows graves of a very different
design from those previously considered,
most mirroring local Swedish designs. Many
carry the emblem of Bosnia or Turkey, and
some follow a European tradition of includ-
ing a picture of the deceased. Another char-
acteristic noted on Muslim graves in Swe-
den is the presence of a foot marker as well
as one at the head of the grave. In addition,
there is no evidence of Arabic or Urdu script.
Thus, what is portrayed is a Muslim identity
rooted in European culture. One phenome-
non witnessed in Malmo and worthy of
mention is that of Muslims participating in
the Swedish 'All Saints Day' ritual of decorat-
ing the grave with flowers and lights (see
photo 5).
It is apparent that Muslim grave designs
vary considerably. Some reflect that which
constitutes an appropriate grave marker in
the cultures of origin. For example, the Gu-
jarati graves in Leicester follow traditional
Gujarati designs, while others such as those
in Dundee and Sweden appear to reflect de-
signs current in the host communities. It can
be argued from evidence so far collected
that, while in both the UK and Sweden grave
markers contain statements regarding reli-
gious/cultural identity, in the UK such state-
ments are likely to include Arabic script and
verses of the Qu'ran, while in Sweden na-
tional symbols and crests are employed.
Moreover, by their participation in 'All
Saints Day' rituals, it may be argued that
Muslims in Sweden are also seeking ways to
make statements regarding their sense of
being Swedish as well as being a Bosnian or
Turkish Muslim, and are hence participating
in what might be termed 'Civil Religion'.9
Furthermore, while Muslim burial areas
may be seen as fulfilling the functions out-
lined by Durkheim (see above), it can be
noted that distinct variations in the nature
of grave markers do exist, as revealed when
comparing Muslim grave markers even
within the UK. The variety extends from
those that are clearly designed out of reli-
gious motivation, to those that vary little
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Indi a n Oc ea n
A B D AL L A H  C H A N F I  AH M E D
The post-independence period from 1976 to 1985
was witness to a great number of young Comorian
students heading for the Arab world, particularly to
Medina, to receive the necessary training to become
the future ulema of the Comoros Islands. Their return
home began to have an impact even during their
summer vacation, a time during which the d acw a
(mission) could be spread and during which they,
having studied in different countries, manifested dif-
fering influences.
Dac wa in the
Comoros Islands
The Comorians had the tendency to distin-
guish between those studying in Medina,
having the reputation of being the least
evolved of all, and those studying in other
cities in Saudi Arabia or in Kuwait, consid-
ered to be the 'evolved youth'. The latter
were said to be comparable in intellectual
terms as well as in their mentality to those
who came from France and those educated
in the lycées français of the country. Indeed,
those not coming from Medina emphasized
their difference by dressing in the latest Eu-
ropean fashion and bringing with them the
latest modern gadgets: radio-cassette
recorders, hi-fi stereo systems, cameras, and
the like. Their mannerisms starkly contrast-
ed them with their Medinian counterparts:
the Wahhabis. The latter wore sombre
clothing consisting of a white robe and
skullcap. They stayed in their villages to
carry out preparatory work, first amongst
their families, for their definitive return. The
'apprentice cleric' defined himself as an ad-
versary of traditions and he expressed this
within, among others, his female family
members by attempting to impose the veil
and preventing them from frequenting men
outside of the family. Furthermore, he tried
to put an end to the marabout practices,
which his family may have resorted to in the
case of need.
His intervention would then be carried
out at the village level: the mosque, the
école française, and the public square. At the
mosque, he would ask the village c-a l i m, who
generally administers religious instruction
between the m ag
.
r i b and a l -ciš -a prayers, to
accept being replaced by him during the
school vacation. The same went for instruc-
tion, such as the t a fsı̄ ra l - q ur c -a n, which takes
place at the mosque during the Ramadan.
As with every period of school vacation, the
local students organize a special course at
the école française, where the young Wah-
habi would propose to administer Arabic
courses. In the public squares, he would set
up debates on a topic relating to local reli-
gious practice. During the month of the
Prophet's birth, the m a u l i d month for Co-
morians, he would seize the occasion to
preach. In this sense his preaching indicates
a capacity to adapt his strategy to the reality
of the country: although the Wahhabi ideol-
ogy condemns the practice of the m a u l i d,
young Wahhabis were happy to participate
in it with the intention of taking advantage
of the podium offered them to propagate
their message. The same holds true for the
d -ayira ceremonies or for the religious cere-
monies of the grand marriages (locally
called (m a d j l i s) .
The Wahhabis thus challenged local prac-
tices, customs, and institutions judged as
contrary to pure, original Islam. However,
these reformist claims of the Wahhabis in
the villages strongly contrasted their ab-
sence on the national scene. Their silence at
the level of the state is especially remark-
able in a country that calls itself an 'Islamic
Republic'. The entire field of contestation of
the political regime was occupied by the
Marxists of the ASEC and the groups ema-
nating from it, such as the Front Démocra-
tique. But as the Wahhabis were home on
vacation, it was not reasonable to risk im-
prisonment or being stopped from return-
ing to Medina. It was thus necessary to keep
a low profile. This, however, would no
longer be the case after 1985.
The d acw a after the Wahhabis
definitive return home
From 1985 on, when some of the Wah-
habis completed their studies and returned
home, they began to attack the regime, crit-
icizing the – by now – Islamic Republic for
not applying the s h a ri -ı ca. In their point of
view, the term Islamic Republic was
pompous and had, for those who had in-
vented it, but two objectives: to legitimize
their policies by means of Islam, and to at-
tract financial aid from the oil-rich monar-
chies. Indeed, this intention cannot be ex-
cluded considering the volume of aid that
Abdallah's regime received from these
countries. For example, the total amount of
aid he received from the Gulf monarchies
amounted to 93.2 million dollars in 1981
and did not cease to increase until at least
1986. Apart from a few infrastructure pro-
jects such as expanding the port of Mut-
samudu, the money mostly landed in the
pockets of the government officials. Fur-
thermore, the Wahhabis' accusation
launched against the government was con-
firmed and rejoined the comical public criti-
cism that called the republic, instead of a
'République Féderal' (Federal Republic), a
'République fédarile' (feda rile: literally,
money, let's guzzle it).
This description of the way Wahhabis
spread and are still spreading their propa-
ganda brings at least three permanent fac-
tors to the fore:
The nostalgic desire to perform their
d acw a as the Prophet Himself did. First, they
tried to impose their doctrine within their
families: the Prophet did so for Islam first
with his clan. Then, they spread to the vil-
lage level: the Prophet had done so for
Mecca. Finally, they spread their message to
the national level: here again, the Prophet
had done the same after his immigration to
Medina. In all of these steps, there would
certainly be obstacles that the Wahhabi d -ac-ı
would face with respect to the means de-
manded by the state of the power struggle:
persuasion or physical confrontation. All
would depend on the opportunity present-
ed. Even this was inspired by the Prophet.
The origin myths, the obsession with the
founding act, and the supposedly perfect
paradigmatic model which must be repro-
duced, are common to all proselytizing doc-
trines that promise adepts the 'great eve'.
This dream feeds their desire to re-institute
in the here and now the prophetic State of
Medina, the ideal City.
The second permanent factor is the de-
nunciation the Wahhabis perform at the
place of the elder ulema. This is done de-
spite the fact that most of the latter were
teachers who, in the m a d r a s s a s they had
founded, gave these Wahhabis a solid basis
in the Arabic language and a modern reli-
gious education – in comparison with that
which they themselves had received from
their own predecessors. They had sought
out scholarships for these young Wahhabis
and organized their departures for the Is-
lamic centres in the Arab world. Today they
consider their former students ungrateful.
The third permanent factor is the fascina-
tion, with all the envy and rejection the term
implies, that the Arabophones or a r a b i s a n t s
hold for the Francophones or f r a n c i s a n t s.
The latter alone monopolize the state appa-
ratus carrying the name école française, con-
sidered to be the sole legitimate education-
al institution. Yet, (as the Arabophones just-
ly hold) the state belongs to all citizens and
not merely to one caste. And while the
ulema that had founded the m a d r a s s as
were attracted and recruited to the political
parties of the period ranging from internal
autonomy to independence, and while the
new Arabophones (other than the Wah-
habis) believe themselves to be obliged to
borrow the mannerisms of the new genera-
tion of the 'Jules Ferry school', the young
Comorian Wahhabis distance themselves
from such attitudes. They want to mark their
difference in every way. Nonetheless, in
many ways, they resemble the youth of the
Marxist ASEC-FD. The former oppose their
elder ulema, the latter contest their elders in
power and the political establishment. All
are against French imperialism. The Wah-
habis are against French imperialism based
on the ideology of the Muslim Brothers
which combats the g
.
a z w i l - f i k r ı̄ ( c o l o n i a l i z a-
tion of the spirit of Muslims by that of West-
erners, especially through their schools).
The youth of the ASEC-FD do the same, but
based on Marxist ideology which is anti-
colonialist, being understood that the impe-
rialism, for this Marxist ideology, is the
'supreme phase of capitalism'. Both move-
ments were to invent a 'counter-culture': on
the one hand, the 'new culture' (msomo wa
n y u m e n i) of the ASEC-FD, which is a mixture
of anti-conformist behaviour slightly hippy-
like and a revolutionary Marxist militantism;
and on the other hand, the Wahhabi puri-
tanism of the 'Medinians'. It seems that the
Wahhabis have imitated the young Marxists
of the ASEC-FD in their propaganda and in
their mode of organization: firstly, by their
seasonal propaganda during the school va-
cation and then by their transformation into
a political party. They generated the FNJ
(Front National pour la Justice, National
Front for Justice) in the same way that the
ASEC produced its 'Front', that being the FD
(Front Démocratique, Democratic Front).
However, in their criticism of the magico-
customary traditions (mila na ntsi ugangi)
such as the grand marriage, they are much
closer to revolutionary Ali Soilih than the
youth of the ASEC-FD, which consider this
domain as secondary. For the latter, it was
necessary to defeat French imperialism as
well as its 'Comorian servants', meaning the
elders of the political establishment, to in-
stall a 'true democracy' (demokrasi mpiya) .
The greatest difference that separated the
youth of the ASEC-FD and the Wahhabis is
an attitude of political culture. The Wahhabis
are, just as their elder ulema and the politi-
cians that evolved from internal autonomy
to independence, much closer to the 'oral
political culture' than the 'written political
culture'. When it comes to expressing a polit-
ical opinion, they often use verbal means
(preaching at the mosque or on the national
radio) rather than written means. But the
youth of the ASEC-FD are the genuine pro-
moters in the country of a 'graphic political
culture' as witnessed in their journals such
as: U s o n i (Up Front), U s h e (The Twilight), and
D a r b i n i (Microscope). They came to master
the art of tract making. The famous 'Voice of
the People' (sauti ya umati) that so annoyed
the Abdallah regime is one illustration of
this. That did not, however, stop them from
joining the written political culture with the
oral, particularly in their records and tapes of
folklore music and revolutionary songs. An-
other difference, and not the least impor-
tant, that distinguishes them is their athe-
ism, they so like to show, and their preaching
thereof to those younger than themselves,
the members of the ASEC-FD were in a way
deicidal, which is contrary to the Wahhabis.
However, the militants of the two move-
ments are both parricidal and liberticidal.
Parricidal, because the members of both
movements aspired to taking the place of
their elders, the traditional ulema for the
Wahhabis, and the politicians for the mem-
bers of the ASEC-FD. Liberticidal, because
both movements aspired to the power and
installing a supposedly salvational dictator-
ship: the dictatorship of the proletariat for
the ASEC-FD and the dictatorship of the
s h a r i ı̄ca for the Wahhabis. But the inaugura-
tion of the 'Shariatocracy' is not possible in a
'deus ex machina'. For that, a political com-
bat in the framework of new democratic era
must be lead.  ◆
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So uthea st  As ia
J U L I A  D AY  H O W E L L
News coverage on Indonesia since the resignation of
former President Suharto has been filled with images
of sectarian violence and separatist agitation linked
to 'fundamentalist' Islam. The ascent of Abdurrah-
man Wahid, former head of the 'traditionalist' Mus-
lim clerics association, the Nahdlatul Ulama, to the
Presidency of the nation at first suggested a shaky
vigour in 'moderate' expressions of Islam. But as his
second year in office begins, grave doubts loom as to
the strength of the middle ground between so-called
'secular' and 'extremist Muslim' forces.
Indonesia's 
Urban Sufis:  
Challenging Stereotypes
of Islamic Revival
Telling the future of this nation in turmoil is
fraught with difficulties, not least because of
the likely manipulation of religious sentiment
by cynical contestants for power. Attempts to
understand how popular commitments
grounded in religion become mobilized in
political contests are also hampered by our
limited vision of what religion means in daily
life in Indonesia today. Not only are terms
such as 'fundamentalist,' 'traditionalist,' and
'secular' loosely defined and likely to carry in-
appropriate implications when reading from
the experience of one country to another, but
even within Indonesia the religious landscape
has been rapidly changing. Some 'traditional-
ists' (like the pluralist Wahid) are looking in-
congruously progressive, while 'modernists'
(such as in Muhammadiyah) have been ac-
cused, even by their own avant-garde, of get-
ting stuck in outmoded visions of reform.
While differences still nettle relations be-
tween 'traditionalists' and modernists, re-
markable commonalities have nonetheless
emerged. These have been best documented
in the areas of public piety in the Muslim com-
munity at large and in the debate amongst
the intelligentsia on interpretation in Islamic
law. The rapid spread of literacy through the
state school system, especially since the
1970s, and the requirement that pupils study
their nominated religion (in nearly 9 out of 10
cases, Islam) at every level of formal studies,
have made for a more doctrinally informed
and 'bookish' ummat. At the same time, the
depoliticization of religion under Suharto's
New Order lowered social barriers between
'strict' Muslims and others. These factors, plus
the rising world prestige of Islam after the
Iranian Revolution, supported an efflores-
cence of popular piety that has cross-cut old
religious/secular party politics and runs
across the social class hierarchy. Veiling has
spread from the kauman (the old 'strict Mus-
lim' quarters of cities) to the university cam-
puses; employees in Jakarta office towers as
well as batik manufacturers in Solonese kam-
pungs take time off for Friday services. As for
intellectual engagement in issues of inter-
preting and applying Islamic law in a modern
society, the degree of convergence in ap-
proaches is signalled by the frequent use of a
single term, 'Neo-Modernism,' to characterize
both progressives within the 'traditionalist'
camp (such as Wahid) and those coming out
of the Modernist movement (such as Nurchol-
ish Madjid).
The upsurge in interest 
in Sufism
What is perhaps the most surprising change
in contemporary Islamic religiosity, however,
and one that has played a significant role in
convergences in popular piety and jurispru-
dence, is an upsurge of interest in Sufism. Par-
ticularly remarkable is the fact that this inter-
est is evident in the cities, not just in the coun-
tryside, and is pursued by cosmopolitan so-
phisticates as well as by provincials. Being a
modern Muslim in Indonesia does not neces-
sarily imply salafi fundamentalism; 'outward'
signs of intensified piety may well betoken a
new commitment to 'inner', Sufistic engage-
ment with the faith.
Some of the most influential sociological
representations of the Islamic world in the
20th century, notably those of Ernest Gellner
and Clifford Geertz, cast Sufism as a predomi-
nantly rural phenomenon. At mid century
they saw it fading away along with tribal and
peasant life as Muslim societies underwent
modernization. In these views, Sufism, origi-
nally propounded by urban sophisticates,
after its distant heyday receded into the hin-
terlands and was compromised by its toler-
ance toward folk customs. Once a disciplined
path of asceticism for spiritual purification,
Sufism became in these constructions a set of
magical practices suited to inspiring petty po-
litical loyalties; once a means of mystical
knowing, it became merely a form of quick
emotional release through suspect rituals.
Gellner argued that the 20th century was
particularly fateful for Sufis. Although they
have always been vulnerable to purification
movements led by urban clerics (ulama) be -
cause of their lax attitude towards customary
practices and the spiritual pretensions of
reckless syechs, before the 20th century chas-
tened Sufis were able to rebound. However,
after the turn of the 20th century, he observed,
modernist reform movements took a more
uncompromising approach, seeking to dele-
gitimize Sufism entirely and to establish legal-
istic (or 'scripturalist') constructions of Islam
as definitive of orthodoxy.
Geertz's highly influential ethnography of
Javanese society around the town of Pare in
the 1950s graphically illustrated this image of
Sufi decline in the face of Modernist reform.
The traditional centres of Muslim education
he observed (the pesantren or pondok) were
cast as vehicles for basic learning in law and
theology, while the Sufi orders (tarekat), once
commonly associated with these schools, ap -
peared to have nearly died out. Not only were
there very few tarekat, but his characteriza-
tion of the ones he did observe as 'a kind of
old man's pondok'1 strongly suggested they
would not be around much longer. When
those elderly, poorly educated farmers
passed away, so would Java's Sufi orders. The
Javanese penchant for esoteric learning
might well survive in the numerous syncretic
mystical groups (the golongan kebatinan or
kepercayaan), but not within the fold of Islam.
The spread of Sufism amongst
the intelligentsia
That this might not have come to pass (or
perhaps never was impending) was im-
pressed on my attention in the late1980s after
having spent some years researching the
mystical groups and their association with
the Hindu and Buddhist reform movements.
It was at that time that I met the respected
Gadjah Mada University economist and for-
mer Rector of the Universitas Islam Indonesia
in Yogyakarta, Professor Aceh Partadiredja. By
then he was himself a new member of the
Tarekat Qodiriyyah-Naqsyabandiyyah (TQN)
centred on Pesantren Suryalaya in West Java.
He introduced me to several young lecturers,
including my research colleague Drs. Suban-
di, MA, and other young Yogya professionals
involved in TQN and other orders. I learned
that the widely reported Islamic revival on the
campuses (and elsewhere) included an in-
tense interest in 'inner' religiosity. It seemed
that in the 1980s kebatinan (literally 'inward-
ness' but more broadly 'mysticism outside the
fold of Islam'), had largely failed to attract the
younger intelligentsia, but Islamic devotion-
alism and Sufi mystical practices were engag-
ing them. Sufi books were amongst the
fastest selling of the religious titles; students
organized lectures on Sufism along with
other Islamic topics; and orders like TQN were
attracting members of the educated middle
class and even Jakarta elites.
Through the surveys we carried out on the
Yogyakarta and Tegal regional branches of
TQN Suryalaya in 1990 and 1997, we were
able to confirm the involvement of well-edu-
cated, occupationally middle-class people,
both old and young, in this order. In 1997,
nearly two-fifths had junior high or high
school education, and just over 10% had at
least some tertiary education. Five had actual-
ly done an MA and one had a PhD. Occupa-
tions covered the full spectrum; and ages
ranged widely, from 16 to 97, with the bulk of
the membership between 35 and 64. Sub-
stantial numbers of women were in the sur-
vey, along with men. Significantly, both the
overall membership numbers for these
branches and the proportion of urbanities
grew over the 1990s.2 This tarekat, at least,
was hardly 'an old man's pondok' confined to
a disappearing peasantry.
The new 'neo-Sufism'
Although demographic survey data on
other orders are not yet available, several
scholars, including Martin van Bruinessen,
have recorded their impressions that Sufis or-
ders are enjoying a new appeal in urban
areas. Zamakhsyari Dhofier and others have
also provided evidence of the continuing vi-
tality of Sufi devotionalism in the pesantrens
at mid century and the vigour of the tarekats.
Indeed in 1957, at the very time that Geertz
was engaged in his Javanese field project, the
Nahdlatul Ulama formed its first council to co-
ordinate the affairs of the tarekats run by
member ulamas.
Apparently there is something to Anthony
John's wry comment about Sufi orders, that
'Rumors of their impending death…are very
much exaggerated'.3 But the issue of the ap-
peal of Sufism to cosmopolitans needs to be
taken beyond the study of Sufi orders, and
even beyond the devotional life of the pe-
santren. Indeed a whole range of novel activi-
ties identified with 'Sufism' or tasawuf are
now popular in Indonesia's major cities: from
reading reflective and 'how-to' spiritual
books, to attending academically-styled pri-
vate courses, to joining informal prayer
groups or healing workshops using dzikir
chanting, to accepting the spiritual direction
of non-traditional teachers outside the con-
ventional tarekat. The key features of these
new-style 'Sufi' activities are their stated link
with sharica-based Islam, their pursuit of an
experiential or 'inner' dimension to religious
life, and a moving away from, or even rejec-
tion of, the supposed hierarchy, authoritari-
anism and 'other worldliness' of conventional
tarekats.4 This last feature distinguishes the
Neo-Sufism of past generations (that at-
tempted merely to distance Sufism from idol-
atrous local practices and reassert the central-
ity of the syarica without attempting major in-
stitutional change) from this new 'Neo-Su-
fism'. The new 'Neo-Sufism' (as some indeed
call it; it is also called 'Tasawuf Positif' or 'Prac-
tical Sufism') responds specifically to the new
conditions of Indonesian urbanism. Notwith-
standing the ideological imperatives of na-
tion building for an unambiguous, prescribed
religious identity, people are propelled into
privatized styles of religiosity by their experi-
ences of social and geographical mobility, ex-
posure to global economic forces and cul-
tures, and participation in international cul-
tural activities.  ◆
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Muslims in Nepal are comprised of Indian migrants
and their descendants. A large majority of them live
in the southern plain areas, while a certain percent-
age of the Muslim population live in certain villages
of the hill districts and the Kathmandu Valley. This
geographic range has a profound impact on their
lifestyles, cultural activities and even their religious
practices. The Muslims of Nepal are categorically di-
vided into different ethnic types, distinguishable by
religious behaviours, language, beliefs, and rela-
tions with the local Hindus.
Ethnic Variation 
of Nepal's Muslim
M i n o r i t y
The Kashmiri Muslims arrived in the Hindu state
of Nepal in the 15 th century. Although historians
differ on the date given for their arrival, there is
no doubt about their being the first Muslims to
arrive in Nepal. Babu Ram Acharya, a prominent
historian, holds that a Muslim saint built the
Kashmiri Pancha Taquia, the first mosque in
Nepal, in 1524 AD.
These early Kashmiris, whose descendants still
live in Kathmandu, used the city as a centre for
trade with Tibet and India.1 As far back as the
18th century, they had earned a formidable repu-
tation for their efficiency in commercial activities
and were thus allowed to enter Kathmandu
under condition that they would not undertake
missionary activities or interfere in Hindu affairs
in any way. Indeed, this condition was upheld.
However, under the rule of a new conqueror,
Prithvi Narayan Shah, founder of modern Nepal,
the Kashmiris began to fear persecution – a fear
which compelled them to shut down business
and move to India. The new king, having consid-
ered the fact that the Kashmiris had such pros-
perous relations with the deposed Malla Kings of
Kathmandu2, imposed various restrictions that
led two Kashmiri trading houses to remain in
Kathmandu after 1774 AD.
The Kashmiri Muslims today 
The Nepali Kashmiris maintain a definite social
status. It is even said that they entertain a sense
of superiority over the other local Nepali Mus-
lims.3 They have their own mosque and a sepa-
rate burial ground in Kathmandu. Nonetheless,
very much influenced by indigenous local Nepali
culture, the Kashmiris are not indifferent to the
process of cultural assimilation. They have
adapted several Hindu tenets to their cultural
practices, but maintain a preference for matri-
monial and other social ties with families of sim-
ilar status. Thus, they are found to be rather con-
servative in contracting marriages, although
some cases of marriages with non-Kashmiri Mus-
lims do exist.
Their long history of residence in Kathmandu
has contributed to a genuine blending of their
culture and language with the local people. But
their entire set of family relations and religious
activities are generally limited to the Kathmandu
Valley.
The Tibetan Muslims 
Tibetan Muslims can also be found in Nepal.
They are mostly Tibetan refugees who fled Tibet
after the Chinese occupation began in 1960. His-
torical evidence suggests that the Lhasa envoy
of King Ratna Malla invited certain Tibetan Mus-
lims to come to Kathmandu in the 15th century.
The Tibetan Muslims today maintain a distinct
Tibetan culture, although their extended stay in
Kathmandu has resulted in a certain degree of
blending culture with that of the Kashmiri and
Indian Muslims. There are altogether some 100
Tibetan Muslim families in the Kathmandu Val-
ley. They actively participate in various religious
activities and collaborate with their Tibetan
Muslim counterparts in Darjeeling and
Kalimpong in India, who have established a joint
association called Tibetan Muslim Welfare Asso-
ciation.4
The hill Muslims: c h u r a u t e y
(bangle sellers) 
A large number of Nepali Muslims live in dif-
ferent parts of the western hill region, mostly in
the districts of Gorkha, Tanahun, Kaski, Syangja,
Dailekh, Pyuthan, Arghakhanchi, Palpa and
Nuwakot. The mosques and small makhtabs
exist in major hill Muslim settlements. The hill
Muslims are the descendants of Indian migrants,
and are synonymously known as churautey (ban-
gle sellers), considered to be a branch of the
Churihar of the plains.5 Common tribes among
them are the Mirja and Fakirs, the latter being
considered lower in the social hierarchy. The hill
Muslims are very much influenced by the sur-
rounding Hindu culture. The makhtabs or
madrasas and masjids, which exist in the settle-
ments of hill Muslims, have been unable to
maintain indigenous Muslim culture. Interaction
with the Hindu families is more frequent than
that with other Muslims. The hill Muslims and
local Hindus regularly invite each other to vari-
ous rituals celebrations and festivals. However,
despite their strong social ties, the Hindus con-
sider the Muslims to be an inferior caste. One
manifestation of this is expressed by the Hindus
cooking their own meals even when attending
feasts at the homes of Muslim neighbours. This
sentiment is nonetheless less important nowa-
days than it was, for example, some years ago.
These emigrant Muslims gradually accommo-
dated themselves to the local conditions. It can
be said that their present culture is a confluent of
both cultures. They have been strongly influ-
enced by the Hindus in all aspects of lifecycle rit-
uals and in the naming of children, to name but
two examples. They even tend to celebrate the
Hindu festivals with greater enthusiasm than the
Hindus themselves. The Hindus, on the other
hand, also participate in Muslim celebrations.
It is worthy of mention that training schools in
Islamic fundamentals are not available in hill
areas. The lack of proper knowledge of religion is
most likely what allowed for their integration of
Hindu cultural tenets. Hence, the process of cul-
tural assimilation is more rapid in the hills as
compared to that of Muslims in the southern
plain. The hill Muslims, despite being considered
'untouchables' by the Hindus, observe certain
components of the Hindu death rituals and also
worship ancestors. Such observances are deeply
rooted in their life pattern.
Tarai Muslims 
The Tarai (plain land in the South) Muslims are
entirely comprised of descendants of Indian mi-
grants who came to Nepal in search of employ-
ment opportunities. At present, the population
of Tarai Muslims constitutes almost two million
people. They are scattered amongst the 20 dis-
tricts of the Tarai region. They have cultural, reli-
gious and other social ties with the Muslims of
Northern India.
The year of arrival of the Indian Muslims in the
Tarai region remains unknown. T. A. Ansari has
argued that they have been living in there since
before Nepal gained political control over the re-
gion.6 The uninterrupted intercourse between
the people of the region and Indian states sup-
ports this argument.
In the eastern Tarai, the majority of Muslims
are Ansari and Mansuri. The Muslims of Tarai
have high quality religious education facilities. A
large number of reputable madrasas, masjids
and yetimkhanas (orphanages) have been estab-
lished in the region. Muslim children first go to
the madrasas for religious education, where the
Maulvis from India teach. There are also Nepali
Muslims trained in India or Saudi Arabia who
teach religion at the madrasas. The Tarai Mus-
lims are thus able to maintain their identity as
they attempt to avoid cultural assimilation. They
can learn Urdu, Arabic, and Persian languages
along with the study of the holy Qur'an and the
Hadith. But the growing trend of English educa-
tion in Nepal has brought about certain changes
in indigenous religious education: some of the
madrasas have introduced the teaching of Eng-
lish and modern mathematics as independent
subjects. In these religious schools, girls also
have equal opportunity for education.
The Tarai Muslims clearly differ in several ways
from the hill Muslims. Such differences are no-
ticeable mainly in physical appearance, lan-
guage, dress conventions, and cultural practices.
It should be mentioned that Muslims in certain
remote villages in the hills, in western and far
western regions, are completely ignorant of Is-
lamic culture and religious practices.
Apart from the fact that the availability of reli-
gious facilities has allowed the Tarai Muslims to
maintain their culture intact, they are very much
traditional orthodox in religious matters. This, of
course, has led to decreased adaptability. Fur-
thermore, they entertain excellent relations with
Islamic institutions beyond the boarder. The
extra-territorial loyalty of the Tarai Muslims in
terms of their religious beliefs remains vital to all
of their cultural activities – thereby affecting
their identity as a whole.  ◆
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So uth As ia
D A VI D  W A I N E S
To even the casual observer, public education in Pak-
istan appears to be in a state of crisis. On a recent trip
to Islamabad and Lahore, I noticed state-supported
schools seemingly outnumbered by private 'schools'
that have sprung up on almost every street corner.
These are generally housed in a villa, a bungalow, or
a couple of rooms in a building with a billboard and
fancy title and logo advertising their wares; Leeds
Academy or London College of IT were spotted
amongst the forest of signs. Other education indica-
tors reveal Pakistan lagging behind its neighbours in
South Asia: it has the lowest literacy rate, the lowest
female participation in education, the highest female
primary school dropout rate, and the lowest enrol-
ment in tertiary education.




Pakistan is the only country in the region
where expenditure on education as a pro-
portion of the GNP has decreased since
1990, which makes the discovery of several
thousand 'ghost schools' in the Punjab
province – which were in practice closed
but where teachers had been drawing
salaries at a cost, or waste, of 1.4 billion ru-
pees annually – all the more dramatic. These
may be some of the reasons for the emer-
gence of a private sector industry of the
urban 'school' which is said to be one of the
most profitable growth areas in a lacklustre
economy. The private 'schools' are also fash-
ionable, regardless of whether or not they
are performing their tasks properly. The
principal of a well-known government col-
lege for girls in Lahore told me that some of
her pupils are even absent when the exam
period approaches, as they attend private
'tutorial' centres where they seek help in
their weakest subjects. The principal was
justly saddened by this trend claiming that
her own institution still prepared students
more thoroughly for their exams than did
these virtually unregulated swot-shops.
Revaluing the education
s e c t o r
There is another, brighter, side to this oth-
erwise bleak educational landscape. Recog-
nizing that the key investment for national
and individual social and economic devel-
opment lies in primary education, the gov-
ernment of Pakistan and non-governmental
organizations are attempting to address
and redress an historical undervaluing of
this crucial sector, especially in rural areas.
And most undervalued of all within this sec-
tor are the young girls of rural districts.
Since 1995-96, the Prime Minister's Literacy
Commission has supervised the establish-
ment of more than 7,000 non-formal
schools; however much needed and wel-
come, critics observe that provincial educa-
tion departments still focus too heavily
upon buildings at the expense of delivering
quality education through quality teaching.
Syed Ayub Qutub, head of the NGO Pakistan
Institute for Environment Development Ac-
tion Research (PIEDAR), argues that only a
'committed, well-trained, village-based fe-
male teacher can impart the required stan-
dard of education to girls in the country-
side.' Male primary schools teachers are by
no means excluded when they are trained
and motivated as educators rather than sim-
ply as employees in education. The key to
sustaining the non-formal village school is
involvement of the parents. The latter, in re-
turn for quality education for their children,
usually find the means to contribute to-
wards the salary of the teacher who, with
sound training thus develops a growing
commitment to becoming a proprietor of
his/her own school. Since PIEDAR began in
1994, some 1400 girls are or have been en-
gaged in lessons in reading comprehension
and writing in Urdu and in English, and in
learning to perform basic mathematical cal-
culations in their heads.
A unique small-scale initiative
A further ray of light upon this scene is
cast from a quite unexpected, and uncon-
ventional quarter; I learned by chance of a
personal and private initiative in non-formal
schooling in Islamabad which gave another
meaning and restored some dignity to the
term 'private'. Four years ago, Zainab and
her brother Junaid (then aged 11 and 10
years respectively) encountered a young lad
Asif, selling poppadoms in the market. They
later met his mother, Zareena, who made
the poppadoms to be sold by her husband
and son as the sole source of the family's in-
come. The family lived in a squalid commu-
nity of huts adjacent to one of the expand-
ing modern sectors of Islamabad where
Zainab and Junaid lived. Zareena's commu-
nity had no school. Troubled by this, Zainab
and Junaid recognized their own privileged
position and saw, with the simple lucidity
that only children possess, the injustice of
their position compared to that of children
in the mud-hut community. Together with
Zareena's encouragement and cooperation
amongst other parents in the community,
they determined to try and change the situ-
a t i o n .
During their summer vacation that first
year, Zainab, now with Amber, a friend, and
Junaid set up their open-air school in the
community by the shade of a tree. Junaid re-
counted some of the challenges of those
first difficult weeks: 'We had to convince the
children that they would not be beaten in
school when they came to learn', a practice
he assured me was still far too common in
state schools. Moreover, the children were
told they should come only if they really
wanted to. 'The first thing we taught them
was how to hold a pencil and draw a
straight line', he added. Then gradually, the
Urdu alphabet was introduced using pic-
tures of familiar objects and the initial char-
acter of the word for that object. The stu-
dents reproduced the character and picture
and learned the appropriate letter sound.
Zainab said she noticed a change in the chil-
dren's appearance after the school lessons
were established; they were washed and
wore clean clothes, setting them apart from
other children in the community. With the
summer vacation coming to an end, the
classes also now seemed in danger. The
community is very poor; women generally
work as domestic help in the nearby mod-
ern housing sector, while men find whatev-
er temporary odd jobs they can. Hence,
Zainab and Junaid's parents ensured conti-
nuity by hiring a teacher and providing the
necessary textbooks and stationery sup-
plies; their mother, a professional consul-
tant on gender issues, has become the key
organizational support system behind the
enterprise which has gradually expanded to
three schools in adjoining communities,
with five teachers and some 120 students.
Four years on, the original school under a
tree is now quartered in the tiny community
mosque where children sit in the courtyard
when the weather is fine and inside when it
is inclement. When we visited the new site,
known as the Golra School of Basic Educa-
tion, students had just finished their
lessons. One of the two male teachers, Mu-
nawwar, who himself lives locally, told me
the children, girls and boys aged from 5 to
14, were instructed in the rudiments of
Urdu, English and mathematics.
The second school I visited is the Zobia
Private School, near Golra Railway Station.
Here the community is slightly better off
economically as the men have steady jobs
and their wives remain at home. The parents
pay very modest fees of 25 rupees per
month for the rent of a room and adjoining
courtyard in which to hold the classes.
Lessons were being given by the two female
teachers when we arrived: Rubina was in-
structing the older children and Zubeida the
younger children. One girl read confidently
from her Urdu text while a male classmate
read several lines in English without hesita-
tion. The school is named after Zobia, a
daughter of Zareena who tragically died of a
blood disease for which there is no available
treatment in Pakistan. It came as no surprise
to learn that Zareena, who had moved here
from the squatter settlement, where the
first school is located, now lives next door to
the second school and has also been a influ-
ential in this new enterprise. In addition to
the material support for these schools,
other provisions are necessary. Teacher
training and upgrading helps ensure the
quality of teaching and the establishment of
teacher-parent committees gives parents a
crucial stake in their children's education.
Behind it all there is the organizational, in
addition to the financial, input of Zainab
and Junaid's parents, while their children
continue to teach and participate in several
extracurricular activities during their sum-
mer vacations and other holidays.
I left Islamabad reflecting that this private
family initiative, galvanized unusually by
the energies and caring of these remarkable
children, was, in the context of the modern
world, a refreshing restatement of historical
Islamic social values – not only to seek
knowledge for oneself but also to encour-
age others to seek the same goal, and to
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C entr al  As i a
M .  N A ZI F  S H AH R AN I
If the process by which we arrive at today's institutions
is relevant and constrains future choices, then not only
does history matter but persistent poor performance
and long-run divergent patterns of (socio-political and
economic) development stem from a common source.1
The meteoric rise of the Taliban (1994-1995) as an ex-
tremist Muslim militia movement in post-Soviet
Afghanistan remains an enigma to the Afghans as well
as to outside observers. What is enigmatic is not so
much where they come from, or what internal and ex-
ternal forces might be propping them up, or even the
brand of Islam they are brandishing. Rather what re-
main puzzling are questions such as: What in the
Afghan history and political culture provides space
and a place for the rise of such an extremely harsh and
violent militant movement at the dawn of the 21st cen-
tury in this beleaguered nation? Is this an expected
manifestation of recognizable historical patterns in the
country? Or is it an aberration and a product of novel
circumstances of post-jihad Afghanistan? If it is not a
novelty, as will be argued here, then how can it be ex-
plained within the parameters of Afghanistan's social




A f g h a n i s t a n
Manifestations of 'extremism' or 'radicalism',
whether ideological or behavioural are by de-
finition political and, as such, r e l a t i o n a l, rela-
t i v e , contested and highly contextual phe-
nomena. The most common context giving
rise to extremism (religious or otherwise),
both historically as well as in the present
time, has been the struggle for control of the
powers of the institution of state (both tradi-
tional and modern). The principal objective of
these often violent struggles has been over
the rights to control, to re-define, and even to
determine not only the basis for political le-
gitimacy and exercise of authority, but also to
proclaim what ought to constitute Muslim re-
ligious orthodoxy/orthopraxy. That is, their
goal is to articulate the nature of the relation-
ship between state and society, to define the
limits of the subjects'/citizens' rights against
the need to ensure security and sanctity of
the state, and to justify it by the particular
reading of what is held to be 'the o n l y t r u e
and authentic' practice of Islam. Therefore,
the rise of any form of extremism within a po-
litical community must be considered as a
calculated response – a very risky response
indeed – to either perceived or actual extrem-
ist policies and practices of the contestants
including the state, within the larger political
ecological and socio-economic realities shap-
ing the contest.
Person-centred politics in
A f g h a n i s t a n
Assuming that history and cultural context
profoundly condition the trajectories of fu-
ture possibilities, the following aims to ex-
plore, however briefly, the implications of
one crucial characteristic of Afghan political
culture. This characteristic is person-centred
politics within the changing contexts of
state-society relations during the anti-Com-
munist jihad as well as the post-jihad politi-
cal-ecological and political-economic envi-
ronment that has given rise to the Taliban
movement and their particularistic form of Is-
lamic extremism or Talibanism, in
Afghanistan today. Person-centred politics,
the cornerstone of kin-based mode of Push-
tun tribal social and political organization,
has been the defining attribute of Afghan
politics since the creation of Pushtun-domi-
nated centralized polity in the mid-18t h c e n-
tury by a charismatic and able Abdali Push-
tun chief, Ahmad Shah Durrani (r. 1747-
1773). According to Eric Wolf,2 the 'Achilles'
heels' and 'the diagnostic points of stress' of
kin-based politics is that a chief or leader
'draws following through judicious manage-
ment of alliances and redistributive action,
[but] he reaches a limit that can only be sur-
passed by breaking through the limitations
of the kinship order [itself]'. To overcome the
limitations of this person-centred kin-based
politics, Wolf suggests that the leader 'must
gain independent access to reliable and re-
newable resources [material, monetary, and
ideological] of his own.'
Addressing this serious limitation of per-
son-centred, kin-based political economy in
Afghanistan has been possible, however
brief, by two major means. During the 18t h
and 19t h centuries, it was through the fruits of
waging jihad, initially against non-Muslims in
the Indian subcontinent, and then internally
against the non-Pushtun communities to im-
pose a form of internal colonialism. And dur-
ing the latter parts of 19t h and the 20t h c e n-
turies it was through solicitation/offer of for-
eign subsidies, mostly from real and/or po-
tential enemies of the nation. The effective-
ness of these strategies, however, has proved
to be episodic and transient.
The costs of the failure to resolve this seri-
ous problem of political economy of the
state for Afghanistan have been very heavy.
The primary reason for the failure has been
the unwillingness or inability of the leader-
ship to shift from a tribal political culture an-
chored in person-centred politics to a
broader, more inclusive, participatory na-
tional politics based on the development of
modern national institutions and ideolo-
gies. As a result, during its 250-year history
of statehood, Afghanistan has suffered
through at least 100 years of fratricidal wars
of succession and/or pacification (often
called jihad by the contestants) with devas-
tating consequences and painful legacies.
These bloody internal conflicts, which have
facilitated (invited) foreign aggressive inter-
ventions (British, Russian and now Pakistani,
Iranian and others), even when dressed with
ideological justifications (Islamic or other-
wise), were fought not for or against any
ideological or institutional cause or causes.
Instead, they were fought for or against spe-
cific individuals, families or clans out of per-
sonal, but often rapidly shifting, commoditi-
cized loyalties (primordial and/or ac-
q u i r e d / p u r c h a s e d ) .
The legacies of person-centred
politics in Afghanistan
Modern state building efforts in
Afghanistan began (in 1880) with unprece-
dented brutality against large segments of
society, especially by violence directed
against non-Durrani Pushtun and certain
non-Pushtun groups. The rulers utilized the
discourses of Islam, tribe/kinship and Durrani
kingship to hold together a myriad of linguis-
tic, sectarian and tribal groups in virtual sub-
jugation within a buffer state. Resistance and
popular revolts against the state were repeat-
edly crushed with weapons and money pro-
vided to the governments by outside colonial
powers, initially Great Britain and later the for-
mer Soviet Union. These efforts, however, did
not disrupt the kin-based personalized poli-
tics of what Edward Banfield termed 'amoral
familism'3 – a tendency to 'maximize material,
short-run advantage of the … family [and
kin], assuming that all others will do like-wise'
– but strengthened them. Indeed, it can be ar-
gued that the contradictory policies and prac-
tices of state building in Afghanistan have
promoted a political culture of person-cen-
tred politics to the virtual exclusion of nurtur-
ing broader and more inclusive national ide-
ologies, institutions and moral principles.
Therefore, it is contended that the rise of Tal-
iban movement during the post-jihad crises
of succession, with their form of Islamic ex-
tremism or Talibanism, is the inevitable culmi-
nation of the historical legacies of the person-
centred, Pashtun-dominated, Afghan political
culture. The most significant of these legacies,
although by no means exhaustive of all the
possibilities, include:
Firstly, consistent policies and practices of
political mistrust directed against the great
majority of Afghan subjects/citizens by state
authorities have promoted an attitude of dis-
trust of politics and politicians by the citizens.
Such prolonged experiences, in turn have se-
riously weakened traditional communities of
trust (jamacat), i.e., civil society. And it has
caused the general erosion of trust as a 'social
capital' in Afghan society beyond the circles
of family and close kinsmen or at most one's
own ethnolinguistic group.
Secondly, person-centred, paternalistic pol-
itics encouraged commoditization of loyal-
ties, the creation of a political economy of de-
pendency and patron-client relationships at
all levels of Afghan society, including the in-
creasing dependence of governments on for-
eign aid. This situation has been further exac-
erbated because of the collapse of the state
and the rise of multiple centres of power, all
of them receiving assistance (economic and
military) from numerous governmental and
non-governmental international agencies
during the more than two decades of a devas-
tating war. This new political ecological con-
dition of continuous warfare has also intro-
duced a new weapon in the arsenals of per-
son-centred political combatants. It is access
to a thriving print and electronic media – in-
side Afghanistan, in Afghan refugee commu-
nities around the world as well as the BBC and
VOA radio services in Dari and Pashto lan-
guages – utilized for a more effective vilifica-
tion and demonization of the opponent's
character. These pervasive attempts at mutu -
al character assassinations have left no room
for the possibility of constructive dialogue
and discussion about national goals, ideas or
strategies, and have led to the inevitable es-
calation of political contests into violent mili-
tary conflicts, justified increasingly by adher-
ence to religious extremism and Talibanism.
Thirdly, person-centred politics has placed
all ideologies (Islamic and otherwise) and
moral principles at the service of preserving
self-interest and protection of personal, famil-
ial, tribal or ethnic group honour. This has re-
sulted in serious discrepancies between pub-
lic policy pronouncements of the contending
groups and their actual practices. The Taliban
claims of being inclusive of all ethnic groups
and of bringing peace and security to territo-
ries under their control while committing
some of the worst ethnic cleansing violence
against non-Pushtuns in their conquered re-
gions; and contrary to explicit Islamic princi-
ples, the rising production of opium poppies,
and the manufacture, sales and trafficking of
elicit drugs in the areas under the Taliban
control may be a case in point.
Fourthly, the treatment of non-Pushtun cit-
izens of Afghanistan as mere internal 'colo-
nial' subjects (not citizens, at least not 'real
Afghans') has produced a deep sense of alien-
ation, resentment, and distrust. Their role in
national history was depicted as marginal and
their participation in national politics was
purposefully undermined. That is, through a
well-established policy of demographic ag-
gression, ranging from resettlement of Push-
tun in non-Pushtun territories to underesti-
mating the actual numbers by administrative
means,7 their political representation in na-
tional assemblies were severely curtailed. At
the same time, non-Pushtun groups were
subjected to excessive conscription (for mili-
tary service and corvée labour) extraction by
taxation, appropriation, looting and other
extra judicial exactions. It is because of these
painful historical memories of oppression and
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Afghanistan are fighting with such powerful
determination to resist the Taliban attempt to
return the country to the status coup ante, i.e.
the conditions of Pushtun internal colonial-
ism before the onset of anti-Communist jihad
(1978).
The ultimate product of 
person-centred tribal 
Pushtun political culture
Finally, the ultimate product of the person-
centred, tribal Pushtun political culture in
Afghanistan is the rise of the Taliban militia
movement with its enigmatic, and increasing-
ly apotheosized leader and his militantly anti-
S h ica, anti-modern, anti-Western, anti-
women, and especially anti-democratic poli-
cies and practices. The Taliban's 'divinely or-
dained' reclusive leader, Mullah Umar, was
proclaimed on 4 April 1996, by a gathering of
some 1,200 mullahs in Kandahar, the spiritual
capital of Talibanism, as the Amirul Mu›m i-
neen (Commander of the Faithful). As such, he
is the ultimate source for articulating and en-
forcing the 'new' Muslim orthodoxy/ortho-
praxy of Talibanism in Afghanistan – the basis
of his legitimacy.
The Taliban project themselves as the bear-
ers of peace and 'true Islamic justice' in the
country, a form of justice bent on the enforce-
ment of the harshest principles of hudud in the
s h a r ica. Such punishments include, for exam-
ple, amputating the limbs of thieves, stoning
to death of adulterers, and public execution of
murderers by the victims' relatives in sport sta-
diums with thousands of spectators. Their real
claim to infamy comes from the imposition of
a policy of 'Gender Apartheid' directed against
the girls and women of Afghanistan. This col-
lective self-image of Talibanism is further but-
tressed by the projected images of their for-
eign Muslim allies, the various conservative
and radical Pakistani Muslim political organi-
zations. These include, among others, two fac-
tions of the Jamiat-e Ulema Islam (JUI) led by
Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Moulana Samiul
Haq, the two rabidly anti-Shica terrorist
groups, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and
Harakat-ul-Ansar, as well as Ben Laden's mili-
tary organization, Al-Qacida. True to the na-
ture of person-centred tribal political culture,
the projected positive 'Islamic' self-images of
Taliban are contrasted by demonizing the
Muslim character of their many opponents.
Ironically, many of those being damned are, in
fact, well-known heroes of the anti-Soviet
jihad. The Taliban also demonize their oppo-
nents' foreign patrons, Muslim and non-Mus-
lim, such as Shici Iran, Russia and Central Asian
republics, except for Turkmenistan.
The rise and successes of Talibanism, fleet-
ing as it may turn out to be, fits well within the
structural patterns and dynamics of wars of
succession in Afghanistan, at least during the
last 100 years. The mysterious beginnings of
the Taliban, and their quick adoption by for-
eign forces in this instance by Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia,8 have had major precedents in
Afghan history.9 The economic support of for-
eign Muslim sponsors has made it possible for
the Taliban to purchase loyalties from a huge
chain of economically desperate and depen-
dent local commanders within the country.
These external patrons, by extending official
recognition to the Taliban regime, have also
condoned the Taliban version of Islamic ex-
tremism and have facilitated the recruitment
of much needed foreign fighters (Pakistanis
and others) from Pakistani Muslim seminaries
(m a d r a s as) and beyond.
What distinguish the Taliban and the rise of
Talibanism at this juncture in the history of
Afghanistan, are the radically altered political
ecological and economic conditions, both in-
side Afghanistan and in the region, following
the collapse of the former Soviet Union. That
is, the presence of multiple competing foreign
Muslim sponsors, with their divergent or con-
flicting strategic, ideological, political and eco-
nomic agendas have proved to be the ideal
situation for the emergence of an extremist
militia organization such as the Taliban within
the person-centred tribal political culture of
the Pushtun in Afghanistan. Indeed, these
same political ecological realities in the region
have also fuelled the wars of resistance
against the Taliban hegemony, forcing it to re-
sort to increasingly violent policies and prac-
tices against women, Shicis and the non-Push-
tun ethnolinguistic communities in
Afghanistan.  ◆
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C o nfe r ence  Re po r t
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C H R I S T I N E  N O E L L E - K AR I M I
From 15-18 June 2000, more than 200 persons partici-
pated in an international conference entitled, 'Afghan-
istan – Country Without State?', organized by the Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft Afghanistan (AGA) and the Medio-
thek für Afghanistan e.V. in Munich. In the almost 30
presentations given, researchers as well as representa-
tives of NGOs and political institutions addressed the




Most papers focused on the construction of
the Afghan nation state and the political cul-
ture related to it. From these analyses, it ap-
peared that the state apparatus that had
evolved in the 20th century was a quasi-for-
eign body that tried to impose various forms
of control on the country and its people, but
failed to build an Afghan nation. Karl Jettmar
(University of Heidelberg) pointed to the ne-
cessity of re-examining the existing nation-
state structures of Central Asia in general.
Rasul Rahim (Wuppertal) discussed the
tremendous obstacles that prevented the de-
velopment of a civil society in each phase of
Afghan history. Eckart Schieweck (UN-Special
Mission to Afghanistan) analysed the growth
of Afghan government institutions and their
destruction in the course of the Afghan War.
Rangin Dadfar Spanta (University of Aachen)
argued that the protracted war has led to the
destruction of political culture in Afghanistan,
which constitutes the major problem for de-
veloping a common idea of state and civil so-
ciety. The papers of Angela Parvanta (Univer-
sity of Bamberg), Conrad Schetter (Center for
Development Research, Bonn) and Rameen
Moshref (New York) dealt with the construct-
ed character of the Afghan nation and the
equation of Afghan nationalism with Pushtun
culture. The role of the state in the notions of
political Islam was stressed by Olivier Roy
(Centre National Recherche Sociale, Paris). He
concluded that political Islam has failed to
bridge the gap between tradition and moder-
nity in Afghanistan. He and Neamatollah No-
jumi (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Somerville) discussed the question of how
the failing state in Afghanistan and the inter-
linked export of international Islamic
brigades are affecting the neighbouring
states as well as other countries. Almut
Wieland-Karimi (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung),
Max Klimburg (University of Vienna) and
Bruce Koepke (Australian National University,
Canberra) dealt with the effects of the war
and Islamist policies on local culture and pop-
ular religiosity, which revolves around Sufi
networks and saint worship, and, in the case
of Nuristan, is rich in pre-Islamic traditions.
Two presentations concerned the institution
of the jirga and its potential as a means of de-
cision making on the local and national levels.
Bernt Glatzer (Deutsche Stiftung für interna-
tionale Entwicklung) pointed out that the as-
semblies held in the rural setting primarily
serve as a public enactment of a consensus
negotiated by the local leadership before the
jirga is summoned. This process of conflict
resolution hinges on the ability of influential
men to act as opinion leaders and is entirely
local in scope. Christine Noelle-Karimi (Uni-
versity of Bamberg) drew attention to the lim-
itations of the loya jirga as a political mecha-
nism on the national level. Initiated as an in-
strument for promoting government policies
in the early 20th century, it by no means repre-
sents a time-honoured basis for installing
democracy in Afghanistan.
Other speakers focused on the current situ-
ation in Afghanistan. Amin Saikal (Australian
National University, Canberra) gave a detailed
overview of the external actors (e.g. Pakistan
and Iran), that are involved in the Afghan con-
flict and weaken the reconstruction of the
Afghan state. Reinhard Schlagintweit (Bonn),
as well as Michael Pohly (Freie Universität
Berlin) and Citha Maass (Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, Berlin) discussed the
meaning of state for the Taliban and the
Northern Alliance. They concluded that none
of the war parties had either a conception of
state or the capability to assume its responsi-
bilities. Two major sources of support for the
Taliban were examined by Ahmed Rashid (Far
Eastern Economic Review, Lahore) and
Michael Lüders (Die Zeit, Hamburg). Rashid
depicted the dynamics at work between the
Taliban and the Pushtun tribes. While certain
tribal groups made the upsurge of the Taliban
possible in the first place, others openly reject
their policies. Michael Lüders gave an inside
view of the indoctrination young students
and potential Taliban cadres are subjected to
in the Pakistani madaris. Peter Schwittek (Car-
itas, Kabul) reported on the desperate need
for education programmes and the contradic-
tions he encountered at different levels of the
Taliban government in his (ultimately suc-
cessful) efforts to establish schools for 13,500
boys and girls. Heike Bill (Deutsche
Welthungerhilfe, Jalalabad) discussed the Tal-
iban policies concerning women. She pointed
out that the restrictions imposed on women
do not reflect a specific Taliban ideology but
have rather had the effect of institutionalizing
and legitimizing patterns of oppression al-
ready prevalent in Afghanistan before its as-
sumption of power. Michael von der Schulen-
burg (UN-International Drug Control Pro-
gramme, Vienna) investigated the factors en-
couraging opium production in Afghanistan
and its rising proportion on the world market.
Jonathan Goodhand (Manchester) presented
a study on the local level concerning the so-
cial and economic transformations a rural vil-
lage in North Afghanistan underwent with
the introduction of opium production.
In summary, the conference has shown that
the state has lost its influence on the political,
ideological, social and economic affairs in
Afghanistan. Therefore, it might be right to
claim that Afghanistan is a country without a
state, even though a failed state keeps its re-
sponsibility by law as Hermann-Josef Blanke
(University of Erfurt) emphasized. How to
cope with a region in which state structures
have collapsed is a salient problem not only
related to Afghanistan – as Schlagintweit
mentioned – and will pose a challenge to in-
ternational security systems in different parts
of the world (e.g. Somalia, Sierra Leone) in the
future.
The papers presented at the conference are
in the process of publication.  ◆
Afghan Taliban Foreign Minister, 
Wakil Ahmad Mutawakel (centre)
greets returning Afghan hostages.
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K A Z E M  A L A M D AR I
On 18 February 2000, Iran held its 6t h p a r l i a m e n t a r y
elections after the 1979 revolution and the founding
of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). The elections were
yet another challenge to cleric rule. Despite provision-
al measures, the dominant hard-line conservative fac-
tion of the government suffered its third embarrass-
ing defeat of the past three years, the first being the
surprise presidential victory of Sayyed Mohammad
Khatami on 22 May 1997. Secondly, in the municipal
elections of 26 April 1999, reform candidates won a
majority of the 200,000 seats in city and village coun-
cils across the country. Thirdly, in the recent parlia-
mentary elections, the pro-Khatami reform candidates
had a landslide victory. These consecutive triumphs
indicate a strong desire among the people for struc-




Victory for the Reformists
In the recent elections, almost 70% (26.8 mil-
lion) of 38.7 million eligible voters cast bal-
lots. More than 6,000 candidates, including
504 women and 35 non-Muslims, competed
for 290 seats of the Majlis-e Shura-ye Islami,
or parliament. (Five seats are reserved for
non-Muslim religious minorities)1 Despite ef-
forts of the Guardian Council (whose princi-
pal responsibility is to ensure that all the
sanctioned laws and regulations of the parlia-
ment conform to the Islamic standards and
constitutional laws) to prevent reform candi-
dates from entering in the race, the hard-line
conservative candidates lost their 20-year-
long majority hold in the Majlis to pro-Khata-
mi reformists who unified their policies under
reform slogans in 18 political parties and
fronts. In the final months before elections,
the Guardian Council (GC), along with conser-
vative members of the 5t h parliament, passed
various laws in a rush move – mainly concern-
ing the free press – aiming to block the
change. In doing so, the GC extended its su-
pervision of the elections to supervision of
the candidates. These tactics, however, were
to no avail.
Elections 'Iranian style'
Approximately 10% of the candidates (571
individuals) – the most outspoken critics of
the Islamic regime and popular figures – were
rejected by the GC as 'unqualified' or not suf-
ficiently religious to sit in Majlis. Of course,
the reasons were political. The GC considered
critics as 'outsiders'. Having foreseen this, re-
formists had many substitutes among the
6,000 candidates. Despite counteractive
measures by the conservatives, the primary
poll indicates that in the first round some 150
seats were won by reformists (mostly from
the Islamic Iran Participation Front), 40 by
conservatives, and 35 by independent candi-
dates whose political identities have yet to be
determined. Sixty-six seats were left to be
filled in the run-off elections.
Of the 225 candidates who obtained the
minimum requirement of 25% of the votes,
the GC disapproved the election of 11 re-
formists and changed 2 in favour of conserv-
atives in various cities. But the main difficulty
was found in Tehran, where 29 out of 30 seats
were won by reformists. The GC placed an un-
precedented 3-month hold on the election
results. During this period, the conservatives
launched a new set of oppressive measures
to offset the overwhelming victory of pro-re-
form candidates: 1) Saeed Hajarian, the lead-
ing architect of reform and a key figure for
the success of three past elections for presi-
dent, city council and the Majlis, was shot and
seriously wounded by right wing zealots. 2)
Seventeen reformist daily and weekly publi-
cations were shut down following a speech
by the supreme leader and upon conserva-
tive judiciary orders. 3) Several reformist and
prominent liberal writers and journalists, in-
cluding two women, (Mehrangiz Kar, an at-
torney and author of several books, and Shala
Lahiji, writer and publisher) were arrested. 4)
A plot to assassinate President Khatami was
d i s c o v e r e d .2
After three months and just days prior to
the opening of the new Majlis, the GC la-
belled the elections fraudulent and officially
disapproved them, leaving the final decision
to Ayatollah Khamenei. Khamenei, realizing
the extent of tension surrounding the situa-
tion, however, demanded that the election
results be respected. The GC did indeed an-
nounce the results, but with a few changes,
including the cancellation of 534 boxes con-
taining 726,366 votes. It was due to this that
Rafsanjani was moved from 30t h to 20t h p l a c e ;
Alireza Rajaei, a liberal reformist elected in
2 8t h place, was eliminated; and Golamali Had-
dad Adel, a conservative who was ranked in
3 3r d place, was moved to 27t h place. Rafsan-
jani, in a surprise move, gave up his seat
under the pressure of public opinion. As a
powerful figure in the IRI, he is assumed to be
responsible for all actions taken against the
r e f o r m i s t s .
Rafsanjani, a two-term speaker of the
House and two-term president of Iran, cur-
rently holding the powerful position of Expe-
diency Council Chairman, had entered the
race perceiving it an easy victory. He wanted
to regain his position as speaker of the parlia-
ment while holding his current job, so as to
have control over legislation. He wanted to
keep it from going beyond the 'redline' – as
some, including himself, may dare to ques-
tion the IRI leaders of doing – in terms of
abuse of power during 20 years of rule. Con-
servatives dominant in the Majlis passed a
law exclusively for Rafsanjani, allowing him to
stay in his governmental position while run-
ning for the parliament. These IRI leaders
wish to continue to rule society as the 'godfa-
thers' of the revolution. Rafsanjani and a
group of intellectuals and technocrats sur-
rounding him, collectively known as the Ex-
ecutives of Construction Party (ECP), perceive
the reform movement as 'bargaining chips'
for negotiating with their rival groups in the
government, rather than believing in a gen-
uine political democracy.3
Rafsanjani finished with a humiliating 30t h
place among 30 elected members of parlia-
ment in the district of Tehran.4 Even his 30t h
place was questioned as many believe that
there was some 'miscounting' in his favour.
Consequently, a recount was ordered. How-
ever, the Guardian Council decided to put an
end to this, for after 50% of the votes were
tallied, it was clear that the candidate placing
3 1s t, Ali Akbar Rahmani, had approximately
6000 more votes than in the initial count.
Nonetheless, Rafsanjani's tactics to wrestle
political power through illegitimate means
have been overshadowed by the people's de-
sire for genuine political development.
Run-off elections
The final tally on run-offs took place on 19
May 2000 for the 66 remaining seats. Re-
formists won 44 and the rest were evenly di-
vided amongst conservatives and indepen-
dent candidates. Similar to the first round,
the GC did not approve all elected candi-
dates. On 27 May 2000, when the new parlia-
ment was convened, there were 22 elected
reformists still waiting for official GC ap-
proval. The Majlis opened with only 257 of its
290 members. As was expected, the most
conservative cleric of the pro-reform groups,
Mehdi Karubi, was elected the provisional
speaker of Majlis. His victory was the result of
a compromise between conservatives and re-
formists. Karubi was the speaker in the 3rd
Majlis for a period of three years. As many
argue, he does not fully represent the reform
m o v e m e n t .5
S e c u l a r i s t s
Thus far, the reform movement has created
opportunities for pro-reform factions of the
IRI and their associates to compete with rul-
ing conservatives for power. A third group
(secularists) that completely opposes the 're-
ligious-state' was not allowed to enter the
race due to being considered an 'outsider'
g r o u p .
One may ask why the hard-line monopolist
conservatives are willing to allow the 'in-
group' of reformists to enter the circle of
power? The answer is simple. The IRI has lost
its legitimacy that was once based on a tradi-
tional and charismatic leadership. Now, in the
absence of such leadership, the IRI needs
legal recognition. However, the ruling con-
servatives were not able to win more than 15
to 20% of the popular vote. Therefore, in
order to govern they mainly rely upon the
military forces' capacity to maintain a con-
stant tension within the society. Moreover,
the economy is in a deep crisis from which
the youth suffer the most. The conservatives
may risk the entire regime if they continue to
exclude 80% of the population. Participation
of reformists in the government could poten-
tially reduce the tension between the state
and society. Also, it may allow space for the
secularists to respond to some of the civil and
political demands currently not being met.
A comparative analysis of election results of
the past three years for president, Assembly
of Experts, city council and the parliament,
testify to the following distribution of peo-
ple's support for each political group in Iran:
Conservative groups enjoy between 15 to
20%; The pro-Khatami reformists that partial-
ly hold power in the government receive be-
tween 35 to 40%; All independent groups
(collectively referred to above as the 'third
group', or secularists) constitute 40 to 45%.
During the 20 years of Islamic rule, this group
has not been allowed to enter any local or na-
tional race. Its members are encouraged,
rather, to vote for 'in-group' candidates.
Therefore, regarding the policy of choosing
between 'the lesser of two evils', the third
group, at least partially, has expressly sided
with the reformists in all of the past three
e l e c t i o n s .6 The reformist slogans of 'Iran for
all Iranians' and 'rule of law' have served to
contrast the Islamic policy of dividing society
into 'in-groups' and 'out-groups' and have
encouraged secularists to participate in the
e l e c t i o n s .
The trend of democracy
c o n t i n u e s
The 1997 presidential election in Iran con-
stituted a watershed marking a clear break
with the past. It signified the failure of Islamic
ideology to govern a society by force and
marked the end of violence as a means of
achieving power by opposition. Furthermore,
it opened an indirect political dialogue be-
tween the opposition and the government
(or part of the government). The elections
brought repressed popular sentiments to the
fore, which led to public empowerment. The
outcome of the presidential, city council, and
now more obviously, parliamentary elections
thus undermined the position of the conserv-
ative religious leaders. Pushing Iranian soci-
ety to the point of violence is their way to jus-
tify a repressive policy in defense of Islam and
national security. Elections, however, are now
accepted as a means of change for the oppo-
sition. The dominant view among the reform-
ers is that reforms can be realized within the
current system, rather than through the
painful, risky processes of revolution and civil
w a r .
Revolution does not guarantee democracy,
and repressive policies may continue regard-
less of the replacement of an old regime by a
revolutionary one. Today, in Iran, the public
attitude has become predominantly support-
ive of reforms, hence shifting the catalyst of
change from the state to the level of society
itself. This grassroots phenomenon may just
make the difference necessary for genuine
change.  ◆
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Mi dd le  East
A Z AD E H  K I AN - T H I É B AU T
The implementation of the s h a r ica h and the institu-
tionalization of gender inequality in the aftermath of
the Iranian Revolution have provoked general dis-
content among women and triggered their mobiliza-
tion against segregation laws. As a response to their
demands, Islamist women parliamentarians have
been forced to prepare motions to defend more ade-
quately women's needs and rights in both the private
sphere of the family and the public sphere, 
maintaining that the teachings of Islam are not re-
s p e c t e d .
Women's Religious
Seminaries in Iran
Women not only challenge the institutional-
ized gender inequalities by emphasizing
their activity in the economic, social, and po-
litical realms that are not forbidden by the
religious and political elite's reading of the
s h a r ica h, but they also assert their authority
in the religious and judicial realms where
women are denied power. Because authori-
ties justify such prohibitions by referring to
the Qur'an, the s h a r ica h, the h a d i t h ( s a y i n g s
and practices attributed to the Prophet and
the imams) and Islamic tradition, the chal-
lenge for women necessarily entails debates
that revisit and reinterpret Islamic principles.
To this end, women m u j t a h i d s (doctor of ju-
risprudence) are needed more than ever.
Following the death of Mrs Amin-Isfahani, a
woman m u j t a h i d, in the early 1980s, Iran has
been devoid of female religious authorities.
This shortage has led some religious women,
who believe that such undertakings necessi-
tate the training of women in relevant fields,
to create religious seminaries for women.
One of the implications of this undertaking is
the autonomization of women in the realm
of religion. Young women, including univer-
sity or high school students, increasingly
seek religious training and enrol in religious
seminaries. In 1996, out of 62,731 students in
religious seminaries, 9,995 (or 16%) were
women, 34% of whom were in the age group
20-24, and 20% in the age group 15-19. Al-
most 90% of these women resided in urban
a r e a s .1
Fatemeh Amini: founder 
of the earliest women's
s e m i n a r i e s
The first religious seminary for women was
founded in Qom in 1972 by Fatemeh Amini. I
met her in 1994 at her fifth religious seminary,
a modest two-story building in a b a z a r i n e i g h-
bourhood in northern Tehran. Unlike her stu-
dents who wore a m a q n a>eh (headgear), she
wore a black chador. They all take their shoes
off before entering the main hall and walk
around with slippers or socks. While several
older women were sewing a traditional Iran-
ian blanket for the trousseau of a poor bride,
younger ones were doing paperwork, answer-
ing the phone or serving tea. Mrs Amini led me
to a huge room serving as a classroom with no
furniture, covered with cheap Iranian carpets
offered by a b a z a r i. We sat on the floor and she
explained that in addition to training women,
the Mujtahids Fatemeh-ye Zahra religious
seminary also financially and morally assists
deprived women in order to boost their activ-
ity in the public sphere. The seminary has es-
tablished a credit system which collects
money from the pious rich and grants inter-
est-free loans to the poor: 
Our interview was constantly interrupted
by women who called or came by to seek ad-
vice on practical and spiritual matters. Some
had serious family problems, others asked
religious questions. Fatemeh Amini believes
that a woman m u j t a h i d should be capable of
solving a multitude of problems. The follow-
ing is a brief account of her involvement:
'With the support of the late Grand Ayatollah
Kazem Shari'atmadari, I created Maktab-e
T a w h i d in Qom. I then founded three more
seminaries there before moving to Tehran,
where I founded Fatemeh-ye Zahra religious
seminary in 1988.'
A divorced woman and a mother of two
daughters, Fatemeh Amini is convinced of
women's capabilities but regrets the low
self-esteem of her counterparts:
The challenging of dominant
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s
Women's mobilization against 'the dispos-
session of women of their power in the
realm of the sacred'2 is not limited to training
women m u j t a h i d s. Because several articles
of the Civil Code (e.g. men's unilateral right
to divorce and polygamy) find their origins
in the Qur'anic verses, especially that of A l -
N i s a (Women), women challenge the domi-
nant readings by the clergy which they con-
sider as distorted. By presenting their own
interpretations, they intend to show that
Islam accommodates the equality of rights
between women and men. Women who
have religious training are better equipped
to deal with religious issues. For example,
Payam-i Hā j a r, edited by Azam Taliqani, the
daughter of the late radical cleric Ayatollah
Mahmoud Taliqani, was the first to publish
an article (in 1992) refuting the legalization
of polygamy and proposing a new interpre-
tation of the A l - N i s a verse: 
Nahid Shid is a lawyer who has both a reli-
gious and a university education and has ini-
tiated several amendments to the divorce
law, in particular ojrat-ol mesl, the principle
that says when a man files for divorce his
wife can ask to be compensated by her hus-
band for the housework she has carried out
during the marriage. She maintains that 'the
bulk of the enforced laws can and should be
changed because they are not divine orders.
They are based on secondary orders. Blood
money is one of them; it was determined
when men were valorized as warriors who
contributed to the expansion of Islam.
Women, however, were devoid of such so-
cial values. Times have changed and the law
should reflect this change. This law cannot
be functional in a society in which women
are medical doctors, university professors,
engineers, and the like. Blood money should
be the same for men and women.'4
By questioning traditional gender roles
and identities, and by advocating equal
rights, these women are also constructing
their own religious models, thereby acquir-










'In Tehran and Qom we assist several
poor families who have lost their heads of
households. We pay for the educational
and other expenses of their children,
prepare dowry for their daughters, equip
their homes with water and electricity,
etc. We also provide financial assistance
to a school with 2000 students in a poor
neighbourhood of Tehran. We also
provide several female university
students with financial assistance, one of
whom just graduated in engineering. We
have established free loans.'
'Our Prophet raised the status of women
but many of them are still ignorant.
Women have not acknowledged their
own capabilities yet. They do not value
themselves. They have not yet realized
that they can be everything they want to
be: doctors, engineers, mujtahids. They
[men] have not wanted to make women
believe in themselves. I am 61 and work
over 12 hours a day. I obtained my divorce
in 1965 less than two years after my
marriage. I worked and raised my children
alone with a lot of hardship. But I'm proud
of myself because they are both well
educated and successful. One is a medical
doctor and the other is an engineer. My
own parents were against women's
education and did not let me go to school.
I actually obtained my high-school
diploma after the revolution at the age of
47. I was even admitted to university but
decided not to enrol. I then worked as a
schoolmaster in Qom for 6 years but was
not satisfied with my new job and
preferred to go back to religious seminary.
But I had serious disagreements with
others on educational methods and how
to manage a religious seminary for
women. As a result, my working
conditions were not satisfactory in Qom.
Besides, my daughters were studying in
Tehran. I therefore decided to join them
and founded Fatemeh-ye Zahra religious
seminary. Our main aim here is to form
women mujtahids. According to the
Qur'an, men and women are equal. […]
The society needs women doctors and
engineers as well as women mujtahids.
But there is an important resistance
against women attaining the degree of
ijtihad (interpretation). Without these
obstacles, which seriously hinder their
training, we could have had at least 50
women mujtahids since the revolution. A
lot of young women study at these
seminaries but nobody encourages them.
When I came to Tehran nobody [no
religious authority] supported me either
although they all knew me for years. A
bazari provided me with a basement flat
and a factory owner paid my teachers.
One of my students then suggested that
we move to avenue Dowlat and
introduced me to the imam of the
neighbourhood mosque who agreed to
help me. He gave me this building, which
was falling apart. I worked hard for two
months to renovate it and began our
courses shortly afterwards. We are
independent and have over 250 students,
many of whom are also university or high
school students. Like at other religious
seminaries, they study for four years. In
addition to ordinary curricula, common to
other religious seminaries, we also offer
courses on public health, ecology, home
management, and the like. These are
taught by university professors. Owing to
the lack of financial means, I have not
been able to hire an adequate number of
teachers. As a result, many of my students
have been enrolled for five years without
being able to finish all courses. Our aim
here is to educate women mujtahids as
well as women capable of finding
solutions to women's problems, including
their social problems. Our goal is to
contribute to women's development by
giving impetus to their creativity, thereby
also increasing their self-esteem.'
'The analysis of the Qur'anic verse on
polygamy shows that this right is
recommended in some specific cases and
exclusively in order to meet a social need
in view of expanding social justice. […]
Contrary to the ancient time, the modern
state and its social institutions are
conceived to assist needy families.
Therefore, polygamy has no social
function to fulfil. […] It has been shown
that in reality it is pleasure rather than
charity that motivates men to become
p o l y g a m o u s .'3
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There are a few trees left in Beirut, but their branches
are no longer to be seen. Large pictures of men are
hanging on them. There are many grey concrete
buildings in Lebanon (we call them boxes). They are
now quite colourful thanks to the multitude of men's
portraits covering their facades. There is a wonderful
old building on Sodeco square: a magnificent skele-
ton reminding us incessantly of the civil war and its
destructive power. It is no longer proudly defying
the developers who want to erase it to plague Beirut
with another concrete box. It stands there like a des-
olate past looking helplessly at the ridicule it has to
endure: its ornate old columns have been turned into
hangers for the pictures of more men, more wishful
candidates in the Lebanese parliamentary elections
of August 2000.
P h o t o g e n i c
Elections, 
Men and Status 
in Lebanon
Walking through the streets of Beirut, dri-
ving through the 'autostrade' that takes you
to the north of the country or going south of
the capital, you cannot avoid looking up to-
wards these large portraits. You are looking
up, but they do not seem to be looking
down towards you. For despite their thick
moustaches and their desperate efforts,
they fail to emanate a sense of authority, of
traditional notability and status, a tool es-
sential to any z a i m, or leader of men. Per-
haps this failure is caused by the multitude
of juxtaposed and competing pictures. A
notable or a leader should, after all, be easi-
ly distinguishable from 'all the others'. But
with so many pictures of candidates exhibit-
ed and so many candidates wishing to be
selected, are the individual and his message
(on the rare occasion when there is a mes-
sage behind the candidacy) not totally lost
and submerged? These candidates seem to
be projecting their image more than they
project their candidacy or express any soci-
etal concern. According to Freud, 'The ego is
first and foremost a bodily ego…. The pro-
jection of a surface'. Are we not witnessing
here a festival of bodily egos, a clumsy and
adolescent projection of faces? – face (as in
façade) as in w a j i h a and w a j i h (wajih = no-
table or man of status; the root of the word
in Arabic is the same as face). Could we be
looking at an exuberant, Mediterranean ex-
plosion of masculine self-presentation? Are
these thousands of faces telling us some-
thing about Lebanese politics today and the
state of democracy in post-war Lebanon?
Elections are not always
about politics
'When something is about masculinity, it
isn't always about men' wrote Eve Sedgwick
in Constructing Masculinity.1 Looking at the
pictures of these male candidates hanging
above and around the city, trying to con-
vince us to vote for them in the parliamen-
tary elections, it is tempting to say: 'In
Lebanon, when something is about parlia-
mentary elections, it is not always about
politics'. What are these pictures, which
have changed the landscape and colour of
Lebanese streets, roads and public places,
telling us about the state of the country, its
real or imagined identities, the anxieties of
its citizens and the responsibilities of its
leaders and representatives? Do they reflect
the changing patterns of power and domi-
nation after the trauma of war or are they
merely caricatures of its old traditions and
uncertain modernity? On the surface, one is
tempted to believe that these pictures,
often carrying no written message except
for the name of the candidate, seem to be
saying: 'Look at me, I am here, I am a candi-
date. Thus I exist. I am not a nobody'. But
this simple message is very revealing and
essential to the assessment of the place of
the individual in Lebanese society today.
This visual message is an outcry for prestige
and social status in a small Mediterranean
society, where concepts like reputation and
'what the neighbours say or think' are still
very effective and determining factors in
people's behaviour. It is a longing for power
that is now reconciled with the idea of
being reduced to a much smaller scale (the
big matters being increasingly decided
upon by non-elected forces and often in the
interest of neighbouring countries). This vi-
sual exhibition tells us about a society that
has not cut its umbilical cord with its old tra-
ditions in which its leaders and rulers ex-
celled at negotiating authority, gaining ac-
cess to benefits and wealth through net-
works and alliances be it under Ottoman
rule, during the French Mandate or in the
post-colonial era.
Lebanon as a republican
f r a t e r n i t y ?
'By the end of the 1920s, three conflicted
modes of reconstituted authority emerged
and stood in tension with one another,
based on paternalistic privilege, republican
fraternity and universal democracy' wrote
Elizabeth Thompson.2 It is frightening how
this description of Lebanon in the 20s could
be repeated when looking at our candidates
and the multitude of expressions they are
bestowing upon us from their studio made
or photo-shop portraits. Paternalism is defi-
nitely present in some faces that are project-
ing a secure middle-aged man behind re-
spectable moustaches and the advent – just
a touch – of greying hair near his temples.
The large, if not gigantic, size of the poster is
aiming not only at taking our attention away
from the multitude of middle-sized portraits,
but also at making us feel like children look-
ing up to their father. The same moustaches3
above a large smile are definitely aiming at
projecting a cool, brotherly atmosphere. The
candidate may be the son of an old b e y, he
may be just a rich fellow, or a returning mil-
lionaire emigrant, but he is still like us. He
seems to be so easy-going that we could
give him a tap on the shoulder. Yes! Lebanon
is a republican fraternity. Lebanon is indeed
a modern country, a universal democracy –
look at the portraits: all the candidates are
dressed in Western-type suits with austere
ties; they are trying to charm us, normal mor-
tals, into voting for them. They are all pre-
senting themselves as free and autonomous
individuals. There is no mention of coali-
tions, of Syrian veto or the influence of large
families on these portraits. Like all photo-
graphic pictures, they express an indis-
putable truth, but not all of it.
Perhaps we can try to read what the pic-
tures do not say. The following are state-
ments made by 'citizens' conversing about
the elections in August: 
People argue, they make cynical remarks,
but they end up voting. They will vote in their
village or town of origin. They may have lived
and worked for ages in a town where their
parents were not born, it does not matter.
This system has hindered the development of
Lebanese democracy and tied the individual
to his or her family's allegiances and con-
cerns. When an engineer, a teacher or a state
employee goes to vote for a candidate born
in the same place as his father and father's fa-
ther, the concerns, hopes and frustrations of
the large family are more at stake than the de-
cisions and policies of the candidate and his
influence on the parliament.
The various tales of
m a s c u l i n i t y
The photo-portraits present a large array
of masculine traits, from the wise intellectu-
al behind professional glasses, to the secur-
ing smile of a friendly candidate. One candi-
date in the Bekaa Valley decided to present
himself doing fitness exercises in his gar-
den! If the photographs of the candidates
tell us something about men and politics in
Lebanon, they speak of conflicting images
or more accurately of juxtaposed value sys-
tems and of a democracy torn between
some of its rooted traditions and its congen-
ital infirmities. The posters speak of men
who call for your democratic vote while giv-
ing in to clientelism and dictatorial imposi-
tions from higher instances. The few female
candidates hardly change anything in the
male panorama that dominates the facades
of the country.
It is significant that the written messages,
when available, are as insipid as possible:
Ma bi sih illa as-Sahih (Only the right thing is
right!) is the slogan under the Prime Minis-
ter's electoral portrait. Sometimes the mes-
sages betray a ridiculous paranoia: the slo-
gan of an incognito candidate tells us 'Don't
be afraid, I am with you'. Many large posters
on the road to Tripoli contained different
landscapes of Lebanon placed, thanks to
photo-shop techniques, as a background to
the candidate's portrait. One rich immigrant
raised slogans calling, out of the blue and in
full contradiction with his Clark Gable pos-
tures, for women's emancipation.
Lebanon, in this new landscape, seems to
be preparing for a carnival rather than for its
new parliament. The words of the poet
Nadia Tueni come to mind: 'My country tells
me…do take me seriously'. In order to feel
better about it all, I recall the days, those ter-
rible days, when the facades of my country
were covered with the pictures of martyrs
and when the red colour of blood was pre-
dominant. Then, I look at the pictures of our
candidates and indulge in a little smile of
amusement.  ◆
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'X has made a small fortune in Africa, he
thinks that now he can stand on a list
instead of the traditional notable of his
a r e a . '
'This candidate is hoping to make some
money, he is only there in order to be paid
off to retract from the race (by a
prestigious candidate whose prestige is
hurt by the presence of an opponent).
Indeed a real notable should not have
opponents, his prestige and authority
alone should intimidate any pretentious
c a n d i d a t e . '
'Who ever heard of … before the war? His
father was an office boy. Heads of militias
and thieves are now filling our
p a r l i a m e n t . '
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Mi dd le  East
L I S A  W E DE E N
The announcement of Syrian President Hafiz al-
Asad's death on Saturday, 10 June 2000, prompted
panegyrics to his greatness and public displays of
grief. Syrians – those who genuinely admired him
and even those who feared him – may have experi-
enced sadness at his passing. Death has a way of gen-
erating mournful feelings, or at least of inducing ap-
prehension about the future. Yet the political rituals
praising his rule, likening his brilliance to the sun's
and stressing his role as a 'man of the people', were
not new to Syrians. Asad's image was omnipresent
for much of his rule (1970-2000), and the rhetoric of
flattery was commonplace. In newspapers, on televi-
sion and during orchestrated events, Asad was re-
peatedly lauded as the 'father' and the 'gallant
knight'. If only by dint of its repetition, all were fluent
in this symbolic language of the Syrian state, which
had become a hallmark of Asad's rule.
Ambiguities 
after Asad
Asking why a regime would spend scarce re-
sources on a cult whose rituals of obeisance
are transparently phony, I have argued that
Syria's cult of Hafiz al-Asad operated not to
produce belief or emotional commitment –
which the concepts of legitimacy, charisma,
and hegemony presuppose – but to specify
both the form and content of 'civic' obedi-
e n c e .1 Beyond the barrel of the gun and the
confines of the torture chamber, Asad's cult
served as a disciplinary device, generating a
politics of public dissimulation in which citi-
zens acted 'as if' they revered their leader.
By inundating daily life with instructive sym-
bolism, the regime exercised a subtle, yet
effective, form of power. The cult worked to
enforce obedience, induce complicity, iso-
late Syrians from one another, and set
guidelines for public speech and behaviour.
Syrians under Asad both recognized the
disciplinary aspects of the cult and found
ways to undermine them. The fact that so
many politically critical cartoons, films, and
television comedies were published or cir-
culated raised the question of why a regime
would tolerate symbolic affronts to its offi-
cial claims of omnipotence. On the one
hand, these practices were politically effec-
tive to the extent that they counteracted
the atomization and isolation public dissim-
ulation fosters. Whereas seeing others obey
may make each feel isolated in his/her un-
belief, a shared giggle, the popularity of a
comedy skit, the circulation of cartoons and
transgressive stories enabled people to rec-
ognize that the conditions of unbelief were
widely shared. Both permitted and prohibit-
ed methods of registering resistance were
thus partially effective to the extent that
they reasserted this widely shared unbelief.
At the moment when a joke is told and
laughter resounds in the room, people are
cancelling the isolation and atomization
manufactured by a politics of 'as if'. They are
affirming their shared status as unwilling
conscripts. On the other hand, it is precisely
this shared acknowledgment of involuntary
obedience that can make a cult so powerful.
Or to put it differently, Asad's cult was pow-
erful, in part, b e c a u s e it was unbelievable.
The philosopher Slavoj Zizek points out that
even if people keep their ironical distance,
even if they demonstrate that they do not
take what they are doing seriously, they are
still complying, and compliance is what ulti-
mately counts politically.2
Asad's cult cluttered public space with
monotonous slogans and empty gestures,
draining citizens' political energies. The in-
sinuation of formulaic rhetoric and self-serv-
ing state symbolism in the daily lives of citi-
zens habituated people to perform the ges-
tures and pronounce the slogans constitu-
tive of their obedience. Representations of
power and obedience in Syria also operated
to produce power and obedience by dis-
seminating credible t h r e a t s of punishment.
The images of citizens delivering panegyrics
to Asad's rule, collectively holding aloft
placards forming his face, signing oaths in
blood, or simply displaying his picture in
their shop windows, communicated to Syri-
ans throughout the country the impression
of Asad's power independent of his readi-
ness to use it. And the greater the absurdity
of the required performance, the more
clearly it demonstrated that the regime
could make most people obey most of the
t i m e .
It is after the regime's defeat of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood at Hama in 1982, and
Asad's younger brother Rifcat's attempt to
seize power in 1984, that the sacred im-
agery and patently spurious content of offi-
cial rhetoric left the confines of the Bact h
Party and became part of ordinary Syrians'
political lexicon. Although the proliferation
of posters beginning with Asad's coup in
November 1970 implied a new personifica-
tion of power, his cult went increasingly into
operation as a mechanism of civic discipline
when the rhetoric became both flagrantly
fictitious and thoroughly familiar to most
Syrians. By the mid-1980s and throughout
the 1990s, the regime depended heavily on
the disciplinary-symbolic mechanisms con-
stitutive of the cult. Overt coercion – incar-
ceration and torture – declined in the 1990s,
effectively displaced, although not re-
placed, by the insidious forms of social con-
trol characteristic of Asad's cult.
The de-politicizing effects of Asad's cult
on ordinary citizens suggest that to the ex-
tent that political contestations are likely at
all in post-Asad Syria, in the short-run they
will probably occur among Syria's ruling
elite. Political challenges to Bashshar's rule
could come from within the family, from
among members of the cAlawi intelligence
networks, and/or from disaffected parts of
the upper echelons of the Sunni bour-
geoisie. Although there are some who antic-
ipate that Rifcat will return to Syria and lead
what he termed 'the greatest democratic
revolution', it seems unlikely that Rifca t
would be able to take or hold power even if
he were to try. He is reviled by members of
the Sunni commercial classes, as well as by
many cAlawi military men. One of the family
members on whom Bashshar critically relies
is his brother-in-law, General Asif Shawkat.
In the intelligence services, Bashshar's key
ally is General Bahjat Sulayman, who heads
the Internal Branch of the State Security Ser-
vice; he monitors the ministries, the univer-
sity, the press, the parties, and intellectuals.
According to Asad's biographer, Patrick
Seale, Bahjat is credited with being the
'”main manager” of the transition, the “mas-
ter of ceremonies”', for the new regime.3
Continuing strategies of
c o m p l i a n c e
In the immediate aftermath of Asad's funer-
al, the regime initially seemed committed to
continuing the symbolic strategies that nor-
malized external compliance under Asad. In a
characteristic moment of acting 'as if', one of
Rifcat's sons appeared on television and pub-
licly distanced himself from his father. Invok-
ing a well-known familial metaphor from the
official rhetoric, he stated: 'We have no father
other than Hafiz al-Asad.' Crowds shouting
'Bashshar we love you', Syrians carrying black
flags through the streets of Damascus,
women kissing Bashshar's photographs –
these orchestrated acts of 'spontaneity' at-
tested to people's fluency with the language
of the cult. Streets were plastered with the fa-
miliar pictures of the three Asads – Hafiz, his
dead son Basil, who was killed in a car acci-
dent in 1994, and Bashshar. Under Hafiz al-
Asad's picture the caption typically read, 'The
Leader'; under Basil's, 'The Example'; and
under Bashshar's, 'The Future'. These pictures
of the trinity have, for the last six years, sig-
naled the regime's dynastic ambitions at the
same time that they have worked as guide-
lines for acceptable public speech and con-
duct. The fact that the transition has thus far
been peaceful suggests the effectiveness of
the official rhetoric in generating political
compliance.
The new regime's first policy initiatives
have been mixed. Bashshar's interests in the
Internet and his worldliness imply an opening
in discursive space and expanded access to
information. But the introduction of new
technologies does not necessarily undermine
a politics of 'as if', for public dissimulation ac-
quires its force by working not on what peo-
ple think or know, but on how they act. Nev-
ertheless, Bashshar's influence in construct-
ing a new Syrian government headed by
Muhammad Mustafa Miro suggests some
new political and economic possibilities.
There are ambitious plans to use new invest-
ment laws to attract funds from the Gulf and
from Syrian capital abroad, to liberalize the
banking system, to encourage private sector
activity, to revamp the higher education sys-
tem, to curb corruption, and to develop
tourism. Yet there are no guarantees that
these plans will be realized.
Bashshar also seems less willing than his fa-
ther to engage in cult practices. He has re-
portedly ordered the removal of his picture
from all non-governmental buildings, and a
new and relatively open Minister of Informa-
tion has been appointed to enliven the state
media. These measures indicate the decline in
a cult of personality and the emergence of
new, perhaps more liberal mechanisms of so-
cial control. As technocrats supplant the Old
Guard, the political iconography of paterfa-
milias seems to have ceded considerable
ground, to be replaced by advertising images
and by new techniques of population man-
agement. Bashshar's promise to activate the
National Front – a coalition of political groups
dominated by the Bacth party – may signal
the regime's readiness to entertain more di-
verse opinions in Syrian political life, but it
may just mean that citizens and politicians
will be expected to act 'as if' Syria is a multi-
party state. A recent amnesty granted to po-
litical prisoners, including members of the
Muslim Brotherhood and some communists,
continues a trend begun under Asad. In De-
cember 1995, as part of an amnesty marking
the 25th anniversary of Asad's rule, approxi-
mately 1200 political prisoners were released
on condition that they sign an oath of loyalty.
Bashshar's recent announcement to increase
salaries for public sector employees by 25%
means that workers will now earn 100 dollars
a month – still too little to live on. Indeed, the
optimism that seems to attend the an-
nouncement of such moves harks back to his
father's early days when Asad's Corrective
Movement ushered in the man who was him-
self viewed as more open and pragmatic than
his Bacthist counterparts.
On the assumption that state socialism will
increasingly give way to the effects of global
capitalism, new opportunities for rebellion
may also emerge. If resistance to economic
changes occur, they would most likely be in-
stigated by those who are hurt directly by
market reforms. To the extent that the Asad
regime, as opposed to the cult, was able to
distribute goods and services in return for
some measure of genuine loyalty, a widening
gap between rich and poor in a market-ori-
ented, post-Asad era may produce political
conflicts among groups that had previously
been protected by welfare policies, such as
students, teachers, and salaried professionals.
The obedience-based strategies that char-
acterized Asad's Syria may well give way to
market mechanisms of social control in the
long-run, but building market-based compli-
ance takes time. Cultivating desires for com-
modities, firing employees who fail to per-
form efficiently, introducing incentives that
foster competition among people who other-
wise might collectively organize in opposi-
tion – these are the sorts of disciplinary ef-
fects that liberal markets tend to generate.4
Were they to be adopted, liberal markets
would also undoubtedly produce novel occa-
sions for transgression, inventive ways of
staying safe, and new limits to what appears
reasonable, questionable, sayable – or maybe
even thinkable.  ◆
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Ea st  Af r ic a
S H AM I L  J E P P I E
Because of calls in northern Nigeria for the full imple-
mentation of sharia, Islamic law in Africa has re-
ceived much attention recently. The spotlight usual-
ly falls on the other side of the continent – on the
Sudan – since the promulgation of the 1983 'legal
revolution' of Numayri and where no constitutional
debate has been free of major political struggles
over the question of sharia. But apart from these two
sub-Saharan countries, there is very little general
knowledge on or scholarship about the history,
ethnography or politics of Islamic law on the conti-
nent. Yet because of the Muslim presence, in large or
small numbers, in the populations of all African
countries, recognition of Islamic laws in many
African states has, since independence, been fraught
with political controversy. In certain cases, it is part
of 'customary law', in others it stands independently
but always secondary to state law and maintains a
curious relation to customary law. 'Muslim personal
law' has been and continues to be a focus of debate




A project to investigate the history, politics
and current situation of Muslim personal
law in Africa is underway at the Centre for
Contemporary Islam at the University of
Cape Town. With the support of the Ford
Foundation, the project, under the direction
of Professor Ebrahim Moosa, entails a series
of studies on the subject. The project has
begun by commissioning country surveys
and thematic studies from African scholars
with follow-up conferences and consulta-
tions. The first conference was held in Dar-
es-Salaam in the middle of July on Islamic
law in East Africa (with papers on Mozam-
bique, Mauritius, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda,
Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and a paper on
Z i m b a b w e ) .1
I S I M
O n l i n e
The ISIM website (www.isim.nl) is in
the process of establishing itself online
in the field of the study of Islam and
Muslim societies. One of the main func-
tions of the ISIM website is to provide a
'cyber-secretariat' offering the latest on
ISIM activities and programmes. This
means that, even more so than the I S I M
N e w s l e t t e r, the ISIM website offers up-
date information on calls for papers and
application deadlines, as well as specific
and more elaborate information on
workshops and conferences. Moreover,
after such events have taken place, the
ISIM publishes the outcome and papers
on the website so as to further dissemi-
nate results and follow-up activities.
Application forms for all ISIM activities
can be downloaded from the site so as
to facilitate the application process. Fur-
thermore, the ISIM questionnaire, which
serves as the basis for the ISIM database
and mailing list, can be printed out from
the site and sent into the ISIM. The ISIM
aims at offering its Internet services to
all relevant institutes world-wide. In
order to do so, we ask that you send any
relevant hyperlinks to the following e-
mail: isim@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
Islamic law in colonial East
A f r i c a
Some common themes emerged from the
papers. The heritage of British colonialism
has shaped the legal regimes in each coun-
try with the exception of Mozambique,
which was under Portuguese rule, and
Ethiopia, which had no Western colonial
power ruling it except, briefly, Italy. The
British colonial experience and legacy thus
features strongly in any discussion of post-
colonial law in East Africa. Was there a uni-
fied British colonial policy regarding sharia
and specifically Muslim personal law? There
was no unified colonial approach although
there were unifying elements, most promi-
nent of which was the determination to give
Islamic law as narrow a range of jurisdiction
as possible. Its applicability was also defined
by arbitrary geographical 'facts'. Thus,
coastal Kenya and Zanzibar could have Is-
lamic laws but not the Kenyan interior (i.e.
beyond the 10 miles that defined the coast)
or inland Tanganyika. In the latter, after
World War I, 'Mohammedan law' was per-
mitted as part of customary law. The meth-
ods and texts used in 'Mohammedan courts'
in British India played an influential role in
the way Islamic law was implemented in
East Africa. There was also some cross-fertil-
ization of colonial practices from other parts
of Britain's African empire. The colony of
Natal was once looked to for precedents on
how to deal with South Asian Muslims in
K e n y a .
Islamic law in independent
East Africa
The major concern of the project is Islamic
law in post-colonial Africa. After indepen-
dence, there was the dominant common
law, passed on from the colonial powers,
and in most cases customary law, in terms of
which Muslim personal law was given scope
and/or accepted as an independent set of
laws. Tanzania adopted a single unified
legal system in 1964, and after the revolu-
tion in Zanzibar, parallel secular and Islamic
systems were introduced to the island. On
the mainland, while there are no courts to
handle Muslim issues, a magistrate is re-
quired to sit with at least two Muslim asses-
sors. Customary law is recognized in both
places and there have been cases of conflict
between Muslim personal and customary
laws. On the mainland, customary law takes
precedence over Islamic law. The former
Chief Justice of Zanzibar, Augostino Ra-
madanhi, reflected on the problems and
prospects of what he called the 'dual trends'
in the Tanzanian-Zanzibari legal systems. In
Kenya, after independence in 1963, Kadhi
courts were given a constitutional guaran-
tee of continuation but the question since
then has been the jurisdiction of these
c o u r t s .
The locus of the practice of Islamic law
was, and is, the Kadhi courts, known under
British rule as 'subordinate native courts'.
The history, structure and contemporary
role of these courts throughout East Africa
featured strongly in most of the papers and
discussions. The Kadhi of Nairobi, Kadhi
Hammad Qasim, was present at the confer-
ence and spoke about his experience as a
Muslim judge and the challenges facing
these courts. He spoke especially about the
experience of dealing with Nairobi Muslim
women and covered pressing issues rang-
ing from divorce to AIDS. Susan Hirsch, au-
thor of a recent ethnography on women
and the Kadhi courts,2 presented recent
work on the state bureaucracies, Islamic law
and women in Kenya and Tanzania. She was
particularly concerned with showing how
law expresses particular concepts of gender
and constructs gender identities. Yet she
demonstrated how women find their own
legal authority through the Kadhi courts
even though these courts are run by men.
While Islamic law is symbolically connected
to men, in Kenya the Islamic courts are seen
as places of women; the courts have been
'feminized', as Hirsch argued.
Islamic law is an issue of great importance
in East Africa, both within the Muslim com-
munities and in the relations between these
communities and their governments. It has
always been and will remain an issue that
politicians and social movements can use to
mobilize Muslim constituencies. This oc-
curred in Tanzania in 1998 when a Member
of Parliament from the opposition party in-
troduced a motion for the introduction of
Kadhi courts. This has been an issue for ma-
nipulation in the Tanzanian elections this
y e a r .
The experience of the Muslim communi-
ties of Kenya, Tanzania and Zanzibar are
strikingly different to those of Mozambique,
where both under Portuguese colonialism
and Frelimo rule only state law was recog-
nized. However, in March 2000 a draft of the
family law recognized 'traditional' and 'reli-
gious' marriages. In Ethiopia, Muslim per-
sonal law operates under a system of Feder-
al Shariat Courts, which are currently being
re-organized. In the Sudan, the state has ef-
fectively nationalized Islamic law.
While the statutory acceptance of Muslim
personal law has always been part of the
broader political process, Muslims them-
selves have not all been equally concerned
with its recognition by the state. In Mauri-
tius, Muslims had their personal laws recog-
nized in 1981 but this was repealed in 1987,
causing widespread Muslim reaction. Yet,
only 10% of Muslim marriages were sancti-
fied in terms of official Muslim personal law.
In Zimbabwe, the Muslim minority has not
raised the issued – unlike their counterparts
in South Africa, where the question has
been subject to heated debate among Mus-
lim organizations since the early 1980s,
without much consensus. Indeed, in South
Africa, the newest government-appointed
commission recently issued its report and
awaits the responses from the community.
Furthermore, in East Africa, ethnic and sec-
tarian divisions have determined various at-
titudes. Muslims from South Asian back-
grounds, and who are Ismaili or Ithna Ashari,
generally do not use the Kadhi courts and
have informal structures for their communi-
ties while also using the state law.
Conceptual questions
The structural effect of colonialism on the
substance, practice and institutions of Is-
lamic law was a recurring theme throughout
the conference. Professor Issa Shivji sug-
gested that notions such as 'Muslim person-
al law' were inventions of a dominant colo-
nial discourse foisted onto Muslim subjects.
He called for greater suspicion of the terms
of the debates about law. In a similar vein,
Professor Mahmood Mamdani suggested
that just as 'customary law' was largely a
construct of colonialism, so too did British
colonial authorities aim to freeze Islamic law
into narrowly defined areas minus its au-
tonomous logic. The role and corpus of the
legal and missionary scholars who pro-
duced the standard works on Islam and Is-
lamic law in Africa, such as Anderson, Coul-
son, Fitzgerald, and Trimingham, need criti-
cal study – as suggested Professor Bruce
Lawrence. These authors were present in
the contents or footnotes of virtually every
paper, yet there was no discussion of the
way in which they constructed the field of
'Islamic law in Africa'.
The state and law are closely connected
spheres. The contraction and weakening of
the African state also witnesses growing
claims for more recognition of cultural dif-
ference and its inscription into law. Muslims
have come to voice their grievances loudly
and energetically against a perceived un-
sympathetic state, often recreating an
imagined idyllic African Islamic past as was
clear in the papers on Uganda which dealt
with the Domestic Relations Bill of 1998. At-
tempting to exit from the established order
is another option. Implicit in many papers
was the growth of an 'anti-state' discourse
among various sectors of the Muslim public,
and calling for 'Islamic law' expressed this
d e s i r e .
The second conference of the project will
be held early in 2001 in Senegal and will
focus on Islamic law in post-colonial West
Africa. The various conference proceedings
will be edited and published.  ◆
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D O R OT H E A E .  S C H U L Z
Since 1991, when multi-party democracy was estab-
lished in Mali, there has been a remarkable prolifera-
tion of Muslim associations that call for moral renewal
of Malian society and for spreading the teachings of
Islam. Some associations make extensive use of broad-
cast technology, helping them create transnational
communities of believers at an unprecedented rate.
Women play a prominent role in these associations,
not only as followers, but as self-appointed spokes-




in Urban MaliMany members of the Western-oriented eliteexplain the Muslim associations' current suc-
cess by the substantial financial support they
receive from the Arab world, but the reasons
for their prominent position in the national
arena are far more complex. They are the
most recent expression of a long history of in-
tellectual and material exchange between
Muslim West Africa and the Arab world – and
more recently, cities of the West.1 Contrary to
their supposed literalist readings of written
sources and claims to authentic ritual prac-
tices – seen by the associations themselves as
countering the corrupting influences of the
West – these Malian initiatives can be under-
stood as locally variable incorporations of
Western consumer culture and notions of
subjecthood and achievement, and of reli-
gious symbols and accessories from the Arab
world. This heterogeneous and sometimes
contradictory legacy of current Muslim move-
ments in Mali is clearly expressed in the field
of education, where the struggle for access to
political and economic resources in the post-
colonial state is predominant.2
There are but a few associations that call for
the introduction of the sharica. Most of them
emphasize faith as a matter of personal con-
viction and moral conduct. Their view strong-
ly individualizes religious identity. This con-
cern with individual conviction offers an ex-
plicitly 'modern' element to the associations'
search for identity in a public arena where the
government, although controlling education-
al and broadcasting institutions, does not
hold the monopoly over resources of ideolog-
ical orientation. In fact, the government is
deeply ambivalent about the whether, and
the extent to which, a 'Malian' path towards
modernity should be based on 'occidental ' or
'Islamic' values.
The public debate over Malian
moral values
The competing versions of what constitutes
the basis for 'authentically Malian' moral val-
ues constitute a central field of contention
and ideological struggle among Muslim asso-
ciations and socio-political interest groups.
Central to the public debate is a concern with
what is seen as the dissolution of traditional
values and social solidarity under the on-
slaught of Westernization. Instead of criticiz-
ing the degrading living conditions which are
a source of growing intergenerational and
gender conflict, Muslim leaders attract follow-
ers by presenting these difficulties as a matter
of moral decadence, proposing individual
moral betterment as the remedy. Very similar
to the moral wars waged in other countries in
response to radical changes in living condi-
tions, women, in their roles as responsible
mothers and dutiful wives, are given a central
role as guardians of tradition. Women's dress
code and bodily enactment of chastity be-
come central icons of moral conduct.
The movements differ substantially in their
relationships with current political leadership
and its decidedly secularist orientation. They
also set themselves apart from the leading
marabout clans and representatives of the
Sufi brotherhoods that form a substantial part
of the religious establishment. The new Mus-
lim initiatives are especially critical of the
practice of curing illnesses attributed to oc-
cult forces, which they perceive as corruption
of Islamic practices. That they distance them-
selves does not necessarily imply that they do
not believe in occult forces causing misfor-
tune and illness. Rather, they condemn that
many self-appointed marabouts turn the fab-
rication of amulets and other protective
'medicines' into an expanding, lucrative busi -
ness.
The new Muslim associations are primarily
an urban phenomenon, both in their social
basis and in that they address concerns ema-
nating from life in the city. The social back-
ground of members varies considerably:
while some groups recruit their followers pri-
marily from graduates from Western schools,
other groups are composed of people from
lower urban classes (artisans, petty traders,
people working in the informal sector of
town). Apart from regular attendance of
group meetings and celebrations, a person
manifests his or her membership by adopting
a dress and behavioural style considered 'dis -
tinctively Muslim'.
A sanctioned space for women
Membership in an association provides ac-
cess to a network that facilitates income-gen-
erating activities across national boundaries,
spreading from Mali to its neighbouring
countries and the Arab world. While this com-
bination of religious and occupational identi -
ties and the resulting economic networks per-
petuates a long-standing tradition, some new
exchange items have been added to older
commodities. These include home-made arti-
cles that recombine elements of Western,
West African and Arab consumer style, such
as all-purpose religious 'print' media in the
form of T-shirts, dresses, scarves, posters and
stickers featuring surats, religious leaders and
their most famous citations. Women's re-
markable public visibility and engagement in
group activities show that their significance
extends beyond the limited status they are
accorded by male authorities as emblems of
an untouched Islamic tradition. Some older
women from wealthy families, having ac-
quired literacy in Arabic, hold gatherings at
least twice weekly to teach women appropri-
ate ritual conduct and Arabic. The historical
antecedents of these female initiatives date
back to colonial times, but they were then re-
stricted mostly to elite women.3There are
now far more women from various back-
grounds publicly proclaiming and enacting
their faith. In their claims and teachings, they
deal with the dilemmas and difficulties arising
from modern life in towns. Their teachings
place a strong emphasis on their roles as
mothers and wives, invested with greater re-
sponsibility as guardians of Islamic values.
Self-restriction, patience, modesty, frugality,
and submission to the will of one's husband
and in-laws are the norms that should guide
and express the newly found Muslim identity
of these women. In the face of the difficulties
and moral dilemmas of everyday life, commu-
nal prayers and learning give women a sense
of spiritual empowerment and, occasionally,
of moral superiority.
Women's group activities can be seen as an
attempt to create emotional certainty and
normative orientation in a situation where
patriarchal authority and ideology are in-
creasingly questioned. Women's increasing
contributions to family maintenance, in par-
ticular among the lower classes, collides with
the ideal of man as the principal provider. A
major incentive for women to attend group
meetings is that they offer social, emotional
and some financial support. Socializing with
women with similarly modest life-styles liber-
ates women from the social pressure to prove
sociability through their capacity to spend.
Also, the small contributions collected during
group meetings are given out to members to
enable them to overcome financially difficult
situations or to start a small-scale trade enter-
prise. The meetings provide a sanctioned
space for informal interaction, the exchange
of information, and even gossip. Many men
strongly oppose their wives' joining a credit
savings group (which even many women dis-
trust because of the many stories of failure
and misappropriation of group funds), but no
husband can prevent his wife from joining
such a group without risking being called a
'bad Muslim.'
Reaching out to a
transnational community
A major factor facilitating Muslim women's
public prominence is the extensive use of
local radio stations and audio-cassettes to dis-
seminate to a larger public their visions of an
Islamic renewal and of the role that women
should play. These women's credibility as
spokeswomen of 'Islamic morals' is widely ac-
knowledged – and often more appreciated
than that of male representatives of Muslim
associations. Although these female speakers
articulate their call for moral renewal in ways
that support male authorities' conservative
outlook on gender roles and conduct,
women's sermons appeal to many men and
women, not only members of associations,
because they articulate a widespread concern
with the loss of social solidarity. Moreover,
they represent current difficulties of urban life
as something to be resolved by individual
women's 'better' conduct. Thus, one implica-
tion of women's use of broadcast media is
that it allows them to very audibly accord
themselves a prominent role in the moral re-
newal.
Broadcasting changes the character of the
sermons, because it dislocates the site of re-
ception, expands the audience, and allows for
a recombination of various narrative styles.
Audio-taped sermons can be dissociated
from the original, often public and male-dom-
inated, setting of its deliverance and may be
circulated among a wider audience and in
various settings, such as at home, on the mar-
ket and in the street. As women have easier
access to the sermons, they can debate their
contents and turn the message into some-
thing meaningful to their lives. As many
preachers blend various oral genres, religious
sermons turn into a type of popular entertain-
ment broadcast on the media and consumed
during work and leisure time activities.
The audio-taped (and increasingly video-
taped) sermons and proclamations of an 'Is-
lamic renewal' address an audience that is no
longer defined by territorial boundaries, but
reaches out to a transnational community of
believers, with the Arab world as its centre of
reference but including expatriates in North
America and Europe. In this sense, Malian
Muslim associations not only respond to lo-
cally specific dilemmas of Malian urban life,
but are constitutive of a transnational com-
munity that promotes 'religious identity' as
part of a modern life-style reflected in the
eclectic incorporation of icons of Western





b a p t i z i n g
c e r e m o n y .
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West  Af r ic a
F AB I E N N E  S AM S O N
If the Senegalese youth have, in majority, always
manifested great fervour for their religion by strong
involvement in t u r u q,1 it seems that today they are
rather investing their energies in the new Islamic
movements that are specific branches of their origi-
nal Sufi orders. While retaining close ties with and
even reproducing the teachings of the latter, these





Islam in Senegal, by virtue of its historical
implantation, is generally practised within
the t u r u q, the greatest numbers of followers
of which belong to the Tijaniyya and the
Mouridis. For more than a century, re-
searchers have shown particular interest in
the latter, indigenous to Wolof territory and
fascinating for its economic activism and its
capacity to adapt itself to social change.
However, the Tijaniyya, originating in the
Maghreb and divided over several
marabout families in Senegal, remains the
t a r i q a with the most adepts.
The Dahiratoul Moustarchidina wal
Moustarchidaty, gathering at its base young
followers of the Tijaniyya (Tijans) who have
taken an oath of allegiance to the Sy family
of Tivaouane, has set itself apart since 1993
by its political orientation. This has meant
severing ties with its affiliated brotherhood
and has transformed the Dahiratoul
Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty into a
politico-religious movement.
From religion to politics
The main caliphs of the Tijaniyya in Sene-
gal are all members of the Sy family, a
marabout lineage based in Tivaouane. It is
thus in this city that the Dahiratoul
Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty was
born in 1973. Its origins as well as its real
founders are vague and discourse on the
subject contradictory. Nonetheless, it is
highly probable that the caliph of that peri-
od, Abdoul Aziz Sy, encouraged his grand-
children to regroup themselves in a d a a i r a
to learn the Qur'an. One of the grandsons,
Moustapha Sy, moral leader of the current
movement, began to follow in this direction
in the early 1980s. In this same period, fol-
lowing the Iranian Revolution, numerous
movements of Muslim youth (notably the
Mourid youth movement) were created in
Senegal. Moustapha Sy, in response to this
competition, spread the Dahiratoul
Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty
throughout the territory (from then on the
d a a i r a became a genuine movement) more
particularly in Dakar, where he established
his headquarters. He created a pyramid-
shaped hierarchy. Moustapha Sy, uncon-
tested leader aided by his advisors, lead his
followers with extreme precision in his
teachings (e.g. the way one was to dress and
to behave). His orders were transmitted to
the leaders of each sector, zone and section,
from the top to the bottom of the pyramid.
Until the 1980s, the doctrine taught to
adepts was that of the Tijaniyya, and
Moustapha Sy maintained close relations
with Tivaouane from his base in Dakar. In
the early 1990s, he improved relations with
his father, Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy, who, as
a result of a family disagreement, lived in
Dakar cut off from Tivaouane. Moustapha Sy
aligned himself according to the directives
of his father, who then – in his son's shadow
– became the veritable leader and was
named spiritual guide of the movement.
Since then, the line of conduct of the
Dahiratoul Moustarchidina wal Moustarchi-
daty has changed: being clearly defined as
apolitical in its preamble, it suddenly be-
came a religious movement with political
involvement. On 13 February 1993,
Moustapha Sy intervened in a meeting with
Abdoulaye Wade and declared his support
of the Senegalese Democratic Party (Parti
Démocratique Sénégalais – PDS) for the
presidential elections against Abdou Diouf.
His discourse was remarkable since, for the
very first time, Moustapha Sy presented
himself incontestably as a young, modern
marabout breaking with the attitudes of the
spiritual guides of Tivaouane. He involved
himself in the electoral game, haranguing
the crowd like a politician and showing a
certain attraction for reformist discourse on
Islam – despite his being the heir of a Sufi
t r a d i t i o n .
Since then, the leader of the Moustarchi-
dine has never left the political scene, which
was to lead to his imprisonment and the
prohibition of his movement by the govern-
ment in 1994. In 1996, he reconciled with
the Socialist Party (Parti Socialist PS) and the
d a a i r a was rehabilitated. By 1999, he had
announced his desire to found his own po-
litical party. With the Senegalese constitu-
tion not allowing religious-based parties, he
rejoined an already-existing party, the Unity
and Rally Party (Parti de l'Unité et du
Rassemblement, PUR) of the Diouf
Caliphate. He became president of the party
and declared, in January 2000, his candidacy
for the presidential elections of February
2000. But this was not to last more than
three days for Moustapha Sy immediately
retreated under the orders of his father.
Explanations of this
p o l i t i c i z a t i o n
During the reign of Ababacar, father of
Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy and caliph from
1922 to 1957, serious contention broke the
Sy family in two: the father and son on one
side, openly opposed to other members of
the family, half-brothers of the caliph. This
crisis worsened with the succession to the
throne since Abdoul Aziz Sy, opposed to
Ababacar, was elected caliph. Sheikh
Ahmed Tidjane Sy, who was always consid-
ered the successor of his father, has since
unceasingly claimed his right to the
caliphate. As Villalon explains,2 his entire
marabout and political career are interpret-
ed under the angle of his will to compete
with Tivaouane by regrouping his father's
followers so as to found a sort of parallel
b r o t h e r h o o d .
The coming together of Sheikh Ahmed
Tidjane Sy and his son Moustapha was ac-
companied by the latter's break with
Tivaouane. The new political line of Dahira-
toul Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty
should also be understood as a strategy still
aiming to position the father in the
marabout field. In 1993, during the presi-
dential elections, Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy
was removed from the public scene. Yet in
that period the caliph of the Tijans was
aging. The question of succession was soon
to be posed. Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy thus
had to reinforce his marabout status in the
eyes of his followers. But his position of re-
treat prevented him from doing so. At the
same time, Moustapha Sy needed to consol-
idate his legitimacy. Allying with the oppo-
sition allowed him to re-establish ties with
urban youth, unhappy with the current
regime, and also to recruit adepts for his fa-
ther by explaining that the political posi-
tioning of the movement was a decision
emanating from Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy
h i m s e l f .
The strategy of politicization brought with
it changes in the movement's proclaimed
religious education. From Tijan apprentice-
ship, strictly religious, the movement orient-
ed its teachings in such a way as to trans-
form adherents into Muslim patriots. The
latter learned to rationalize their daily acts
in order to correspond to a type of 'perfect'
behaviour and to act in service of the com-
munity. They became ambassadors of an
ideal Islamic society yet to be constructed.
The non-religious state was to be combat-
ed, society lost in Western atheism to be
changed. It became necessary to return to
the real values of Islam.
Consequences of
p o l i t i c i z a t i o n
The Dahiratoul Moustarchidina wal
Moustarchidaty is composed of two types of
followers: those from a relatively wealthy
social background and/or those with an oc-
cupation allowing them to participate in so-
cial life (artists, journalists, academics, etc.);
and those from less wealthy backgrounds
that generally have an occupation involving
them to a lesser degree in social activities.
The former, which constitute a sort of elite
within the movement, are close to
Moustapha Sy in his political choices; while
the others, who constitute the majority of
followers, are often not completely in step
with the positions assumed by their leader,
whom they have difficulty in understand-
ing. Most adepts, in fact, consider the move-
ment first and foremost of a religious nature
(which is why they adhere to it). They feel
that political matters are not of their con-
c e r n .
How can a movement, declared as politi-
co-religious by its leaders, be non-militant
at its base? How can one explain the move-
ment's incessant political turnarounds?
How can one understand its discourse,
more concerned with social aspects than
with political ones? How can one approach
such a closed movement, which threatens
its detractors while maintaining an image of
openness and tolerance? 
The attitudes and desires of the
Moustarchidine leaders are difficult to read.
However, Moustapha Sy does not seem to
genuinely want to take power. Politics
would be for him a way in which to distin-
guish himself from other religious guides
and to make himself heard at the level of the
state: the movement is composed of thou-
sands of followers – and thus thousands of
v o t e r s .
It is quite apparent that religious leaders
are increasingly directly involved in the po-
litical sphere in Senegal. This was confirmed
during the last presidential election: the reli-
gious discourse was extremely present dur-
ing the electoral campaign and, in addition
to Moustapha Sy, two other Muslim guides
presented their candidacies. Many wanted
to clearly demonstrate that, as citizens, they
too had the right to participate in politics.
Nevertheless, the n d i g a l s3 have never failed
as they did during the last election. It seems
that religious leaders' efforts to influence
citizenship are no longer within their reach:
following their advice, people did indeed
vote, but also demonstrated political matu-
rity by considering the act of voting as in in-
dividual act. Does the end of the n d i g a l s a l s o
mean an end to political Islam in Senegal at
the very moment that the religious leaders
are more mobilized than they have ever
been?  ◆
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T u r k e y
E L I S E  M AS S I C A RD
The Hacibektaş festival has become, in the last
decade, the main public event of Alevism in Turkey.
It is characterized both by its undetermined nature
between religion, culture, folklore and politics, and
by the diversity of its participants and scenes. The
process of assertion of a contested identity and ne-
gotiation of public space are vital to understanding
Alevism as it exists today.
Uncovering Alevism,
Covering Difference
Alevis are a large heterodox Islamic syncretis-
tic minority, consisting of approximately 15
million Turkish and Kurdish-speaking mem-
bers. Isolated communities with a wide range
of local customs were bound together by a
segmentary structure until massive migra-
tion, beginning the 1950s, brought with it
(mainly to the cities of Turkey and Europe) the
loss of traditional means of transmitting her-
itage, the weakening of the socio-religious
structure and secularization.
A revival movement began at the end of
the 1980s under the influence of the fall of the
USSR, Islamization of state and society, and
the Kurdish movement. Breaking the century-
old tradition of secrecy, some Alevis have
been trying to assert a collective identity and
to re-define their place in society, which has
resulted in a process of re-construction of
community structures, beliefs, and rituals.
However, this process became very con-
flictual due to the lack of both a binding text
and of a central authority able to lead Alevism
and to determine its signification. Many intel-
lectuals from the newly educated middle
class with various ideological backgrounds
have been trying to define Alevism, thus com-
peting with the holy lineages. As a result, very
different conceptions of Alevism coexist
nowadays, and are asserted through a selec-
tive use of history and traditions: some claim
Alevism to be a purely religious matter – a
branch of Islam, a religion of its own, or even
atheist – while others prefer defining it politi-
cally, as a philosophy of resistance, a way of
life characterized by tolerance, or the very tra-
dition of democracy. On an ethnic scale, some
bring its (Turkish) Shaman features to the
fore, while others emphasize the (Kurdish)
Zoroastrian elements. Moreover, the fact that
this issue has also been argued outside Ale-
vism has increased its politicization.
In this context, while many local rituals and
pilgrimages are being re-activated, mostly by
city dwellers, the main Alevi meeting point
and public event, the annual Hacibektaş festi-
val, is far from being a 'traditional' ritual.
Historical developments
The dervish lodge at Hacibektaş, the head-
quarters of the Bektashi order, was closed –
like all Sufi orders in Turkey – in 1925. Howev-
er, the site continued to be a place of pious
visits due to both its ritual functions and the
location there of the mausoleum of the
order's founder, Haci Bekta̧s Veli. In 1958, after
a relaxation of the anti-religious drive, the
restoration of the lodge began, and a muse-
um was opened in 1964 as a result of a local
initiative strongly influenced by Bektashi cir-
cles. In August of each year since then, cere-
monies of commemoration have been held in
honour of this saint.
The organizers had to deny any religious
motives in order to persuade the authorities
to allow their 'purely touristic' initiative. Thus,
pilgrims come together with folk dancers in
'traditional' costumes of varying degrees of
authenticity and folk musicians.
In the 1970s, along with a general political
polarization in Turkey, the festival organiza-
tion passed into the hands of young men
yearning for radical political change, and left-
wingers swept in to disseminate their views.
After 1980, the municipality, assisted by the
state, took over the responsibility of organiz-
ing the festival. More and more ministers and
representatives from all parties began attend-
ing, making speeches or sending messages –
even the President has been attending since
1994. Hacibektaş has become a place for po-
litical bargaining, expressing demands and
promises.
Alevi associations too have been increas-
ingly active in the festival and use this occa-
sion to mobilize participants and to discuss
important issues. The festival has increased in
scope with the 'Alevi revival'. Quite interest-
ingly, new pilgrimage practices to Hacibektaş
have appeared in recent years. The newspa-
per Cumhuriyet stated that some 500,000 par-
ticipants were expected to attend in 1998.
As a result, this event has managed to im-
pose its centrality, both within the Alevi com-
munity and without. Still, its very develop-
ments show its undetermined nature, lying
somewhere between a pilgrimage, festival,
and commemoration. This imprecision is re-
flected in the differing names given to it: Haci
Bektaş Veli Kültür-Sanat Şenlikleri, Etkinleri, or
Anma Törenleri.
Diversity of actors and scenes
This indeterminacy also reflects the diversi -
ty of actors, activities, and logics coexisting
during the festival. Visitors come from all over
Turkey, Europe and beyond (many taking ad-
vantage of their summer holiday to Turkey),
and from very diverse backgrounds – from
peasants to the President. In contrast to an in-
stitutionalized pilgrimage like the one to
Mecca, there is no rigid procedure to be fol-
lowed and no obligation to visit all sites. Actu-
ally, visitors pursue different activities and
concerns. Thus, the festival is characterized
by a great variety of scenes (both official and
un-official), of constituencies and participato-
ry modes.1
The most massive scene is the official open-
ing ceremony, with political speeches and
semah (ritual dance) performances, reported
by the media on a national scale. But there are
many other places with different activities:
the lodge/museum, where some 'perform
their rituals regardless of curious tourists and
the objections of museum officials'2; private
houses, where Bektashis from all over Turkey
and beyond gather, exchanging news and
views; the streets, mainly a place for commer-
cial and political publicity for parties and
movements, through tracts and books; ritual
places, where sacrifices and 'superstitious'
practices are performed by a chiefly rural
population; the public seminar rooms, with
leading academicians, writers and leaders of
associations; the encampments where politi-
cal groups, mostly illegal left-wingers, dis-
seminate their publications in order to recruit
without being caught by security forces; and
concert halls overcrowded with young peo-
ple.
The divergent opinions on Alevism coexist
peacefully during the festival, although most
participants are conscious of these differ-
ences and criticize the 'others': 'these young
people don't even know the signification of
the semah they are performing, they are per-
verting Alevism'. Interestingly enough, these
differences are rarely publicly expressed dur-
ing the event, yet they manifest constantly
through private discussions.
Central role of symbols and
the assertion of community
The lack of consensus concerning the na-
ture of Alevism is covered during the festival
by the use of shared symbols – like Atatürk,
Ali, Pir Sultan, Haci Bektaş himself (represent-
ed by various sculptures and images), slo-
gans, semahs, and even words like 'Alevi' –
since the assertion of Alevism and one's iden-
tification with it are more important, in this
framework, than the definition of its content.
By their very nature as vehicles for simplifying
a variety of meanings, symbols are imprecise
and thus provide scope for interpretation.
Thus, the same symbol may communicate dif-
ferent things to different people, but com-
mon affective sentiments towards it create a
symbolic consensus. For instance, some may
hold the figure of Haci Bektaş Veli because
they see in him a religious saint, others be-
cause he is a progressive thinker, or a carrier
of Turkish values. Symbols are, therefore,
ideal media through which people with di-
verse backgrounds and concerns can speak a
'common' language, behave in apparently
similar ways, and participate in the 'same' rit-
uals, for different or even incompatible rea-
sons.
In the frame of the festival, the use of com-
mon symbols permits the assertion of com-
munity. Thus, the diffusion of objects carrying
standardized images of Ali or Haci Bektaş and
functioning as signals of identity, as well as
their discursive use, do contribute to this as-
sertive process. Further, a symbolic consen-
sus on community is created by the folkloris-
tic objectification of culture, and made cele-
bratory through the pastoral allegory of cul-
tural loss and the rhetoric of authenticity.
Symbols are used to re-assert Alevi commu-
nity and its boundaries when the process of
change threatens its integrity, when the actu-
al geo-social boundaries are undermined,
and especially when its members have been
dispersed.3 Each individual is able to define
the community for himself using the shared
symbolic forms proffered by the festival. Ritu-
al helps in the reconstitution of the communi-
ty, because it permits its participants to as-
similate symbolic forms to their individual ex-
periences and social and emotional needs. In
a context of migration and of individualiza-
tion and diversification of the constructions
of Alevism, the Hacibektaş festival is a prime
occasion where the Alevi community is as-
serted both on a collective and on an individ-
ual level.
Negotiating public space
Public folklore, as the representation of folk
traditions in new contexts, is used to symbol -
ize Alevi identity to oneself as well as to oth-
ers; thus, public ritual also serves to reformu-
late values and self-definitions and to negoti-
ate the relationships with these 'others'. Actu-
ally, the festival is, through its centrality and
media publicity, the main public point of rep-
resentation of Alevism to the outside world
and, through its politicization, of negotiation
of public space for Alevism in Turkey.
Although the multi-vocality of the event
permits diverse participants to communicate
with different outside audiences, the public
negotiation of Alevism with these audiences
as transmitted by the media is quasi-monop-
olized by state agents, who also use celebra-
tory and symbolic language in order to gain a
large audience. Alevism is officially interpret-
ed as a tolerant form of Islam reduced to its
folkloristic characteristics and is presented as
being in keeping with the republic. Haci
Bektaş is presented as a state-loyal figure as-
sociated with Turkism, which provokes
protests against political recuperation of the
festival and of Alevism. Many Kurdish Alevis,
refusing the assimilation between Alevism
and Bektashism, boycott the event. Thus,
Hacibektaş is also an occasion where the
image of an inclusive, tolerant state is creat-
ed, for which Alevism is a source of authentic-
ity and Turkishness and a resource against Is-
lamist and Kurdist movements. But on the off-
scenes, competitive interpretations of Ale-
vism and (both symbolic and real) articula-
tions with the rest of society are proposed.
◆
Semah ritual
d a n c e
p e r f o r m a n c e
during the
o p e n i n g
ceremony of
the Hacibektas
f e s t i v a l .
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T u r k e y
M U C A H I T  B I L I C I
In summer 1996, Turkish newspapers, especially
those addressing a religious audience, reported the
introduction of a new space of consumption: a five-
star hotel in Didim (Aydin) designed on the basis of
Islamic rules. Fadil Akgunduz, owner of the hotel, an-
nounced in a press release on the opening of the fa-
cility that this investment was an attempt to enable
religious-conservative people to benefit from the
blessings of God and use their right to enjoy the
worldly pleasures in accordance with their religious
beliefs (Yeni Safak D a i l y, 3 July 1996).
Caprice Hotel:
Transforming Islam on the Aegean Coast
Being the first organized and institutional
attempt to serve leisure to an public with a
particular social base, that is, a newly
formed religious-conservative upper middle
class, Caprice Hotel assumed a symbolic im-
portance in the understanding of Islam in
Turkey during the 1990s. It also highlighted
the multiplicity of possible trajectories that
Islam may take. In this sense, Caprice Hotel
symbolizes the autonomization of a particu-
lar formulation of Islam by a consumption-
oriented middle class from that form which
could be called 'intellectual Islam'. Unlike
the Islam of Muslim intellectuals which al-
most always is taken for granted by over-
representational and reductionist ap-
proaches as the decisive form(ulation) of
Islam, the Islam constructed and performed
by emergent Islamic middle classes is far
from being critical of consumerism. Yet, ap-
propriation of consumer culture by rich
Muslims who enjoy the Caprice Hotel can-
not be reduced to a mere embrace of con-
sumerism disseminated by globalization.
Rather, it requires an ideological justifica-
tion which accompanies the re-organization
of spaces like beaches. As an entrepreneur-
ial attempt, Caprice Hotel finds, in the words
of its owner, its discursive justification v i s - à -
v i s established forms of construction of Is-
lamic identity. As already mentioned,
Caprice Hotel is presented as a natural and
legitimate instrument of enabling rich Mus-
lims to benefit and enjoy the worldly plea-
sures created for them by God.
The beach at Caprice Hotel is divided into
three sections. The first section is for males
only. The second section is designated as a
mixed beach and is called as the 'family
beach'. This section is open to all couples in-
dependent of their religiosity and use of
headscarves. The third and the most inter-
esting section, though adjacent to the other
two beaches, is segregated from them. This
part of the beach serves, but is not exclu-
sively for, women with headscarves. Those
women who want to swim in female-only
beaches also use this beach. Despite expec-
tations of strict moral control of the public
sphere by Islam(ism), the case of Caprice
Hotel indicates that Islam carves its own
space within the existing socio-cultural set-
ting by pluralizing its content. It also shows
how the meanings and practices attributed
to Islam are contested. Actors from different
social and economic backgrounds construct
different Islamic discourses.
Discussions over the legitimacy of the
Caprice Hotel highlights the tension be-
tween the 'theory' of those (such as Ali Bulac
and Ahmet Tasgetiren) who attempted to
forge Muslim public opinion with an em-
phasis on piety and solidarity and the 'prac-
tice' of the post-1980 religious bourgeoisie
which articulated a consumer culture in har-
mony with Islamic principles. Ahmet Tasge-
tiren, a columnist of the Yeni Safak Daily, ar-
gued that as far as the sufferings of Muslims
in Chechnya are concerned, the practices in-
troduced by Caprice Hotel are not morally
acceptable for Muslims. (See A. Tasgetiren,
'Can you see the Chechnya through the win-
dows of Caprice Hotel?' Yeni Safak, 16 Au-
gust 1996). By juxtaposing Chechnya with
the Caprice Hotel, he concluded that the lat-
ter is not compatible with the basics of
Islam. Despite the criticisms of opinion lead-
ers of Turkish Islamic polity, the Caprice
Hotel is no longer the only – though it was
the first – five-star hotel to serve religious
Turks. A dozen hotel complexes, among
them Gulnihal and Sah Inn hotels, followed
suit as a response to the boom in the market
of Islamic-oriented spaces for leisure.
By emerging as the locus of a new Islam
cooperating with consumerism in the age of
globalization, Caprice Hotel is a challenge to
the construction of Islamic identity based
on discourses of exclusion and oppression.
It also problematizes the Kemalist under-
standing of Islam and challenges its version
of modernization by symbolically introduc-
ing alternative trajectories of be(com)ing
modern.  ◆
Research on Caprice Hotel was conducted by
Mucahit Bilici within the framework of a workshop
directed and supervised by Professor Nilüfer Göle.
Workshop papers were later edited by Nilüfer Göle
and published in Turkish as Islamin Yeni Kamusal
Yuzleri (New Public Visibilities of Islam) by Metis
Publishers in Istanbul in January 2000.
Mucahit Bilici is a graduate student at the Political
Science Department, University of Utah, USA.
E-mail: mucahitbilici@hotmail.com
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
Caprice Hotel, 
Didim, Western
T u r k e y .
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Islam in Switzerland: a few statistics
In a 1980 census, the population of Muslim origin in Switzer-
land had tripled within 10 years, passing from 17,000 to 56,000
persons. In the 1980s, nationals of Muslim origin continue to
flow in at the same rate as in the 1960s: 157,000 people af-
firmed their membership to Islam in the national census, which
means 2.1% of the entire population. By 1996 Switzerland
counted approximately 200,000 Muslims – slightly more than
2.5% of the entire population. Amongst them, 40% have per-
manent residency, 15% are refugees or asylum seekers, 45.7%
are of Turkish origin, 36.4% are of Yugoslav origin, and 9.2% are
from Maghreb or Machrek countries. 76% are based in German-
speaking Switzerland, 14% in French-speaking Switzerland.
Turkish nationals are mostly found in German-speaking
Switzerland, while the Arab-speakers are concentrated in
French-speaking Switzerland.
We ster n Euro p e
P AT R I C K  H A E N N I
The relations between Islamic revival and ethnic alle-
giances are all too often presented as being in oppo-
sition. Islamic identity – and this dimension is very
present in Islamic discourse – is by its very nature
dedicated to transcending the centrifugal tenden-
cies of ethnicity, of nationalism or of any form of seg-
mentarism. In the face of ideological discourse, the
social imaginaries of the interested parties are con-
tradictory. Arab nationals in Switzerland affirm an
engaged Muslim identity by a rejection of national
and cultural ethnicities, while the Turks affirm their
Muslim identity by borrowing the paths of ethnicity.
These divergences from the trajectory of 'Islamiza-
tion' have less to do with cultural differences be-
tween places of origin than with forms of social
change that have diversely affected these two popu-





In the framework of the Turkish immigrants,
the reference to Islam was imposed at two
points in time. Firstly, by the establishment
of a fragmented network of mosques, in-
scribed in both community and religious
strategies followed by small groups that
sought to preserve religious practices of the
migrants' home community. Later on, the
network of Turkish mosques in Switzerland
became politicized along ideological lines,
but ethnicity continued to play a determin-
ing role. In the 1970s, while immigration
was essentially a male phenomenon not in-
tended to become a permanent situation in
Switzerland, religious practice did not mat-
ter much. It was simply placed aside while
the immigrants awaited their return home.
Religious association, not hegemonic in the
least, served as a space for remembering
one's origins (the religious space coexisting
with friendships, sporting associations,
game rooms, and cafés), destined to facili-
tate the return of an immigrant population.
In the 1980s, the Islamic reference progres-
sively acquired greater status as the plans
to return became increasingly illusory. This
was due to, on the one hand, the political
and economic hardship in their country of
origin and, on the other hand, the arrival of
families and the entirely Swiss education of
their children (the second generation). The
mosque, having been a place of remem-
brance of ethnicity and a functional space
for 'preventative asocialization' (Dassetto)
for the first immigrant men awaiting their
return home, became in the 1980s a protec-
tive structure, as much for regrouping fami-
lies as for preserving the identity of the sec-
ond-generation immigrants heavily ex-
posed to the host society. The reproduction
of cultural and social identity of the group
thus became the principal function of the
mosques. The pennants of the football
team in the cafeteria of in the place of
prayer, posters of the regions of origin, and
the systematic presence of a parabolic an-
tenna, all demonstrate the strength of par-
ticularistic identities and allegiances. Turk-
ish Islam from 1970-1980 was an Islam of
the community, far from the universalism
displayed by their Arab co-religionists (to
be dealt with further on). This was to
change at the end of the 1980s. From then
on, the substance which brought them to-
gether was to fall prey to a double dynamic
of politization and fragmentation. With the
population increasing, political and reli-
gious networks lost no time in implanting
themselves in this population fully in the
process of establishment. This continued
until the Turkish community stabilized its
core, having reproduced itself within the
main lines of the ideological spectre of the
political and/or religious field of their coun-
try of origin. In Zurich, the immigrant asso-
ciations were to either join up with partisan
or religious networks, or be directly put in
place by militant immigrants. Zurich was
thus to witness the emergence of 'indepen-
dent associations'. With the creation of Milli
Görush (European wing of the Islamist Party
of the Prosperity of Islamist Obedience) in
1973 in Germany, some associations were
to re-attach to this organization. Soon after,
the Dyanet, State Ministry of Religious Af-
fairs, with its imams and places of worship,
appeared on the Swiss scene. The fragmen-
tation was not to stop at this bi-polarity of
state Islam / Islam of opposition. Contrary to
what was occurring in French-speaking
Switzerland, the fragmentation was then to
continue simultaneously along religious
and political lines. The Nurcu movement
(see p. 7 of this N e w s l e t t e r, Yavuz), known as
an ideological 'think-tank' of Rifah, was to
leave the Milli Görush, for its ideology was
too dogmatic in their eyes. The Suleyman-
cies, a third important network in Turkish
Islam both in Turkey and elsewhere in Eu-
rope, proposing a popular Sufism, was also
to secede, just as the Grey Wolves, an ultra-
nationalist political party which already in
1978, founded its second Swiss political an-
tenna in Zurich. Nurcus, Dyanet, Milli
Görush, and Suleymancies contribute to the
complexity of Turkish Islam in Switzerland,
but all seem to come together on one point:
they make Islam congruent with Turkish
culture, where the Arabs tend to render
Islam autonomous from other aspects of
their heritage and identity.
Arabs Islam in Switzerland
Arab Islamic institutions emerged in
Switzerland from 1960-1970. Two dynamics,
one political, the other social, contributed
to this: in the first place, Islam in French-
speaking Switzerland initially developed in
the wake of conflicts that formed the Arab
political landscape. Saïd Ramadan, son of
Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim
Brothers, created the first Islamic centre in
1961 in Geneva, fleeing from repression in
Egypt. When relations deteriorated be-
tween the Muslim Brothers and the Saudis
in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia founded its own
mosque in Geneva. The polarization be-
tween official and unofficial religious insti-
tutions which, until the present, remain a
central point of conflict of the political sys-
tems in the Arab world, reproduced them-
selves in the crucible of Arab Islam in
Switzerland. The dynamic of Islamization
amongst Arab immigrants did not take the
same path as that of Turkish populations. In
the Arab-speaking community, there exists
a direct constitution of a religious field rela-
tively unified both ideologically and in
terms of identity, and in clear opposition
with the pre-migratory heritage and identi-
ty. Contrary to the situation amongst the
populations of Turkish origin, the Arab na-
tionals experienced a rapid alteration of
their pre-migratory social structures. This
occurred as part of the process of individual
assimilation. By tradition, however, parents
still endeavour to prevent their children
from marrying Swiss partners, although the
notion of free choice, having been assimilat-
ed by that generation, means that the fami-
ly directives are not accepted without con-
testation. Many young people have opted
for individual integration in the host society
either parallel to, or as a substitute for, fam-
ily ties. This can be the result of marking
one's position in relation to parents or sim-
ply because one has come to the host soci-
ety alone for study or for work. However, it
has not necessarily rendered the youth laic.
Some, whether stirred by such occurrences
as the Gulf War, the stigmatization of Islam
by the media, or simply because of repeated
questioning about their origins or their reli-
gion – a quest for an existential ethic – have
chosen to play the card of the 'reborn Mus-
lim'. For these young people, it is not a ques-
tion of returning to the traditions of their
parents, generally rejected for their old-
fashioned ways, nor is it a way to launch a
community project. Neither the demand for,
nor the offer of, Islam in the Arab-speaking
Islamic groups in Switzerland is fundamen-
tally destined for 'separate development'
(even if certain tendencies of this sort do
exist). All members of the Arab-speaking Is-
lamic network insist upon the necessity of
participation in the Swiss social domain and
upon cooperation with Swiss authorities.
Thus the affirmation of an Islamic network –
open to the host society and socially active
– is at the root of the decrease in traditional
social control. Islamization, advocating
specificity by dialoguing with the host soci-
ety, and individualization are not conflict-
ing. In this case, they mutually reinforce one
a n o t h e r .
The forms of Islamization amongst the
populations of Muslim origin in Switzerland
are thus diverse – this is no surprise – but
the interest lies less in plural Islam than in
the syncretisms that the unique situation (of
ethnic heterogeneity under the Islamic ref-
erence, while spatial differences are abol-
ished) risks engendering. Islam in Europe is
confronted with the challenge of internal di-
versity (and not so much with seculariza-
tion), that is to say with intra-religious multi-
culturalism amongst ethnic or national
communities placed in contact by their mi-
gratory experience. After 30 years of main-
taining particularisms, that ideological una-
nimism will manage to impose a vision of
Islam that is both particularist and homoge-
nous is highly unlikely.  ◆
Turkish mosque
in Lausanne.
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B a l k a n s
X A V I E R  B O U G A R E L
The appearance of Muslim populations in the Balka-
ns dates back to the presence of the Ottoman Empire
in the region (14t h century – beginning of the 20t h
century) and is due to the conversion of local popula-
tions to Islam (essentially Albanians and Slavs) or to




In the early 1990s, the number of Muslims in
the Balkans was estimated at 8,250,000, or
approximately 13% of the total Balkan pop-
ulation. Muslims represented the main reli-
gious community in Albania (approximately
70%) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (45%), an
important minority in Macedonia (30%), in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (20%,
concentrated in Kosovo and in the Sandjak)
and in Bulgaria (12.5 %), and a small minori-
ty in Greece (1.5%) and in Rumania (0.2%).
They were divided into three main groups,
namely the Albanian Muslims (4,350,000, in
Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia), the Bosn-
ian Muslims (2,350,000, in Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina, in the Sandjak and in Kosovo) and the
Turks (1,050,000 in Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Greece et Rumania), to which other smaller
groups can be added: Muslim Romas spread
all over the Peninsula, Slavic-speaking Mus-
lims in Bulgaria (Pomak) and Macedonia
(Torbesh), and Turkish-speaking Tatars in
the Dobrudja (Rumania).
From the Turks of Bulgaria in 1989 to the
Albanians of Kosovo ten years later, not to
mention the Bosnian Muslims between
1992 and 1995, Balkan Muslims figure
amongst the main victims of the forced de-
portations and the massacres that have
marked the region in the last decade. These
dramatic events were presented in a rather
simplified manner: whereas some raised the
menace of a 'green diagonal' linking fanati-
cized Muslim populations, others presented
Balkan Islam as a haven of tolerance threat-
ened by an orthodox Crusade. In both cases,
the internal diversity and the recent trans-
formations of Balkan Islam were neglected,
even denied. These two points are thus in-
sisted upon here by demonstrating that the
Muslim populations are not only victims,
but also actors in the current Balkan crisis.
The political awakening of
Balkan Muslims
Indeed, the emergence of the Balkan Mus-
lim populations as autonomous political ac-
tors is one of the most important develop-
ments of the last decade. In the interwar pe-
riod, these populations remained withdrawn
into their religious identity and their reli-
gious institutions, and maintained a clien-
telistic and obedient relationship to the new
Balkan states. Only the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina had their own political party.
Communist modernization allowed for a
cristallization of Albanian, Bosnian Muslim or
Turkish national identities as well as the
emergence of new secularized Muslim elites
(teachers, physicians, etc.), but it was not
until the 1980s that the first mass mobiliza-
tions of Muslim populations were to occur in
favour of a 'Republic of Kosovo' (in 1981 and
then in 1989-90) or against the brutal assim-
ilation campaign of the Bulgarian commu-
nist party between 1984 and 1989.
After the collapse of the communist
regimes in 1989-90, the mobilization of the
Muslim populations resulted not only in the
constituting of political parties in all Balkan
states, but also in the formulation of nation-
al claims – going as far as demands for an in-
dependent state (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Koso-
vo) or an autonomous territory (Macedonia,
Sandjak). It should, however, be noted that
this wave of national claims amongst the
Muslim Balkan populations is for the most
part reactive: the awakening of an intolerant
and aggressive Serb nationalism, in particu-
lar, has largely contributed to the desires for
independence of the Bosnian Muslims and
the Kosovo Albanians. Inversely, the end of
the forced assimilation of Turks in Bulgaria
and the recognition of their political and cul-
tural rights explain the moderation of their
political leaders and their progressive inte-
gration into Bulgarian political life.
Likewise, throughout the Balkan countries,
this political mobilization of the Muslim pop-
ulations was accompanied by the reshaping
of the relationship between national identity
and religious identity. In Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA)
constituted itself around a pan-Islamist
movement that had appeared at the end of
the 1930s, and of which the main figure is
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic himself.
Elsewhere, the parties representing the Mus-
lim populations were created by members of
the new secularized elites which had ap-
peared during the communist period. In
general, however, national identity and reli-
gious identity tended to come closer togeth-
er. This tendency is most clear in Bosnia-
Herzegovina where, paradoxically enough,
the replacement of the national term 'Mus-
lim' by that of 'Bosniak' was coupled with an
increased insistence upon Islam as a found-
ing factor of national Muslim/Bosniak identi-
ty, and a bringing to the fore of the religious
dimensions of the war (cult of c h e h i d s – mar-
tyrs of faith, evocations of jihad – holy war –
and creation of re-Islamized 'Muslim
brigades' within the Bosnian army).
Amongst the Turks (Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Greece) and the Albanians (Albania, Kosovo,
Macedonia), the re-Islamization of national
identity remains more limited and discrete.
In the Turkish case, the transformations of
identity currently taking place reflect the de-
bate which, in Turkey itself, occurs between
the partisans of Kemalist secularism and
those of a 'Turko-Islamic synthesis'. In the Al-
banian case, the classical nationalist ideolo-
gy of the 19t h century, incarnated today by
such intellectuals as Ismaïl Kadare or Ibrahim
Rugova, is characterized by its rejection of
Islam and the Turko-Ottoman heritage.
Nowadays, however, it has to compete with
a new 'Islamo-nationalist' ideology that
seeks to associate national Albanian identity
and Muslim religious identity, by presenting
the conversion of Albanians to Islam as a de-
fence mechanism in the face of assimilation
efforts of the orthodox Greeks and Serbs.
The paradoxes of re-Islamization
Nevertheless, this re-Islamization of
Balkan Muslim national identities should in
no case be conceived as linear and based on
consensus: on the contrary, it is accompa-
nied by virulent conflicts within each com-
munity and appears to be paradoxical in
several ways. First of all, this re-Islamization
of collective identities does not really re-
verse the results of a half century of author-
itarian modernization and secularization.
Following the re-establishment of religious
freedoms, the Islamic religious institutions
were of course able to resume some reli-
gious activities (opening of mosques and re-
ligious schools, resumption of Sufi pilgrim-
ages, etc.), but nowhere they were able to
recuperate legal competencies (sharia
courts) or real estate (w a q f s) which had
been taken away after the war. Even in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the tight collaboration
between the state apparatus and religious
Islamic institutions did not result in a true
religious revival, but on the contrary in a
strong resistance to the attempts of the SDA
at re-Islamizing everyday life.
The Bosnian example also shows that the
arrival in the Balkans of m u d j a h i d i n and Is-
lamic humanitarian organizations did not
lead to an 'Iranization' or a 'Saudization' of
society, but rather to a widespread incom-
prehension and multiple incidents between
the local population and foreign preachers.
More generally, the development of new
links between Balkan Islam and the rest of
the Muslim world has favoured the renewal
of religious activities (translation and edi-
tion of religious literature, opening of
mosques or religious schools, sending of
students to Islamic universities in the Mus-
lim world, etc.), but also has confronted offi-
cial religious institutions with new competi-
tors supported by various Muslim states
(Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc.) or re-Is-
lamization movements. It has thus con-
tributed to the internal pluralization of
Balkan Islam and compelled the Balkan Mus-
lim populations to better define the fea-
tures of an 'European Islam' which is largely
yet to be invented.
Although Islam remains at the founda-
tions of the Muslim collective identities,
faith itself is thus becoming increasingly in-
dividualized, and the renewal of certain col-
lective and ostentatious forms of religious
practice should not mask a strong tendency
towards secularization shared with all other
European populations.  ◆
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something she would have considered in-
conceivable just a year ago.
Many of the women with whom I spoke,
both inside and outside the school, cited a
number of largely profane reasons for
downveiling: some noted that the tight
nylon k h i m a r caused their hair to thin and in
some cases resulted in their getting bald
patches; others who routinely walked long
distances to and from work complained of
excessive sweating under the k h i m a r; and
still others pointed out that their form of
dress was too cumbersome and restricted
them from moving about as they required.
A number of unmarried n i q a b-wearers (m u-
n a q a b a a t) felt their prospects of being ap-
proached for marriage were diminished
when men had no chance of seeing their
faces. The decision to downveil, in other
words, was never explained in association
with a crisis of faith or a retreat from reli-
gion, and the women routinely emphasized
that they continued to perform their reli-
gious rituals as before. Rather, downveiling
appears to be more of a relaxing of socio-re-
ligious practices spurred largely by practical
reasons. While some women have experi-
enced social exclusion from peers following
their decision to downveil, in both subtle
and dramatic ways, it appears that as more
women engage in downveiling, it is becom-
ing an increasingly more socially accepted
p r a c t i c e .
The trend of downveiling has caused
something of a crisis of moral authority on
the school grounds. One seventh grade stu-
dent remarks, 'Our school has changed. In
the beginning it was very strict and all our
teachers wore the k h i m a r or the n i q a b. Now
a lot of our teachers who once wore the k h i-
m a r wear very tight clothes with a little
scarf', to which her friend adds, 'a very, very
little scarf'. An eighth grade girl complains
that the vice-principal scolded her for wear-
ing a uniform skirt that fits too snugly
around her hips and for not buttoning her
blouse to the neck and asks, 'How can she
comment on my appearance when she her-
self used to wear the k h i m a r, took it off, and
now only wears a scarf? She tells us not to
wear tight clothing, but she sometimes
wears very tight skirts with sandals.' These
same students do not see any conflict in
their own downveiling since, as they point
out, the Islamic uniform was imposed on
them; they did not adopt it of their own will
as their teachers had.
In more complex ways, however, many
women took on higher degrees of veiling not
so much because it was imposed on them,
but because it had become the normative
practice of their professional and community
milieus. Women began downveiling due to a
complex process involving state interven-
tion, changes in community and public
norms, and mundane and sacred considera-
tions. The recent trend of downveiling
among Cairene women is suggestive of the
ways in which gendered practices respond
and contribute to socio-religious change and
indicates a relaxation, or changing of form, of
the Islamist trend in Egypt.  ◆
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L at i n  Amer i ca
P E DR O  B R I E G E R
Most studies on immigration to Argentina1 tend to
associate Muslims with Arabs, without distinction.
This error has its origins in the way immigrants from
Arab countries arrived, especially from Syria and
Lebanon. Before the Ottoman Empire territories were
divided by national frontiers, all Arabs that arrived
here were considered Turkish for the simple reason
that they carried Turkish documents. Still today,
Arabs in Argentina are popularly known as 'Turks',
without necessarily any pejorative connotation. Ar-
gentina having been composed by waves of immigra-
tion, most new incoming groups were donned sobri-
quets: Jews were 'Russian', Italians 'Tanos', the
Spaniards 'Gallegos', and the Arabs 'Turks'.
Muslims 
in Argentina
The first official data on Arabs in Argentina
mentions '17 Ottomans' who arrived at the
port of Buenos Aires in 1887.2 In the first
censuses Muslims do not even appear in the
registers, since only Jews and Christians
were offered specific categories. Muslims
were considered as 'others', and were thus
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e .
Today, the Republic of Argentina has only
a small Muslim minority, and obtaining a
clear picture of the Islamic community is still
somewhat of a problem, although the na-
tional census does offer Islam as a clear
choice. According to Imam Mahmud Hus-
s a i n ,3 there are currently about 450,00 Mus-
lims in Argentina – less than 25% of the pop-
ulation – and only 40,000 consider them-
selves believers. According to Mujamad
Hayer, director of the Oficina de Cultura y
Difusión Islámica (Office of Culture and Is-
lamic Diffusion), there are between 650,000
and 700,000.4
Arab immigration to Argentina was quite
considerable in the late 19t h century, after
World War I and up to the mid-20t h c e n t u r y ,
having become its third most important im-
migration wave. Of these immigrants, 40%
are estimated to have been Muslims or chil-
dren or grandchildren of Muslims.
Late 19t h – early 20t h c e n t u r y
Syrian-Lebanese immigrants in Argentina
created institutions that denoted their cul-
tural-geographic, more than their religious,
origins. Indeed, Muslims, Jews and Chris-
tians comprised these institutions, joined by
their 'Arab' identity. There were, however,
properly Islamic institutions. These were es-
tablished to preserve the religious legacy,
including the Arabic language, that was
being lost as years went by: most children of
Syrian-Lebanese immigrants no longer
spoke Arabic at home and were not interest-
ed in learning it. They clearly manifested an
increasing tendency toward adopting the
culture and customs of their host country.
Chronicles from the 1940s mention that it
is rare for a Muslim Arab not to drink wine.5
And while the 'melting pot' tendency ex-
pressed itself in many ways, each immigrant
group (even to this day) claimed its own
specific part of the national mythology. For
example, the gaucho, a farmer whose sym-
bolic image includes the horse, the spear
and his equestrian skills, is claimed by cer-
tain Muslims as their own, as they see simi-
larities between the gaucho and the
Bedouin. Some even maintain that the ob-
scure origins of the word 'gaucho'6 are root-
ed in Arabic.
Carlos Saul Menem's
p r e s i d e n c y
The diffusion of Islam as such began as re-
cently as 1973, with the foundation of the
Centro de Estudios Islámicos (Centre of Is-
lamic Studies) headed by Imam Mahmud
Hussain, and has also served to attract Ar-
gentineans of non-Muslim origin to Islam.
But until the 1989 elections, Muslims in
Argentina went virtually unnoticed. Their
institutions were only known in the neigh-
bourhoods in which they functioned, or by
the members of the community who at-
tended the small Arabic or Islamic study
c e n t r e s .
However, this was to change when Carlos
Saul Menem became President of Argenti-
na. Of Syrian origin, his father, Saul Mene-
hem, and his mother, Mohibe Akil, had ar-
rived from distant Yabrud at the beginning
of the century and settled in La Rioja, a
small, rather poor, province close to Chile.
Menem's entry into power, beyond any ide-
ological issues, revolutionized the country.
Argentina now had a president of Muslim
roots. Although Menem had embraced
Catholicism, which he repeated whenever
given the chance (up until the 1994 consti-
tutional reform demanded that the presi-
dent be a Roman Catholic), to people he was
still a Muslim. His wife, who never aban-
doned Islam, professed her religion openly,
and his son, who died in 1995, was buried in
an Islamic cemetery.
The 'Arab-Muslim' aspect of the presi-
dent's origins and close environment also
began to acquire public resonance. Menem
promised to visit Syria after becoming pres-
ident, and one of his assistants admitted
that Colonel Muammar Ghadafi had con-
tributed 4 million dollars to the electoral
campaign. In addition, his sister-in-law
Amira Yoma became government staff
member, and her Syrian husband Ibrahim al
Ibrahim – despite not knowing a word of
Spanish – accepted a high position at the
Buenos Aires International Airport (until he
resigned in the middle of a scandal and fled
the country). His brother was president of
the Senate and his other brother, Emir
Yoma, was his private secretary until he fell
from grace due to money laundering accu-
sations. His cousin Rima Siman was appoint-
ed to the Argentinean Embassy in Italy,
while another cousin, Amira Akil, was em-
ployed at the embassy in Syria. These are
but a few examples.
Menem played on ambivalence, not com-
pletely denying his roots. He even said that
he was a descendant of Mohammed and ap-
peared on very popular television pro-
gramme dancing with an Arab odalisque.
Meanwhile, k e b b e, l a b a n and a r a k w e r e
being served at the presidential residence
when entertaining guests.
The controversial government of Carlos
Menem resulted in its being rejected by cer-
tain sectors of Argentinean society. It also
spurred scornful chanting about his Muslim
roots in street demonstrations by the oppo-
sition: 'Traigan al gorila musulman para que
vea, que este pueblo no cambia de idea,
lucha y pelea con las banderas de Evita y
P e r ó n . '7
Still, it was not until the attacks on the Is-
raeli Embassy and the central building of
the Jewish community that Muslims made
their grand public appearance in Argen-
tinean society. On 17 March 1992, a bomb
destroyed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos
Aires, killing 29 people. About two years
later, on 18 July 1994, an attack caused the
death of almost 100 people at AMIA (Aso-
ciación Mutual Israelita Argentina – Joint
Jewish Argentinean Association). Iran was
accused of being responsible from the very
beginning. There was talk of an internation-
al connection and a 'local' connection that
would necessarily imply participation of
members of the Islamic community in Ar-
gentina, although no one was incriminated.
With the objective of finding information
on the 'fundamentalist Islamic' cells at any
cost, Argentinean journalists travelled en
masse to Ciudad del Este, a Paraguayan city
near the border, since it presumably har-
boured terrorists. But no one found any-
thing besides merchants of Lebanese origin.
Muslims in Argentinean
m e d i a
The Islamic community – which up to then
had been ignored by the media – as well as
the words Shia and Sunna began appearing
almost daily in the Argentinean media. Cer-
tain community leaders were invited to ap-
pear on major television programmes to ex-
plain the purported link of Islam with terror-
ism. The term 'fundamentalism' began to be
used synonymously with Muslim, and the Is-
lamic community became stigmatized be-
cause of its 'apparent' link to the attacks. In
the first six months of 1996, Diario Clarín,
the most important newspaper in Argenti-
na, mentioned the word fundamentalism in
104 articles as a synonym for fanaticism, ex-
tremism and, in more general lines, religious
Muslim extremism. In those 6 months, only
3 articles failed to associate fundamentalism
with Islam,8 thus marking a tendency with
regard to the association of a phenomenon
with a community as a whole.
Islam today
The number of Muslims in Argentina is de-
creasing, and this is due to several factors.
Firstly, in families of Muslim origin, customs
are being lost, from the Arabic language to
food and drink. Secondly, there is relatively
little reading material on Islam available in
Spanish. There is a growing tendency to-
ward mixed marriages in which children
lose all references to Islam, and there are
too few study centres for disseminating
Islam. This may, however, change in the fu-
ture with the construction of the new Islam-
ic Cultural Center King Fahd, financed by
the Saudi government, which includes a
school and a mosque with a minaret in the
heart of Buenos Aires. It is considered to be
the largest of its kind in Latin America.
The 1990s marked the 'public' appearance
of Muslims in Argentina but, because of the
attacks and the stereotypes created, Mus-
lims were more worried about proving their
innocence than about spreading their reli-
gion. But despite all of this, the last few
years have witnessed an entirely new phe-
nomenon: Islam has incorporated itself into
Argentinean society as something more
natural and acceptable. There is no longer
an element of surprise when someone pub-
licly claims to be a Muslim. Besides, the chil-
dren and, especially, the grandchildren of
Muslims are beginning to look for their
roots and are trying to get closer to their
own history and that of their ancestors, a
phenomenon common to the both North
and South America.  ◆
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In Egypt, as in many other parts of the formerly-colo-
nized world, numerous tensions and conflicts re-
volve around gender issues. Women are often caught
between the pursuit of modernization, attempts at
liberalization, a pervasive nationalist rhetoric of 'au-
thenticity', processes related to Islamization and on-
going imperialist encroachments. Those women who
are actively engaged in contesting existing gender
relations and social injustice are particularly vulnera-
ble to being stigmatized as anti-nationalist and anti-
religious. Indeed, contemporary women activists in
Egypt have increasingly been accused, particularly
by Islamist movements and conservative nationalist
forces, of collaborating with Western imperialism by
importing alien ideas and practices and disseminat-





But how do the women themselves perceive
these tensions and conflicts? How do they
cope with accusations of being 'Western-
ized'? What do 'the West' and 'authenticity'
mean to Egyptian women activists? These
and many other questions were paramount
in my mind when I embarked upon PhD re-
search on which my recently published book
is based.1 My own involvement in the Egypt-
ian women's movement (from1992 to1994)
provided the initial impetus to pursue acad-
emic research. Yet, my specific focus and in-
terests grew out of a sense of disenchant-
ment with depictions of secular constituen-
cies in much of the literature on the Middle
East. If not omitted altogether, secular con-
stituencies tend to be essentialized (those
who are not Islamist) and portrayed in a ho-
mogenized manner (thereby glossing over
political, social and cultural differences with-
in secular constituencies).
Redefining secularism in
Egypt and the Middle East
My research, then, reflects the pursuit of
several aims. On one level, it presents the at-
tempt to problematize and re-define the no-
tion of secularism in Egypt and within the
wider context of the region and the 'Muslim
world'. In addition to exploring the range of
interpretations, politics, lifestyles and beliefs
of one specific secular-oriented constituency,
the book provides a detailed ethnographic
account of the context, content and political
significance of contemporary women's ac-
tivism.2 This is mainly achieved through an
analysis of interviews with more than 80
members of women's groups and individual
activists. In these interviews, questions per-
taining to women activists' goals and motiva-
tions, their political outlooks and affiliations,
their activities as well as allegiances and ani-
mosities were asked. In this context, women's
activism cannot be analysed without contex-
tualizing it in the wider political culture in
which it takes place. Therefore, a range of fac-
tors was explored, such as the historical and
political development of the Egyptian state
and its relation to the women's movement,
the role of Islamist constituencies and the po-
litical left, as well as international organiza-
tions and agendas. All these elements, in one
way or another, have an impact upon the
forms, content and discourses of contempo-
rary women's activism.
But what is actually meant by 'secular-ori-
ented' activists? Initially, a working definition
was used referring to those who advocate a
separation between religion and politics,
which does not necessarily denote anti-reli-
gious or anti-Islamic positions. Furthermore,
it was expected that secular women activists
do not endorse sharica as the main or sole
source of legislation, but that they would also
refer to civil law and human rights conven-
tions as frames of reference for their struggle.
However, the research findings indicate that
this definition glosses over a great level of
variation in terms of understandings and
manifestations of secularism among Egyptian
women's activists. Rather than juxtaposing
secular with religious, the research reveals the
continuum of religious and secular beliefs
and practices in women's every day lives.
Often, as in my own assumptions prior to
fieldwork, non-religious frameworks of politi-
cal action are presumed to derive from com-
prehensive worldviews and doctrines, like so-
cialism, or specific documents, such as the in-
ternational convention of human rights.
Many of the leftist-nationalist activists inter-
viewed explained that they would still take a
Marxist approach in their analyses. However,
most emphasized that they had moved away
from earlier certainties concerning the direct
relationship between economic exploitation
and women's liberation. Their own experi-
ences within the political parties and with
their 'progressive' husbands at home
changed their outlooks in a way that, today,
they argue for the necessity of an indepen-
dent women's struggle. A number of women
interviewed stressed that their values and
concepts were not based on a specific doc-
trine or on the international declaration of
human rights, but emerged out of the various
experiences of collective and individual
struggle. As Hania K.,3 a member of Markaz Di-
rassat Al-Mar›a Al-Gedida (The New Woman's
Research Centre) told me:
In this context, Hania K. and other activists
complained about the tendency among
Western scholars conducting research in
Egypt to dismiss individual everyday experi-
ences and the capacity to creatively synthe-
size from various value systems. Human
agency is mainly framed in terms of collective
ideologies – whether secular or religious –
and very little space is given to individual im-
provisation and resistance.
Overcoming the cultural-
ization of political issues
Throughout my analyses of the notion of
secularism and the political culture in which
the Egyptian women's movement is embed-
ded, I attempt to achieve a further goal, i.e.
to transcend notions of cultures being
bounded entities and to acknowledge the
entanglements and creative encounters be-
tween and within cultures. Being of mixed
cultural background myself (Iraqi-German), I
have been extremely sensitive to and sad-
dened by the essentialized rhetoric of 'us vs.
them'. I do, of course, understand the histor-
ical and current power relations, colonial
and neo-colonial configurations and imperi-
alist policies upon which these notions and
sentiments are based. Yet, to my mind, nei-
ther orientalism nor 'occidentalism' – essen-
tialist constructions of the West – appear to
be constructive ways forward.
Unfortunately the attempt to legitimize
their struggle and defend themselves
against charges of 'aping the West', often re-
sults in women activists reproducing essen-
tialist notions of 'our culture' vs. 'Western
culture'. For Egyptian women activists, the
notion of 'cultural specificity' becomes more
than a tool in the attempt to demarcate
themselves from 'the West'. It is also em-
ployed to affirm positively one's own cul-
ture, somehow homogenized and defined
as a monolithic entity, thereby discarding
cultural differences within Egypt among dif-
ferent social classes, generations, gender,
rural and urban people and so forth. Yet,
there is also evidence to the various ways in
which some women attempt to overcome
the prevalent 'culturalization' of political is-
sues. Randa K., for example, is one of numer-
ous women who believe that the notion of
cultural specificity is used as a tool by men
to reinforce their power over women. Raga
N., on the other hand, deeply despises the
eclecticism and selectivity of intellectuals
and political activists when deciding what is
universal and what is not. As she states: 'We
scream: “Our values!” when it clashes with
existing power positions, but when it is ben-
eficial to the same group, they adopt it, de-
spite it being Western.' (p. 213) Against the
backdrop of these and many other views ex-
pressed by the women I talked to, this book
is as much about unsettling a rigid East-
West divide and its implications as it is
about secular Egyptian women's movement
and the political culture it is embedded in.
By focusing on one specific, yet heteroge-
neous, segment within postcolonial Egypt,
namely secular women's activism, I hope to
unravel many of the tensions and conflicts
that mark the complex processes of decolo-
nization and continue to shape contempo-
rary political culture. Egyptian women's ac-
tivism today is very much shaped by the fear
of transgressing the norms and values
deemed permissible within the national
fabric. The question of identity is as central
to their activism as concrete struggles over
women's rights and aspirations. Much is at
stake for secular women activists as their re-
jection of Islam as the only possible frame-
work for political struggle and nation-build-
ing evokes suspicion and doubt about their
belonging within the indigenous landscape
of 'traditions' and 'authenticity'.  ◆
N o t e s
1. My main fieldwork took place in Cairo in 1995 and
1996 over a period of 14 months. I have since then
returned several times. In addition to gathering
data through interviews and conversations, I
participated in many activities and events
organized by various women's groups and
networks. I also visited several projects run and
organized by women activists, which aim at
improving the living conditions of women from
low-income areas in Cairo.
2. My use of the term 'women's activism' rather than
'feminism' is related to the fact that many of the
women I interviewed reject the label of 'feminist'
for pragmatic and ideological reasons. The English
term 'feminism', evokes antagonism and
animosity, and sometimes even anxiety. A great
number of women seem to have internalized the
way feminists are being portrayed in prevailing
Egyptian – but also European and North-American
discourses, namely man-hating, aggressive,
possibly obsessed with sex, and certainly
Westernized women. The resistance of many
Egyptian women to identify themselves with
feminism is not only related to its negative image
in society, but it is also linked to the conviction
that it detracts from 'larger issues' such as
imperialism, class struggle and Zionism.
3. All names have been changed.
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Islamists solely use the text and this is
their framework. Their judgement of the
value system comes through the text. My
frame of reference is based on certain
abstract concepts, such as egalitarianism,
humanism, human rights, pluralism,
tolerance, etc., which have come from my
everyday experiences. Of course, these
concepts did not come out of a void, but
emerged from different schools of
thought. However, I do not uphold a
certain ideology, because it would reduce
the forms of oppression and the
complexity of reality. My values and
concepts are as much part of my personal
development as they grew out of
collective struggle. (p.146)
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B o ok  Pr esenta t i o n
E L I S A B E T H  Ö Z DA L G A
The Naqshbandi order constitutes one of the leading
Sufi orders ( t a r i q a ) in the Muslim world. Baha'al-Din
Naqshband (d. 1389), the order's eponym, originated
from Bukhara in Khorasan. During the 15t h and 16t h
centuries, the order developed into a world-wide or-
ganization, spreading to areas as culturally and geo-
graphically distant as Central Asia, Eastern
Turkestan, India, China, Afghanistan, and the then
Ottoman Empire (including the Balkans).
The Naqshbandis 
in Western and 
Central Asia
Of great importance for the diffusion of the
Naqshbandi order was Sheikh Ahmad
Sirhindi (d. 1624) from India, who, at the
turn of the first millennium (Hijra) became
one of its great innovators, thence gaining
the epithet m u j a d d i d (re-newer). He is, as so
many other leading Naqshbandi figures,
well-known both for his great wisdom and
his powerful involvement in social and po-
litical affairs. Ahmad Sirhindi had an influen-
tial predecessor in Khoja 'Ubayd Allah Ahrar
(d. 1490) from Samarqand, who is also re-
membered as a great religious personality
and powerful community leader.
Another prominent Naqshbandi sheikh
and re-newer was Mawlana Khalid (d. 1827),
who belonged to a Kurdish tribe in what is
today northern Iraq. Since he spent his most
influential years in Baghdad, he has been
endowed with the epithet 'Baghdadi'. Like
Ahmad Sirhindi, he was influential enough
to initiate a new Naqshbandi sub-branch,
the Khalidiyya. It was to a great extent under
the influence of the Khalidi branch that the
Naqshbandi order markedly increased its in-
fluence over 19t h century Ottoman society.
Its legacy is still strong in both present-day
Turkey and Syria.
Preserving tradition
In today's world, where social relation-
ships are highly fluid, it is remarkable to no-
tice the existence of a viable religious move-
ment with roots several hundred years back
in history. It is only by reflecting over the im-
mense transformations taking place within
economic relationships, political structures,
settlement patterns, communications, sci-
ence, technology and even family relation-
ships over the last 100 to 150 years, that one
can truly appreciate the extraordinary fact
that a Sufi order like the Naqshbandiyya has
been able to preserve its traditions since the
1 5t h century. This highlights the fact, so eas-
ily overlooked in times of powerful secular-
ization, that religion represents a strong
force in the formation of social and cultural
identity – even in modern society.
Outsiders trying to understand the role of
the Naqshbandi order in today's society
often mistake its members' involvement in
worldly affairs (as economic entrepreneurs,
state officials, or political activists) for sim-
ple worldliness; as if religious involvement
was nothing but a pretext or cover for their
economic or political power interests. How-
ever, this picture is over-simplified. A char-
acteristic feature of the Naqshbandi is in-
deed the emphasis of a double responsibili-
ty: towards this world a n d the other world.
This position seems to be as valid now as it
was hundreds of years ago and constitutes
an important key to the remarkable perse-
verance and integrity of the movement.
The Naqshbandi order could not have pre-
served its core identity so persistently, had
it not been for a good share of flexibility. Its
capacity to adjust to changing social condi-
tions is just as remarkable is its endurance.
The openness towards change has been es-
pecially observable during the last century,
and especially the last couple of decades,
when representatives for the Naqshbandi
t a r i k a t have been involved in a range of
high technology enterprises, advanced in-
stitutions of higher education and the latest
innovations in media technology. Studying
the Naqshbandi raises intriguing questions
not only about how change and continuity
are balanced against each other, but also
how concerns for this world and the next
are combined against the challenges from
an increasingly secularized society.
Background and content
The articles on which the book, The Naqsh-
bandis in Western and Central Asia: Change
and Continuity, is based are papers read at a
conference entitled 'Patterns of Transforma-
tion among the Naqshbandi in Middle East
and Central Asia' held at the Swedish Re-
search Institute in Istanbul from 9-11 June
1997. The conference was part of a two-year
programme of activities at the Institute fo-
cusing on 'Islamic culture'. The aim of the
conference was to address problems of re-
cent change among the Naqshbandi in the
Near East and Central Asia. Keeping in mind
the long history of this institution, the aim
was to encourage analyses in a longue durée
perspective. In light of that objective, stud-
ies focusing on Central Asia gained special
significance, since these areas are the origi-
nal homeland of the Naqshbandi. But it was
crucial to focus on Central Asia for yet an-
other reason, which concerns the fact that
its peoples have only very recently come
out from a 70-year-long communist dicta-
torship, in which religion was severely sup-
pressed. Stemming from this fact are many
questions related to what will happen to
Islam in general, and the Naqshbandi in par-
ticular, as conditions in this part of the world
have the opportunity to normalize.
The book opens with a chapter by Hamid
Algar, where attention is drawn to how
'global' people, living many generations be-
fore us, in fact were. Hamid Algar presents
an analysis of how Sheikh Nidai of Kashgar
(d. 1760), in the capacity of a wandering
mendicant, for more than 40 years travelled
to a large number of holy sites in Turkestan,
later on turned to Kirkuk, Mosul, Aleppo,
Jerusalem and the Hicaz, and how he finally
settled in Istanbul, where he was appointed
the first sheikh for a newly opened t e k k e
(lodge) in Eyüp. This example illustrates
how the Naqshbandi order, for many cen-
turies, bound together the three main re-
gions of the Sunni Muslim world: the Ot-
toman Empire, Central Asia, and the Indian
s u b c o n t i n e n t .
Dhikr (zikr) – the repetitive invocation of
the name of Allah – is widely practiced
among Sufis. The z i k r ritual is most often
practiced collectively, with intensive and
emotion-laden expressions, where the par-
takers move their bodies rhythmically as
they loudly pronounce the names of Allah.
In contrast to such expressions, members of
the Naqshbandi order have generally been
regarded as being more sober and orderly,
practicing the so-called 'silent' rather than
the 'loud' z i k r. However, even if silent z i k r
generally has been referred to as one of the
most characteristic marks distinguishing
the Naqshbandis from other Sufi orders,
such as the Qadiriyya ('whispering' as op-
posed to 'jumping' dervishes) historical
records show that both forms of zikr in fact
have been practiced by Naqshbandi
dervishes themselves. This intriguing ques-
tion is addressed by Isenbike Togan, who,
by referring to developments in Eastern
Turkestan and China of the 17t h and 18t h
centuries, draws attention to the fact that
the question of 'silent' versus 'loud' z i k r
could even stir up controversy between var-
ious Naqshbandi groups.
Jo-Ann Gross discusses the well-known
w a q f (foundation) of Khoja Ahrar (d. 1490) in
Samarqand, and its reorganization after the
Russian conquest of Central Asia in the
1860s. Khoja Ahrar was an influential and
venerated Naqshbandi sheikh, whose
k h a n a q a h , or tomb complex, has been a
place of pilgrimage for over 500 years. The
fact that the Russian colonial administra-
tion, for the sake of control, initiated a spe-
cial investigation of the w a q f, bears witness
to the social and economic importance of
the w a q f holdings. The effect of Russian
colonialism was, however, that the Naqsh-
bandi communities, for the first time in their
long history, were seriously threatened. Fol-
lowing is a chapter by Butros Abu-Manneh,
which approaches this w a q f leader from a
different point of view, namely through a
widely read hagiography, Rashahat Ain al-
H a y a t (Trickles from the Fountain of Life),
written by Kahshiifi, one of Khoja Ahrar's
d i s c i p l e s .
Questions related to what happens to
Naqshbandi networks in Central Asia after
the collapse of the former Soviet Union are
discussed by Vernon Schubel. Based on his
own recent research, Schubel discusses how
written sources in the form of popularized
hagiographies play an important role in the
process of reconstructing the Naqshbandi
tradition in Uzbekistan. He also discusses
the dilemmas facing today's Uzbek authori-
ties, who in their newly begun nation-build-
ing projects, are anxious to support the new
interest in Islam, without leaving the fields
open to religious radicalism and fanaticism.
Outside Central Asia
This volume also contains chapters on the
Naqshbandis in three areas outside of Cen-
tral Asia, namely the Kurdish areas of Iraq
and southeast Turkey, Syria, and
Afghanistan. Ferhad Shakely gives a de-
tailed description of the relation between
the sheikhs of Hawraman and other Sufi or-
ders like the Qadiriyya and their cultural and
political influence in the Kurdish areas until
today. Leif Stenberg analyses the Syrian
branch of the Naqshbandi order, centred at
the Abu an-Nur Foundation in Damascus,
led by Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro, and the
Grand Mufti of Syria. Bo Utas' account of the
Naqshbandi order in Afghanistan is unique.
Having spent time in Afghanistan in 1977
and 1978, he happened to be in the country
on the very day of the coup d'état, 27 April
1978. For a couple of months, he travelled
around and visited 12 k h a n a q a h s , 7 of which
are Naqshbandi. Bo Utas' observations took
place at a very critical point in time and con-
tain information about groups and social
networks that are now lost forever.
The book also contains three chapters on
modern Turkey. Hakan Yavuz problematizes
the role of different Naqshbandi groups in
terms of economic, political and intellectual
life in post-war Turkey, placing this against
the background of an historical exposé of
the Naqshbandi order. Fulya Atacan pre-
sents a portrait of a contemporary Naqsh-
bandi sheikh, Osman Hulusi Ate_ (1914-
1990), who was born in a small town in the
province Malatya.
Korkut Özal, former MP for the National
Salvation Party and Minister of Internal Af-
fairs in one of the coalition governments of
the 1970s, focuses on yet another leader,
namely the well-known Sheikh Mehmed
Zahid Kotku (1897-1980). Professor Özal of-
fers more than just a portrait of a prominent
Sufi leader. He also gives an account of his
own experience of being Kotku's m u r i d ( d i s-
ciple) for a period of 20 years.
This book was intended as a modest fol-
low-up of the impressive work , The Naqsh-
b a n d i s (Gaborieau, Marc, Alexandre Popoviç
and Rierry Zarcone (1990) It is hoped that as
such it will help in carrying the scholarly dis-
cussion of this powerful branch of Islamic
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M AM O U N  M O B A Y E D
Muslims in Northern Ireland: 
The Belfast Islamic Centre
The famous Muslim historian and sociolo-
gist Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) called the is-
land of Ireland r e s l a n d a h in his M u q a d d i m a h
(the introductory volume to his Kitab al-Ibar
(Universal History).1
The Muslim Community
It is difficult to know when the first Mus-
lims arrived in Northern Ireland, but there
are some indications that this was in the
1940s. We know that some Muslims cele-
brated Eid al-Fitr in 1953 at a small house on
Cromwell Street in Belfast. Early Muslims
were mainly students from the Indian sub-
continent, South Africa and the Middle East,
studying at Queens University of Belfast.
The Muslim Community has grown in size
since then. There is no accurate statistical in-
formation on the exact number of Muslims,
but the estimate is approximately 3000. The
majority live in Belfast, while the rest are in
Craigavon, Londonderry, Ballymena, Col-
eraine, Bangor and Lisburn. They belong to
different ethnic groups from Pakistan, India,
Middle East, Africa, Malaysia, Gulf, Turkey
and others. There are also small numbers of
Irish/British that have recently become Mus-
lims, yet have not formed a unified commu-
nity. All of these Muslims are fully integrated
together by sharing of mosques and Sunday
school (m a d r a s a) yet they have diverse cul-
tural traditions and customs. Many of the
Muslims have either Irish and/or British citi-
zenship, some of them through marriage.
The Muslim Community in Northern Ire-
land has certain features which distinguish
it from other Muslim minorities in Europe.
Since Northern Ireland did not bring over
cheap labourers, as is the case with England,
France and Germany, for example, the ma-
jority of the Muslims are professionals who
decided to come voluntarily. They work in
medicine, university teaching, engineering,
or business. The students form the biggest
group among the non-residents. It is a
young community, as they represent the
upcoming third generation. These factors
make it possible to prevent some social, ed-
ucational and economical difficulties which
are faced by Muslim communities else-
where in Europe.2
Belfast Islamic Centre
The current Centre was established in the
early 1980s, and it serves the Muslims in
Northern Ireland. It is registered as a charity
organization, and has a mosque, a small Is-
lamic library, a few rooms for teaching, and
a section for women. It holds the usual ac-
tivities of a mosque and an Islamic centre,
ranging from worship, Qura'nic teaching,
e i d prayers and celebrations, as well as so-
cial and cultural activities. It holds a Month-
ly Meeting when a guest speaker is invited.
On the first Sunday after Eid al-Fitr, the Cen-
tre holds the Annual e i d Dinner when many
non-Muslim friends of Belfast Islamic Centre
are invited, including the Lord Mayor of
B e l f a s t .
The Centre has a Sunday school (m a d r a s a)
called Dar al-Uloom, where Muslim children
attend three sessions: Qur'an, Islamic Stud-
ies and Arabic language.
Belfast Islamic Centre has a Women's
Group which organizes various activities or
training for the Muslim women in Northern
Ireland. Belfast Islamic Centre also has a
popular website.3
The Centre has established good relation-
ships with the Northern Irish Community,
and institutions, such as universities, several
colleges, and the police. The Queen's Uni-
versity of Belfast has recently run a short
course on 'Islam and Islamic Cultures', and
the Ulster Museum, for the first time, recent-
ly had an Exhibition on Arabic Calligraphy.
Along with other ethnic and religious mi-
norities the Belfast Islamic Centre has estab-
lished two important organizations. The
first is the Northern Ireland Interfaith Forum
(established in 1993), with the first chairman
from the Muslim Community.4 This Forum
has recently opened a multi-faith prayer
room at Belfast International Airport, the
first of its kind in Northern Ireland. The sec-
ond organization is Northern Ireland Coun-
cil for Ethnic Minority (established in 1994.)5
Belfast Islamic Centre is a founding mem-
ber of the Muslim Council of Britain, estab-
lished in 1997. It is also a member of the Eu-
ropean Council of Islamic Cooperation in
Strasbourg. It has a close relationship with
the Muslim communities in the Irish Repub-
lic, and throughout UK.
The Centre is run by volunteers, consisting
of three trustees and an Executive Commit-
tee, elected every two years.
Future projects
The Muslims in Northern Ireland are active-
ly involved in the building of a new mosque.
They would like it to combine the Islamic ar-
chitecture with the Northern Irish heritage,
and this should reflect their Islamic Irish iden-
tity.
The Centre would like to arrange an 'Open
Day' to invite non-Muslims to visit the
mosque and see first hand what type of work
it offers to the community at large.
Muslim children in Northern Ireland still
have unmet needs regarding their Religious
Education, as the Syllabus of Religious Educa-
tion in Northern Ireland is exclusively Christ-
ian. It is under review now, and Muslims are
working with other minorities to identify the
needs of their children, and subsequently to
meet them. Many Muslims are not in favour of
segregated schools provided that their chil-
dren receive Islamic religious education at
their local schools.
The Muslim Community in Northern Ireland
is an example of the peaceful coexistence of
different cultures and religious systems.  ◆
N o t e s
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Islam Outside the Arab World, David Westerlund and
Ingvar Svanberg (eds.), Richmond: Curzon, 1999.
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Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed is associate professor of Political
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Bo o k P r esenta t io n
I S H T I AQ  A H M E D
Islam originated in the Arab peninsula in the 7t h c e n-
tury. Currently, of the 175 million speakers of the
Arabic language, some 90% are Muslim. The fact is,
however, that they constitute only 15% of the esti-
mated 148,750,000 Muslims of the world. As the sec-
ond major proselytizing religion (second only to
Christianity) to emerge within the Semitic tradition,
Islam, in the past, spread to the various regions of
the world through peaceful as well as military means.
In that very long phase, it established itself primarily
in Asia and Africa. Of the six most populous Muslim
countries of the world – Indonesia, Pakistan, India,
Bangladesh, Turkey and Iran – none are Arab, and in
sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria has more Muslims than
any of the Maghreb countries of North Africa.
Islam Outside the Arab World
Since the Second World War, a major route to
the internationalization of Islam has been the
migration of Muslims in large numbers to Eu -
rope, North America, Latin America, Australia
and New Zealand. The Muslim immigrants
comprise various sorts of economic migrants
as well as political and humanitarian
refugees. Today Muslims are to be found in all
corners of the world. They form the second
major religious group in almost all European
countries as well as in the United States and
Canada. They observe the Islamic obligations
such as fasting during the month of Ramadan
in places as far-reaching as Anchorage, Rio de
Janeiro, Cape Town, Stockholm and
Christchurch.
The contemporary processes of economic
globalization, on the one hand, and political
universalization of human rights issues and
democracy, on the other, are exerting contra-
dictory pressures on states and societies to
develop appropriate mechanisms for dealing
with an increasingly variegated and complex
social order consisting of diverse faiths, prac-
tices, attitudes and aspirations – a new situa-
tion to which both Muslims and non-Muslims
have to respond. The responses are not al-
ways benign and productive, but adjustment
and understanding have been improving.
Islam Outside the Arab World fills a major la-
cuna in the study of contemporary Islam and
Muslims, which hitherto has concentrated on
the Middle East or the Arabic-speaking world,
by its focus on all regions of the non-Arab
world. The following areas are examined: 
– Africa, including Somalia, Nigeria, Senegal,
Tanzania and South Africa; 
– Asia and Oceania, including Turkey, Turkic
Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and Tajik-
istan, China, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia, Malaysia, Aus-
tralia and New Zeeland; 
– Europe and the Americas, including Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Germany, Austria, France,
Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
Finland, Russia, Transcaucasia, the United
States, Canada, the Caribbean Islands,
Trinidad and Tobago, Central Americas,
Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, Brazil, Ar-
gentina and other places where significant
Muslim presence exists.
About the authors
The authors, who have been selected from
all over the world and are country or area spe-
cialists, belong to disciplines as diverse as his-
tory, anthropology, political science, theolo-
gy, peace and conflict research, history of reli-
gions, linguistics and languages, ethnogra-
phy, and Islamic and comparative religions.
They probe, within a comparative framework,
common themes such as the Islamic revival,
the sectarian divisions within Islam, the com-
mon rites and rituals of the various groups
and sub-groups, the position of women and
religious minorities within Muslim-majority
states and of Muslim minorities in non-Mus-
lim social and political orders. Special empha-
sis is given to Sufism as an alternative ap-
proach to Islam.
Islam Outside the Arab World is a very ambi-
tious undertaking. Each author has produced,
in an easily accessible language and style, in-
formation-rich descriptions and sophisticated
analyses of their particular case studies. His-
torical backgrounds are provided, but the
main emphasis is placed on the current peri-
od. In this sense, the book is a unique work of
scholarly collaboration, which is likely to be-
come the standard reference on this vast sub-
ject. French and German translations are soon
to follow. The introduction to this work is au-
thored by Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed.  ◆
P U B L I C A T I O N S
Northern Ireland, which is known for its 300-year re-
ligious conflict, is now going through what is called
'The Peace Process'. It has become a pluralistic soci-
ety with multi-religious diversity. The Muslim Com-
munity forms the second largest religious group
after Christianity and has always supported the






Muslim Centres in Europe
In the last decades, Muslim centres have been estab-
lished all over Western Europe. Apart from being cen-
tres of religious, social, and cultural activities, the inten-
tion is often to establish and maintain relationships
with non-Islamic surroundings, such as local govern-
ments, churches, and schools. Through these institu-
tional embodiments, active spokesmen try to meet the
needs of Muslims as citizens of host societies. Islamic
centres in Europe thus play an important role in the
emancipation of Muslim communities. The ISIM Newslet-
t e r is now launching a series of articles on Muslim cen-
tres in Europe, the first of which is authored by Mamoun
Mobayed, director of The Belfast Islamic Centre in
Northern Ireland, introducing his centre.
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Liz Kepferle works at Georgetown University, where
since 1993 she has helped
coordinate the Master of Arts in Arab Studies
p r o g r a m m e .
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Tel: +33-1-45 49 51 40, Fax: +33-1-45 44 95 49
E-mail: joelle.moras@sciences-po.fr 
Professor Gilles Kepel is the director of research at the
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and
professor at the Institut d'Études Politiques in Paris,
F r a n c e .
Susan Rutten is secretary of the Association for the
Study of Islamic Law and Law of the Middle East
(RIM) and lecturer in law at Maastricht University, the
N e t h e r l a n d s .
E-mail: S.Rutten@PR.UNIMAAS.NL
O b i t u a r y
L I Z  K E P F E R L E Hanna Batatu: 1926-2000
Hanna (John) Batatu passed away on Satur-
day, 24 June 2000, in Winsted, Connecticut,
after a brief battle with cancer. Batatu was
born in 1926 in Jerusalem; his first employ-
ment was as a staff officer with the Palestine
Mandatory Government in Jerusalem in the
1940s. Following the creation of the State of
Israel in 1948, Batatu immigrated to the
United States, living with relatives and
working as a manager of a carpet company
in Stamford, Connecticut, until 1951, when,
at the age of 25, he entered Georgetown
University's Edmund A. Walsh School of For-
eign Service. After earning his BS degree
(summa cum laude) from Georgetown in
1953, he continued his higher education at
Harvard University, where he earned a PhD
in Political Theory in 1960.
Dr Batatu's early scholarly interests in-
volved the United States and the Soviet
Union. In his doctoral programme he shifted
his focus to the Soviet Union and the Arab
East. His dissertation was entitled 'The
Shaykh and the Peasant in Iraq, 1917-1958'.
Apart from research fellowships at Har-
vard, MIT, and Princeton, Batatu held two
major teaching appointments: at the Ameri-
can University of Beirut (1962-1981), and at
Georgetown University's Center for Con-
temporary Arab Studies (1982-1994). At
Georgetown, he held the Shaykh Sabah Al-
Salem Al-Sabah Chair of Arab Studies, and
was named Professor Emeritus upon retire-
ment. He remained in the Washington area
until the fall of 1999. Dr Batatu was to be ho-
noured on June 28 by the American Univer-
sity in Beirut as one of their Millennium
S c h o l a r s .
Hanna Batatu's detailed published re-
search is invaluable to students and schol-
ars of the modern Arab East. The first of his
two major works, The Old Social Classes and
the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq ( 1 2 8 3
pages, Princeton, 1978), is regarded by
many scholars as one of the most significant
works of recent times dealing with Middle
Eastern society and politics. Actually three
volumes in one, it is one of the few books to
have received the distinction of having an
entire conference held to discuss its impli-
cations – at the University of Texas at Austin
in March 1989. The proceedings of this con-
ference were later published as a book enti-
tled The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old So-
cial Classes Revisited, edited by R. Lewis and
R. Fernea (London: Tauris, 1991). Batatu's
masterpiece has been described as 'an in-
dispensable foundation for any thoughts re-
garding the creation of a new Iraqi political
order' (L. Bushkoff, Christian Science Monitor,
3 / 4 / 9 0 ) .
Last year, Dr Batatu published a counter-
part to his Iraq study, Syria's Peasantry, the
Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and
Their Politics (Princeton, 1999). Dedicated
'To the People of Syria', the book traces the
rural roots of Syria's ruling Ba'th party, ex-
ploring the characteristics and power struc-
ture of the Asad regime. As in his study of
Iraq, Batatu relies heavily on extensive inter-
views with individuals at all levels of Syrian
life, in the process providing valuable in-
sights into this critical Arab country. The
noted political scientist Rashid Khalidi
writes: 'This is a profound and comprehen-
sive study of modern Syria that is unlikely to
be surpassed for a very long time. It is a
model of how social history should be writ-
ten, and of how it can be used to explain the
politics of a complex society like Syria.'
Hanna Batatu is survived by his brother
and sister-in-law, Anthony and Bertha Rey-
naud of Winsted, Connecticut, and many
nieces and nephews.  ◆
P r o g r a m m e
G I L L E S  K E P E L Institut d'Etudes Politiques 
Doctoral Programme 
on the Muslim World
The Doctoral Programme on the Muslim
World, created in 1985, is a part of the doc-
toral school of the Institut d'Etudes Poli-
tiques in Paris. It has given many young
francophone academics and researchers
training in both epistemology and in field-
work. The most prominent among them,
Malika Zeghal, Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi,
Dina El Khawaga, Luis Martinez, Yves Gonza-
lez-Quijano, Séverine Labat, Xavier
Bougarel, Philippe Droz-Vincent, Laetitia
Bucaille and others have gained status and
authored major works in this field of knowl-
edge. The programme also aims to train
professionals who will staff private corpora-
tions or work in public service, in sectors rel-
evant to the modern Muslim world.
Launched by Professor Rémy Leveau, the
programme is now headed by Professor
Gilles Kepel, and has been widely restruc-
tured to meet the new challenges of the
field. It recruits a dozen students per year,
offering them a syllabus which includes
courses and seminars on politics, economy,
religious and social issues, together with
Arabic language lessons (students willing to
study other languages of the Muslim World
register for that purpose in other Parisian
universities, to which the programme is
linked) and a tutorial in English.
Professors Ghassan Salamé, Olivier Roy,
Malika Zeghal, Christian Décobert, Ruth
Grosrichard, amongst others, teach and give
tutorials together with Professor Kepel. The
duration of studies is one year for the
Diplôme d'Etudes Approfondies (DEA), and
three to four years for the PhD dissertation.
The DEA year includes a collective two-
week fieldtrip, and an individual four to six-
week fieldwork journey to a Muslim country.
In February 2000, students and instructors
went to Southern Morocco: they mixed with
students of the doctoral programme in Po-
litical Science from Casablanca University
and shared their experience and world-
views. In May and June, students will go in-
dividually to such countries as Lebanon,
Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and
Mauritania. Upon their return, they will
write a circa 100-page paper, to be publicly
defended in the fall. The best students will-
ing to specialize in academia will then be in-
vited to join the PhD programme.
Admission is conditional to the comple-
tion of a master's degree in the humanities,
the knowledge of one of the languages of
the Muslim world, and a TOEFL level of Eng-
lish. French is the main language of instruc-
tion, though students are encouraged to
develop their writing and speaking abilities
in other languages as well. Generally half of
the student body is foreign – whether from
European countries or other countries of
the Muslim world. Interviews for admission
are conducted in late June and mid-Sep-
tember. The academic year commences in
mid-October.  ◆
C o nfe r ence  Re po r t  
S U S A N  R U T T E N 1 8 t h RIMO Conference
The Dutch Association of the Study of Islam-
ic Law and the Law of the Middle East (RIMO
Association) held its annual meeting on 26
May 2000, in Leiden, the Netherlands. Ap-
proximately 55 individuals from various dis-
ciplines, such as law, Middle Eastern Studies,
Islamic Studies and Islamic Law, participat-
ed in the conference. Five lectures were pre-
sented by specialists who attended the con-
ference from different parts of the world.
Each lecture was followed by discussion
with the audience and was presided over by
the conference chairman, Ruud Peters. The
morning session began with two lectures
devoted to theoretical aspects of Islamic
law, while the afternoon sessions were de-
voted to an exploration of issues of the ap-
plication and practical relevance of Islamic
l a w .
The conference was opened by Muham-
mad Khalid Masud, academic director of
ISIM, who spoke about the doctrine of s i y a s a
in Islamic law. The second lecture was pre-
sented by Wael Hallaq, who spoke about
changes in Islamic law: Has it ever been
changed? Can it be changed at all? Or can
we speak of a structural change? Who is
qualified to change Islamic Law? What
methods can be used? These and other
thought provoking questions were raised
and discussed by Hallaq.
The afternoon sessions of the conference
opened with a lecture by Maurits Berger,
who engaged the audience in his presenta-
tion of Egyptians' inter-religious choice of
laws on marriage and divorce. According to
Berger, if one spouse is Muslim, Islamic law
will prevail and the marriage will be gov-
erned by it. Christian or Jewish law can only
be used in the case of both spouses sharing
the same religion. The lecture was en-
livened by many illustrative and practical
e x a m p l e s .
The second lecture of the afternoon ses-
sion was presented by Jamila Bargach. Her
lecture concerned the k a f a l a in Morocco.
Since adoption is not legally recognized in
Moroccan (and Islamic) law, other means
had to be devised in order to assist aban-
doned, orphaned or neglected children.
Other individuals can then take over the
care of these children by means of k a f a l a. In
practice, this 'gift of care' is often offered to
young girls as they can be of practical use
within their new families.
The conference was closed by Frans van
der Velden of the Dutch Ministry of Justice
who spoke of the cooperation between the
Netherlands, the Moroccan Embassy and
the Government of Morocco. Specifically, he
spoke of the cooperation designed to re-
solve issues emanating from marriages and
divorces of Moroccan citizens residing in
the Netherlands. He also mentioned Moroc-
can proposals to modify Moroccan family
law in order to improve the status of Moroc-
can women.
The RIMO Conference 2000 provided stim-
ulating and interesting presentations and
discussions about issues related to Islamic
law. The texts of the lectures will be pub-
lished in English and in Dutch by the RIMO
Association.  ◆
Info Pages3 8 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  6 / 0 0




T e l: + 31-20-623 72 34
6 – 8 October 2000
• Maroc opens its doors. This Festival
features Moroccan music, stand-up
comedy theatre, lectures, a suq, fash-




T e l: + 31-15-285 01 14
3 September – 23 December 2000
• Arabesk. Contemporary art from Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon. Art from non-western
countries as source of inspiration for
Dutch artists. Lectures, music, work-
shops and for schoolchildren the op-
portunity to work with mosaic. Pro-
gramme on request.
Den Haag
G e m e e n t e m u s e u m
Stadhouderslaan 41,
2517 HV The Hague
T e l: +31-70-338 11 11/365 89 85
25 November – 11 March 2001
• Glass from the Orient. Islamic
g l a s s w a r e .
C o n t i n u i n g
• Islamic crafts. The renewed exhibition
from its own collection, in particular
ceramics. Other objects illustrating
Islamic art.
Zijdemuseum Grijpskerke
Kerkstraat 1, 4364 AJ Grijpskerke
T e l: +31-118-59 33 05
E - m a i l: info@zijde.net
30 May – 30 September 2000






T e l: +31-10-270 71 72 
F a x: +31-10-270 71 82 
E - m a i l: mediatheek@wereld-
m u s e u m . r o t t e r d a m . n l
26 November 2000 – 
25 March 2001
• Buitenlandsche Zaaken (Foreign Af-
fairs). The exhibition concerns rare
documents from diplomatic and
trade contacts between the Nether-
lands and the Islamic world since
1600. The often exquisitely decorated
documents belong to the Dutch State
Archives and include manuscripts
from the Dutch East India Company.
Paintings, engravings and maps illus-
trate the longstanding historical con-
nection.The museum will reopen on
26 November 2000 with a permanent
exhibition of Islamic art from its own




T e l: +31-53-341 37 88
C o n t i n u i n g
• Intercultural art
L e c t u r e s / S o c i e t i e s
N e d e r l a n d s - A r a b i s c h e
K r i n g
Secretariat: 
H. Zwaardecroonstraat 17




T e l: +31-30-231 95 53
E - m a i l: raz@casema.net
• Organizes lectures and other
activities in five regional branches:
Amsterdam, The Hague, Groningen,
Nijmegen, and Utrecht.





T e l: +31-30-233 01 23
F a x: +31-30-233 01 22
E - m a i l: rasa@rasa.nl
Throughout the years 2000-2001
• Music from Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey,
Morocco. Concerts are organized in a
number of cities in the Netherlands
and Belgium. Programme to be
obtained from Rasa.
B E L G I U M
E x h i b i t i o n s
Royal Museums for Art and
H i s t o r y
Jubelpark / 
Parc du Cinquantenaire, 10
1040 Brussels
17 October – 29 October 2000
• Modernity and Authenticity in
Harmony. Exhibition on the occasion
of 30 years of Renaissance in Oman.
C A N A D A
E x h i b i t i o n s




T e l: +418-643 21 58
F a x: +418-646 97 05
Through January 2001
• Syria, Land of Civilizations, assembles
more than 400 cultural treasures to
present one of the oldest cultural cen-
tres. The exhibition views 12,000
years of history from various view-
points: political, economic and spiri-
tual. It also highlights the West's in-
tellectual and scientific ties to Syria.
'Contemporary Syria' explores every-
day life, particularly from the per-
spective of young people.
F R A N C E
E x h i b i t i o n s
Institut du Monde Arabe
1, Rue des Fosses St-Bernard
75236 Paris
T e l: +33-1-40 51 39 60/33 10 
21 September – 
12 November 2000
• Gaza Mediterranée. Exposes the re-
sults of archaeological excavations
in Gaza since 1994. This event is a re-
sult of the French-Palestinian coop-
eration. The most spectacular ex-
hibits are mosaics from the Byzant-
ian period.
F e s t i v a l s
Rue de Rivoli
75001 Paris
T e l: +33-1-53 45 17 00
F a x: +33-1-53 45 17 01
E - m a i l: w w w . f e s t i v a l - a u t o m n e . c o m
20 September –
30 December 2000 
• The Festival d'automne is partly
devoted to Iran. Performances of the
Tazieh, a unique form of traditional
tragedy from the Muslim world and
music from Khorassan, a region in
north Iran.
Musée Goya
C a s t r e s
F r a n c e
Through 8 October 2000
• Music and Figurative Arts: Music and
Society in Spain from the Middle Ages
to the Year 2000, presents more than
100 old, or reproductions of, musical
instruments as well as paintings,
sculptures and other music-related
objects. The importance of the
travelling musician and the large
contribution of Arabo-Andalusian
music in repertoire, rhythms and
instrumentation, are highlighted.
G E R M A N Y
E x h i b i t i o n s
Vorderasiatisches Museum
Entrée Pergamonmuseum
M u s e u m i n s e l
Am Kupfergraben
B e r l i n - M i t t e
T e l: +49-30-20 90 54 01
Tentatively 15 May 2001 – 
30 September 2001 
• Agatha Christie and the Orient.
Criminology and Archaeology traces
those two strands in the life of the
'Queen of Crime', displaying diaries
and hitherto unpublished
photographs of Christie and her
husband, archaeologist Max
Mallowan; more than 200 artefacts
from his excavations in Iraq and
Syria; and a compartment from the
Orient Express.
Museum of Islamic Art
M u s e u m i n s e l
B e r l i n - M i t t e
T e l: +49-30-20 90 54 01
C o n t i n u i n g
• This continuing exhibition is
dedicated to the art of Islamic
peoples from the 8t h to 19t h c e n t u r i e s .
The works of art originate from an
area stretching from Spain to India.
B a y e r i s c h e s
A r m e e m u s e u m
Neues Schloß
85049 Ingolstadt
T e l: +49-841-350 67 69
Through 15 October 2000
• Islamic Art from private collections in
Germany. An exhibition to
commemorate 10 years of the Society
of Friends of Islamic Art and Culture.
Museum fur Islamische
Fliesen und Keramik
W e s t e r h o f - K l i n i k
Olaf-Gulbransonstrasse 19
83684 Tegernsee
T e l: +49-80 22 18  10
C o n t i n u i n g
• Dr Theodor Sehmer collected, since
the 1950s, Islamic ceramics, in
particular tiles from Turkey, Iran and
Iraq. Some 300 pieces of this very
interesting collection dating from the





T e l: +49-711-222 51 73
F a x: +49-711-222 51 94
U R L: http://www.ifa.de
C o n t i n u i n g
• Exhibitions and contemporary art
from the Middle East
I R A N
E x h i b i t i o n s
Islamic Period Museum
T e h r a n
C o n t i n u i n g
• Continuing exhibition of e.g. Qur'anic
manuscripts, ceramics, metalwork
and textiles
I S R A E L
E x h i b i t i o n s
The Israel Museum
P.O. Box 71117 
Jerusalem 
Israel 
T e l: +972-2-670 88 11
F a x: +972-2-563 18 33
U R L: http://www.imj.org.il
26 September – December 2000
• 'Have a Nargileh' – Water Pipes from
the Islamic World. This exhibition
shows the origins of the water pipe,
an object closely associated with the
Orient, which has recently become
popular among certain sectors of
Israeli youth. In addition to a wide
variety of some fifty ancient and
elaborate water pipes, the exhibition
also presents Orientalist paintings
depicting images of smokers.
J O R D A N
E x h i b i t i o n s
Darat al Funun Amman
U R L: http://www.daratalfunun.org/
20 September – 
17 November 2000
• Artists from Bilad al-Sham, Part 2,
highlights Lebanese, Palestinian and
Syrian artists in a survey of
contemporary Arab-world arts, with
an emphasis on painting.
K U W A I T
E x h i b i t i o n s
Dar al-Athar al-Islamiyyah
M a h b o u l a
K u w a i t
T e l: +965-565 30 06
C o n t i n u i n g
• Al-Sabah Collection of Islamic art
The Tareq Rajab Museum
Hawelli 32036
K u w a i t
T e l: +965-531 73 58
F a x: +965-533 90 63
C o n t i n u i n g
• Arts of the Islamic world: Qur'ans,
calligraphy, pottery, metalwork,
glass, ivory and jade carvings,
costumes, textiles, embroideries and
jewellery. The exhibitions include also
relevant objects from Tibet, Nepal
and Bhutan.
M A L A Y S I A





T e l: +60-3-22 74 20 20
C o n t i n u i n g
• Collections of local and international
Islamic art objects. The museum
periodically holds local and
international exhibitions.
R U S S I A
E x h i b i t i o n s
The State Hermitage
M u s e u m
St Petersburg
T e l: +812-110 90 79/96 25
F a x: +812-312 15 50
U R L: http://www.hermitage.ru/
C o n t i n u i n g
• Art of the Near East is represented in
the museum by an excellent
collection covering the 7t h – 19t h
centuries, including several exquisite
m a s t e r p i e c e s .
S I N G A P O R E
E x h i b i t i o n s
Asian Civilisations




• Calligraphy from the Tareq Rajab
Museum Kuwait. The Qur'an was
central to the development of the art
of beautiful writing. This exhibition
explores the various scripts that
developed over the centuries, and
also calligraphy as a decorative motif
on various media, such as ceramics
and metalwork.
T U R K E Y
E x h i b i t i o n s
The Museum of Turkish
and Islamic Art 
I s t a n b u l
C o n t i n u i n g
• Exhibition of Ottoman and Islamic
Art, Folk Art and Folk Life
U N I T E D  K I N G D O M





T e l: +44-171-412 71 11
F a x: +44-171-323 86 14/84 80
C o n t i n u i n g
• Continuing exhibition of the Oriental
collection. Its Islamic pottery is
considered the best outside the
Islamic world.
Victoria and Albert
M u s e u m
Cromwell Road
London SW7 2RL
T e l: +44-171-938 85 00 
U R L: http://www.vam.ac.uk/
C o n t i n u i n g
• The collection includes a rich
collection of Islamic metalwork.
Brunei Gallery
L o n d o n
Tel: +44-207-898 40 20
U R L:
h t t p : / / w w w : s o a s . a c . u k / B r u n e i / e x h i
b i t i o n s . h t m l /
16 October – 8 December 2000
• Strokes of Genius. Throughout
history, Mesopotamia has been
referred to as the 'Cradle of
Civilization' and its art, treasured in
museums worldwide, is praised as
one of the greatest achievements of
mankind. Today, Iraqi art forms an
important part of global
contemporary art to which the artists
contribute with a diverse, yet distinct,
vocabulary formed by their unique
artistic, cultural and religious roots.
Egee Art Gallery
9 Chelsea manor studios
Flood Street
London SW3 5SR
T e l: +44-171-351 68 18
F a x: +44-171-376 85 10
U R L: http://www.egeeart.com/
C o n t i n u i n g
• Arabic Calligraphy 2000 – The Saudi
Show. Presentation of a breathtaking
beauty and diversity collection of
calligraphy. Contemporary and
antique Middle Eastern art.
U N I T E D  S T A T E S
E x h i b i t i o n s
Harvard University Art
Museums 
Arthur M. Sackler Gallery 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 
T e l. +1-617-495 94 00
8 June – 15 October 2000
• A Decade of Collecting: Recent
Acquisitions of Islamic and Indian Art
showcases important works of art
from the Stuart Cary Welch
C o l l e c t i o n .
C o n t i n u i n g
• Harvard's collection of Islamic and
later-Indian art is small but
magnificent. It comprises a broad
range of works, from Samanid
pottery and Mamluk calligraphy to
Qajar lacquers and Ottoman textiles.
Its masterpieces include a group of
miniatures from the extraordinary
1 4t h century Great Mongol
('Demotte') Shahnama, the Safavid
masterpiece; Mir Sayyid-'Ali's Night-
time in a Palace, and the miniatures
of the 'pocket-size' Divan of Anvari
produced for the Mughal emperor
Akbar. The department also has one
of the most important
representations of Rajasthani
painting in the world.
Wexner Center for the Arts
The Ohio State University
1871 North High Street
Columbus, Ohio
T e l: +1-614-292 35 35
F a x: +1-614-292 33 69
U R L: http://www.wexarts.org/
16 September – 
31 December 2000
• Shirin Neshat: Two Installations. This
Iranian-born artist first commanded
attention through photographic
series questioning the representation
of women in Islamic culture. She then
turned to moving images, such as
these video installations exploring
relationships between men and
women in Islamic culture.
The Detroit Institute of
A r t s
5200 Woodward Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48202
T e l: +1-313-833 79 00
F a x: +1-313-833 14 54
30 July – 8 October 2000
• Empire of the Sultans: Ottoman Art
from the Khalili collection. The
magnificence of the Ottoman Empire
comes alive in the major exhibition.
Over 200 objects ranging from
Qur'ans adorned with elegant
calligraphy, to scientific instruments,
carpets and textiles, embrace every
aspect of Ottoman art of more than
six centuries.
The Arthur M. Sackler
Gallery and Freer Gallery
of Art 
Smithsonian Institution
Washington, DC, 20560 
T e l: +1-202-357 48 80
17 September 2000 (long term)
• Fountains of Light. Islamic Metalwork
from the Nuhad Es-Said Collection.
This collection – arguably the finest
private collection of Islamic
metalwork – consists of 27 inlaid
brass, bronze and steel objects dating
from the 10t h to the 19t h c e n t u r i e s .
Through 29 October 2000
• The Heroic Past: The Persian Book of
Kings looks at the historical figures
who became legendary in the great
Persian epic Shahnama, composed in
1010 by the poet Firdawsi. Coins,
paintings, metalwork and ceramics
are on display.
3 May 1998 – Indefinitely
• Arts of the Islamic World. Some 60
works – Qur'an pages, metalwork,
ceramics, glass, paintings, and
calligraphy – from the 9t h to 17t h
centuries, explore Islamic artistic
traditions. Themes include the forms
and functions of the works of art, the
role of calligraphy, the use of
figurative decoration, and the
meaning of abstract designs.
C o n t i n u i n g
• Metalwork and Ceramics from
Ancient Iran: 45 metal and clay
artefacts, created in western Iran
between 2300 and 100 BC are closely
linked technically and aesthetically.
Metalwork influences ceramic forms,
colours and surface treatment; works
in both media share shapes and
decoration inspired by images of
animals or imaginary creatures.
Objects in the exhibition are on loan
from private collections and from the
Sackler Gallery's permanent
c o l l e c t i o n .
C o n t i n u i n g
• Luxury Arts of the Silk Route Empires:
In these two galleries connecting the
Freer Gallery of Art and the Arthur M.
Sackler Gallery, examples of
metalwork and ceramics from the
collections of each museum illustrate
the effect of multicultural interaction
on the arts of the first millennium AD
Ornaments, bowls, cups, bottles, jars,
mirrors, ewers, and ritual objects in
gold, silver or silver and gilt,
earthenware, or porcelain from Iran,
China, Turkey, Syria, and Afghanistan
are included in this exhibition.
Yerba Buena Center 
for the Arts
San Francisco
30 September – 1 October 2000
• Silk Road Festival features lectures,
dance, theatre, books and regional
c u i s i n e .
The Saint Louis Art
Museum 
1 Fine Arts Drive 
St. Louis, Missouri 
63110-1380 USA.
T e l: +1-314-721 00 72
F a x: +1-314-721 61 72
1 August – 25 February 2001
• Oriental Carpets from the James F.
Ballard Collection. This manufacturer
from St Louis was one of the most
prominent American collectors of
Oriental carpets at the turn of the
century. The exhibition includes rare
examples of a 16t h century Mamluk
carpet, a 15t h century Spanish carpet
and early Turkish pieces known as
Holbein and Lotto rugs.
U N I T E D  N A T I O N S







Art & Culture Agenda
The Agenda is produced by
t h e Centre of Islamic Culture
in Rotterdam, The Nether-
lands. Please send all
information with regard to
activities related to culture
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Recent Conferences
and Public Lectures
The Center for the Study
of Islam and Democracy 1s t
Annual Conference 
D a t e: 30 April 2000
Sponsored by: International Cultural
Center at Georgetown University
Washington DC
I n f o r m a t i o n: Sana Abed-Kotob
10026 Parkwoods Lane
Burke VA 22015, USA
F a x: +1-703-425 19 92
E - m a i l: sakotob@aol.com 
U R L: www.islam-democracy.org/
The 6t h international con-
ference of the Internation-
al Boundaries Research
U n i t
Borders, Orders and Iden-
tities of the Muslim World
D a t e: 12 – 14 July 2000
V e n u e: The University of Durham 




Mountjoy Research Centre, University
of Durham
DH1 3UR, UK
T e l: +44-191-374 77 05
F a x: +44-191-374-77 02
E - m a i l: michelle.speak@durham.ac.uk
U R L: http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/
( B R C M E )
Seminar on Religion and
E c o n o m y
D a t e: 14-15 August 2000
V e n u e: Jakarta, Indonesia
Sponsored by: ISIM, Pusat Pengkajian
Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM), IAIN
Syarif Hidayatullah
E - m a i l: ISIM@rullet.leidenuniv.nl
U R L: http://www.isim.nl/
Fifth International Confer-
ence on Sudan Studies
D a t e : 30 August – 1 September 2000
V e n u e: Durham
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Justin Willis, Senior
Research and Development Associ-
a t e
Department of History
43 North Bailey, Durham DH1 3EX, UK
T e l: +44-191-374 24 37
F a x: +44-191-374 47 54.
E - m a i l : J u s t i n . W i l l i s @ D u r h a m . a c . u k
Religion and Society in
Qajar Iran
D a t e : 4-6 September 2000
V e n u e: Clifton Hill House, Bristol Uni-
versity, Bristol
Sponsored by: The British Institute of
Persian Studies, The Iran Heritage
F o u n d a t i o n
I n f o r m a t i o n: Dr Robert Gleave (confer-
ence coordinator), Department of
Theology and Religious Studies,
University of Bristol, Bristol BS8
1TB, UK
T e l: + 44-117-929 78 50
F a x: +44-117-928 81 68
E - m a i l : r . m . g l e a v e @ b r i s t o l . a c . u k
Muslims of Europe in the
New Millennium
D a t e: 9-10 September
V e n u e: Islamic Cultural Centre of Ire-
land, Dublin
Sponsored by: Association of Muslim
Social Scientists (UK), Islamic Cul-
tural Centre of Ireland
I n f o r m a t i o n: The Association of Mus-
lim Social Scientists
P.O. Box 126
Richmond, Surrey TW9 2UD, UK
T e l: +44-208-948 95 11/2
F a x: +44-208-940 40 14
E - m a i l: amss@dial.pipex.com
The Emergence of the
Stereotypical Image of the
Alleged Enemy in the Con-
flict surrounding Palestine 
D a t e: 6-8 September 2000 
V e n u e: Technische Universität Berlin
Hauptgebäude: Strasse des 17. Juni
1 9 3 5
10623 Berlin, Hörsaal H 3010, Ger-
m a n y
T e l: +49-30-314 258 54 
F a x: +49-30-314 211 36 
E - m a i l: Lindner@zfa.kgw.tu-berlin.de 
U R L: http://www.tu-berlin.de/zfa/
Middle East Popular Cul-
t u r e
D a t e: 17 – 21 September 2000
V e n u e: The University of Oxford
I n f o r m a t i o n: The Administrator, Near
Eastern Studies Programme
The Oriental Institute
Pusey Lane, Oxford, OX1 2 LE, UK
F a x: +44-1865-27 81 90
U R L: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ near-






t u r e s
D a t e: 4-8 October 2000
V e n u e: Berlin, Germany
E - m a i l: iames@zedat.fu-berlin.de
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . i a m e s . d e /
Cinema and the Middle East
D a t e : 11-12 October 2000
V e n u e : Campus of the University of
M a i n z
Sponsored by: The international re-
search network on 'Cinema and the
Middle East' 
I n f o r m a t i o n: Prof. Dr Anton Escher,
Centre for Research on the Arab
World (CERAW), Institute of Geog-
raphy, University of Mainz, 55099
Mainz, Germany
T e l: +49-6131-392 56 54
F a x: +49-6131-392 47 36
E - m a i l : d a v o . c o n g r e s s @ g e o . U n i -
M a i n z . d e
7t h Annual Congress of the
German Middle East Stud-
ies Association (DAVO)
D a t e: 12-14 October 2000
V e n u e : M a i n z




T e l: +49-6131-392 56 54
F a x: +49-6131-392 47 36
E - m a i l : d a v o . c o n g r e s s @ g e o . u n i -
m a i n z . d e
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . g e o . u n i -
m a i n z . d e / d a v o
Islam and Society in 
the Twenty-First Century
2 9t h Annual AMSS 
(Association of Muslim So-
cial Scientists) Convention
D a t e: 13-15 October 2000
Sponsored by: Georgetown University,
Washington DC 
I n f o r m a t i o n: Deonna Kelli, AMSS Con-
f e r e n c e
PO Box 669
Herndon, VA 20172 




Conference of the Human
Rights Movement in the
Arab World Human Rights
Education and Dissemina-
tion 21s t Century Agenda
D a t e: 13-16 October 2000
V e n u e: Cairo Institute for Human
Rights Studies (CIHRS), Cairo
Sponsored by: UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR), Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Net-
work (EMHRN)
I n f o r m a t i o n: CIHRS
P.O. Box 117 (Maglis El-Shaab)
Cairo, Egypt
T e l: +20-2-7954 37 15/795 11 12
F a x: +20-2-7954 200
E - m a i l: CIHRS@idsc.gov.eg
Muslim Communities,
Power and Politics in
A f r i c a
D a t e: 14 October 2000 
V e n u e: Oxford Centre for Islamic Stud-
i e s
George Street, Oxford, UK
T e l: +44-1864-27 87 30
Islam and Peace
D a t e: 23-27 October 2000
V e n u e: Islamic Peace Forum
4545 42nd St. NW #209
Washington DC 20016, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n: Dr Karim Crow
T e l: +1-202-244 09 51
E - m a i l : n o n v i o l e n c e @ i g c . a p c . o r g
Fall meeting of the South-
eastern Regional Seminar
on African Studies (SER-
S A S )
D a t e: 27-28 October 2000
V e n u e: University of Tennessee,
K n o x v i l l e
C o n t a c t: Jonathan T. Reynolds, Kathy
Skidmore-Hess, Aran MacKinnon
E - m a i l: ReynolJo@NKU.EDU,
cskid@gsaix2.cc.gasou.edu, amack-
i n n @ w e s t g a . e d u
U R L: http://www.ecu.edu/african/ser-
s a s / h o m e p a g e . h t m /
The Dialogue of Civiliza-
tions 
D a t e: 27-28 October 2000 
V e n u e: Islamic Centre England, Lon-
d o n
Sponsored by: Institute of Islamic
Studies, London (UK), Institute for
Political & International Studies
(Iran), Shahid Beheshti University
(Iran), Allame Tabataba'ee Universi-
ty (Iran) and the Islamic College for
Advanced Studies (UK)
U R L: http://www.islamic-




Portugal, Spain and Mo-
rocco – the Mediterranean
and the Atlantic
D a t e: 2-4 November 2000
V e n u e: Universidade do Algarve
Faro, Portugal
I n f o r m a t i o n: Prof. Teresa Judice Gami-
t o
God, Life and Cosmos:
Theistic Perspectives
D a t e: 6-9 November 2000
V e n u e: Islamabad, Pakistan
Sponsored by: The Center for Theolo-
gy and the Natural Sciences (CTNS),
the Islamic Research Institute of the
International Islamic University and
the International Institute of Islam-
ic Thought
I n f o r m a t i o n: Muzaffar Iqbal
T e l: +1-780-922 09 27
F a x: +1-780-922 09 26
The Fifth Conference of
the Indian Congress of
Asian Pacific Studies
Asia into the 21s t C e n t u r y :
Challenges of Peace and
T r a n s f o r m a t i o n
D a t e: 8-10 November 2000
V e n u e: University of Jammu
Jammu, India
C o n t a c t: Brij Tankha
E - m a i l: btankha@yahoo.com
The US and the Middle
East after the Gulf War
D a t e: 9-10 November 2000
V e n u e: La Plata University
Middle East Department, Argentina
C o n t a c t: Dr Virginia Petronis
T e l: +54-21-423 06 28
E - m a i l: iri@isis.unlp.edu.ar
History and Theory 2000:
Disrupted Identities and
the Question of the Uni-
versal 
D a t e: 11-12 November 2000 
V e n u e: University of California, Irvine
I n f o r m a t i o n: University of California,
I r v i n e
Department of History – History and
Theory 2000
200 Humanities Office Building
Irvine, California 92697-3275, USA
F a x: +1-949-824 28 65 
U R L: http://www.hnet.uci.edu/histo-
r y / h i s t o r y & t h e o r y /
Communication and the
Culture of Democracy
D a t e : 12-15 November 2000
V e n u e : Journalism and Mass Commu-
nication Department of Yarmouk
U n i v e r s i t y
Irbid/Amman, Jordan
Sponsored by: AUSACE, The Depart-
ment of Communication, The Cen-
ter for International Media Educa-
tion, and the Middle East Center for
Peace, Culture, and Development,
Georgia State University, USA
I n f o r m a t i o n : Dr Issam Mousa,
Yarmouk University, Dept. of Jour-
nalism and Mass Communication,
Irbid, Jordan
F a x: +962-2-727 46 82
E - m a i l : i s s a m @ v u . e d u . j o
Middle East Studies Asso-
ciation Meeting (MESA)
3 4t h Meeting: Representa-
tions of the Middle East
D a t e: 16-19 November 2000
V e n u e : Orlando, Florida
I n f o r m a t i o n : Middle East Studies As-
sociation of North America, Univer-
sity of Arizona, 1643 East Helen
Street, Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA
T e l: +1-520-621 58 50
F a x: +1-520-626 90 95
E - m a i l : m e s a n a @ u . a r i z o n a . e d u
URL: http://www.mesa.arizona.edu/
A Critique of the Mosque
Institution in Malaysia
D a t e: 20 November 2000
Sponsored by: The Aga Khan Pro-
gramme for Architecture
V e n u e: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, room 3/133
Massachusetts, USA
T e l: +1-617-253 1400
E - m a i l: akpiarch@mit.edu
The United States and the
Middle East: A Cultural En-
c o u n t e r
D a t e: 8-9 December 2000
V e n u e: Yale University, New Haven,
USA 
Sponsored by: Yale University, Hofstra
U n i v e r s i t y
I n f o r m a t i o n: Magnus Bernhardsson
T e l: +1-516-463 56 07
E-mail: H i s m z b @ H o f s t r a . e d u
Third International Con-
ference on Gender and Eq-
uity Issues
D a t e: 5-7 January 2001
V e n u e: Radisson Hotel, Bangkok, Thai-
l a n d
Sponsored by: Srinakharinwirot Uni-
versity and Salisbury State Universi-
t y





T e l: +66-2-260 01 26
F a x: +66-2-260 19 14
E - m a i l : a m p o r n s r @ s w u . a c . t h
C o n t a c t : Dr Thomas L. Erskine, English
D e p a r t m e n t
Salisbury State University, Salisbury,
Maryland 21801, USA
T e l: +1-410-543 63 71
F a x: + 1-410-548 21 42
E - m a i l : t l e r s k i n e @ s s u . e d u
Qadhafi's Libya
D a t e: 23 January 2001 (provisional)
Sponsored by: Society for Libyan Stud-
i e s
I n f o r m a t i o n: Society for Libyan Stud-
ies, c/o Institute of Archaelogy




Islam in Southeast Asia
D a t e: 1 March 2001
Sponsored by: Netherlands Institute
for War Documentation, Interna-
tional Institute of Asian Studies
( I I A S )
I n f o r m a t i o n: Dr Peter Post, Nether-
lands Institute for War Documenta-
t i o n
T e l: +31-20-523 38 00
E - m a i l: p.post@oorlogsdoc.knaw.nl
U R L : h t t p : / / w w w . o o r l o g s d o c . k n a w . n l /
Muslim Minority Societies
in Europe
D a t e: 2-3 March 2001
Venue: Erfurt University
C o n t a c t: Prof. Jamal Malik, Chair of Is-
lamic Studies
Erfurt University, P.O. Box 900221
99105 Erfurt, Germany
T e l: +49-361-737 41 00
F a x: +49-361-737 41 19
E - m a i l: jamal.malik@uni-erfurt.de
International Conference
on Medical Ethics and
Medical Law in Islam
D a t e: 19-21 March 2001
V e n u e: University of Haifa, Israel
Sponsored by: The Department of Ara-
bic Language and Literature and
the Centre for Health, Law, and
Ethics at the Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Haifa, Israel
URL: h t t p : / / h c c . h a i f a . a c . i l / i s l a m m e d /
h t t p : / / r e s e a r c h . h a i f a . a c . i l / ~ w e b h u m / a
r a b i c / r e s e a r c h . h t m /
Second Mediterranean So-
cial and Political Research
M e e t i n g
D a t e: 21-25 March 2001
V e n u e: Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies
European University Institute
I n f o r m a t i o n: Imco Brouwer, Mediter-
ranean Programme Coordinator
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
S t u d i e s
European University Institute
Via dei Roccettini 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole, Flo-
rence, Italy
T e l: +39-055-468 57 83
F a x: +39-055-468 57 70
E - m a i l: brouwer@iue.it
XXVIII. German Oriental-
ists Day
D a t e: 26 March 2001
Sponsored by: Deutsche Morgen-
ländische Gesellschaft
C o n t a c t: Maurus Reinkowski
An der Universität 11
96045 Bamberg, Germany
T e l: +49-951-863 21 96
F a x: +49-951-863 51 82
E-mail: d o t 2 0 0 1 @ s p l i t . u n i -
b a m b e r g . d e
Considering Consumption,
Production, and the Mar-
ket in the Constitution of
Meaning in the Middle
East and Beyond
D a t e: March – June 2001
V e n u e: The Department of Middle
East Studies at Ben-Gurion Univer-
s i t y
I n f o r m a t i o n: Dr Relli Shechter, Depart-
ment of Middle East Studies
Ben-Gurion University
Beer-Sheva, 84105, Israel
T e l: +972-7-647 77 63
F a x: +972-7-647 29 52
E-mail: r e l l i s h @ b g u m a i l . b g u . a c . i l
Arab Legal Systems in
T r a n s i t i o n
D a t e: 5-6 April 2001
Sponsored by: The Center for Contem-
porary Arab Studies
Georgetown University
C o n t a c t: Ms. Anne Marie Chaaraoui,
Symposium Manager
Georgetown University, Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies, ICC
2 4 1
3 7t h and O Streets, NW, Washington,
DC 20057-1020, USA
T e l: +1-202-687 57 93
F a x: +1-202-687 70 01
E - m a i l:
ccasinfo@gunet.georgetown.edu 
U R L: www.ccasonline.org/ 
Workshops in South Asian
I s l a m
Challenging the Narratives
of National and Religious
Hegemony 
D a t e: 13-15 April 2001
V e n u e: The University of North Caroli-
na, Chapel Hill
C o n t a c t: Tony K. Stewart, Director
North Carolina Center for South
Asia Studies
Triangle South Asia Consortium
Campus Box 8101, North Carolina
State University
Raleigh, NC 27695-8101, USA
T e l: +1-919-515 63 35; +1-919-513 87
2 3
F a x: +1-919-513 43 51; +1-919-513 14
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U R L:
h t t p : / / w w w 2 . n c s u . e d u / t s a c / s l a m . h t
m l /
Islam in Africa
A global, cultural and his-
torical perspective
D a t e: 19-22 April 2001
Sponsored by: The Institute of Global
Cultural Studies (IGCS)
I n f o r m a t i o n: Michael Toler, Tracia Lea-
c o c k
Institute of Global Cultural Studies
Binghamton University 
PO Box 6000 LNG-100
Binghamton, NY 13905, USA
T e l: +1-607-777 44 94
F a x: +1-607-777 26 42
E-mail: i g c s @ b i n g h a m t o n . e d u
Religion and the State in
the Arab World: Conflict or
A c c o m m o d a t i o n ?
D a t e: 28-30 April 2001
Sponsored by: The Egyptian Historical
Society, The Higher Council for Cul-
ture, Cairo, Egypt
I n f o r m a t i o n: Assem Desouki
E-mail: l o l l a f a r i d a @ y a h o o . c o m
Sexualities in Transition
D a t e: 12-16 June 2001
V e n u e: Dubrovnik, Croatia
I n f o r m a t i o n: Dr A. Stulhofer
The Kinsey Institute
Morrison Hall 313
Bloomington, IN 47405-2501, USA
T e l: +1-812-855 76 87
F a x: +1-812-855 82 77
E - m a i l: AStulhof@Indiana.edu
U R L: h t t p : / / w w w . c s u n . e d u / ~ s r 2 0 2 2 /
e v e n t s . h t m l /
Education and Training 
in the Arab World: Chal-
lenges for the 21s t Century 
D a t e: September 2001
V e n u e: Marrakech, Morocco
Sponsored by: AMIDEAST (America-
Mideast Educational and Training
Services, Inc.), under the High Pa-
tronage of H.M. Mohammed VI,
Kingdom of Morocco 
I n f o r m a t i o n: Ruth Sexton, Vice Presi-
d e n t
Public Relations and Development
1730 M St. NW, Suite 1100
Washington DC 20036, USA




p o s i u m
D a t e: 29 September – 4 October 2001
V e n u e: Al-Ain
Sponsored by: The University of the
United Arab Emirates, Faculty of
Humanities and Social Sciences 
I n f o r m a t i o n: German – Arabic Sympo-
s i u m
c/o Dr Muhammad Abu al Fadl Bad-
r a n
Department of Arabic, Faculty of Hu-
manities and Social Sciences
UAE University, PO Box 17771, Al-Ain,
United Arab Emirates
E - m a i l : M B a d r a n @ u a e u . a c . a e
The Middle East Studies
Association of North
America (MESA) 
3 5t h Annual Meeting 
D a t e: 17-20 November 2001
V e n u e: Hyatt Regency, San Francisco,
U S A
I n f o r m a t i o n: Mark Lowder
T e l: +1-520/626 62 90
E - m a i l : m l o w d e r @ u . a r i z o n a . e d u
Workshops in South Asian
Islam: Music and Literary
P r o d u c t i o n
D a t e: 12-14 April 2002 
V e n u e: North Carolina State University 
C o n t a c t: Tony K. Stewart, Director
North Carolina Center for South
Asia Studies
Triangle South Asia Consortium
Campus Box 8101, North Carolina
State University
Raleigh, NC 27695-8101, USA
T e l: +1-919-515 63 35, +1-919-513 87
2 3
F a x: +1-919-513 43 51, +1-919-513 14
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U R L:
h t t p : / / w w w 2 . n c s u . e d u / t s a c / s l a m . h t
m l /
First World Congress for
Middle East Studies
D a t e: 11-14 September 2002
V e n u e: Mainz, Germany
Sponsored by: The Middle East Studies
Association of North America
(MESA), The European Association
for Middle Eastern Studies (EU-
RAMES), The British Society for Mid-
dle East Studies (BRISMES), The
German Middle East Studies Associ-
ation (DAVO)
I n f o r m a t i o n: Gunter Meyer, Centre for
Research on the Arab World
Institute of Geography, University of
M a i n z
55099 Mainz, Germany
T e l: +49-6131-392 46 35
E - m a i l : d a v o @ g e o . u n i - m a i n z . d e
URL: w w w . g e o . u n i - m a i n z . d e / d a v o /
Images of Loss and Recon-
ciliation: 
Political and Literary Rep-
resentations of Forced Mi-
grations in Comparative
P e r s p e c t i v e
D a t e: September 2002, April 2003
V e n u e: University of Bath, England, UK
I n f o r m a t i o n: Prof. Ian Wallace and Dr
Stefan Wolff
E - m a i l: S.Wolff@bath.ac.uk.
Workshops in South Asian
Islam: 'Imaginaire' in
South Asia 
D a t e: 18-20 April 2003
V e n u e: Duke University 
C o n t a c t: Tony K. Stewart, Director
North Carolina Center for South
Asia Studies
Triangle South Asia Consortium, Cam-
pus Box 8101
North Carolina State University,
R a l e i g h
NC 27695-8101, USA
T e l: +1-919-515 63 35; +1-919-513 87
2 3
F a x: +1-919-513 43 51; +1-919-513 14
4 7
U R L:
h t t p : / / w w w 2 . n c s u . e d u / t s a c / s l a m . h t
m l /
Academic Meetings
In order for the ISIM Info
Pages to prosper, we kindly
ask for your participation by
filling out the forms for
Vacancy Announcements and
Special Events. These forms
can be found online on the
ISIM website:
h t t p : / / i s i m . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
If you wish to have a formula
sent by e-mail, fax, or post,
please contact the ISIM
S e c r e t a r i a t :
Tel: +31 71 5277905
Fax: +31 71 5277906
E - m a i l :
I S I M @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
Linda Herrera
Downveiling: Shifting Socio-Religious
P r a c t i c e s
1
I S I M




'The Production of Islamic 
K n o w l e d g e '
2
'Vingt Ans Après …' An Assessment of
Modern Islamist Movements
3
Family and Family Law in Asia and
the Middle East
3






Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi
J a m acat as a Transnational Islamic
Movement for Faith Renewal
5
The Application of Islamic Law 
in Muslim Courts
5
Africa and Islam: Moral Discourses
and Construction of Identities
6
F E A T U R E S
Hakan Yavuz
Being Modern in the Nurcu Way
7
Cor Hoffer





n c i r l ioğ l u








Science in the Service of God:
Islamizing Knowledge
1 1
M E D I A
Gary Bunt




Approach to an Online Diaspora
1 3
Munawar A. Anees
H u r u f: 
An Interactive Global Portal
1 4
S P A C E
Ahmed Andrews and Michele Wolfe
Muslim Graves in Sweden and the UK
1 5
R E G I O N A L  I S S UE S
Abdallah Chanfi Ahmed
D acwa in the Comoros Islands
1 6
Julia Day Howell
Indonesia's Urban Sufis: Challenging
Stereotypes of Islamic Revival
1 7
Shanker Thapa
Ethnic Variation of Nepal's Muslim Minority
1 8
David Waines
Non-Formal Education in Pakistan: A Child's
A p p r o a c h
1 9
M. Nazif Shahrani
The Taliban Enigma: Person-Centred Politics
& Extremism in Afghanistan
2 0 - 2 1
Kazem Alamdari
Iran Parliamentary Election: The Third
Consecutive Victory for the Reformists
2 2
Azadeh Kian-Thiébaut
Women's Religious Seminaries in Iran
2 3
Mai Ghoussoub
Photogenic Elections, Men and Status in






Islamic Law in Africa
2 6
Dorothea E. Schulz
Muslim Women's Associations, Mass Media,
and Morals in Urban Mali
2 7
Fabienne Samson
Youth, Sufism, and Politics in Senegal
2 8
Elise Massicard
Uncovering Alevism, Covering Difference
2 9
Mucahit Bilici













C O N F E R E NC E  R E P O R T S
Conrad Schetter, Christine Noelle-
K a r i m i
Afghanistan – Country without State?
2 1
Susan Rutten
1 8t h RIMO conference
3 7
P U B L I C A T I O N S
Nadje Al-Ali
Secularism, Gender and the State: 
The Egyptian Women's Movement
3 4
Elisabeth Özdalga
The Naqshbandis in Western and Central
Asia: Change and Continuity
3 5
Ishtiaq Ahmed
Islam Outside the Arab World
3 6
O R G A N I Z A T I O N S
Mamoun Mobayed
Muslims in Northern Ireland: 
The Belfast Islamic Centre
3 6
R E S E A R C H  P R O G R A M M E S
Gilles Kepel
Institut d'Etudes Politiques: Doctoral
Programme on the Muslim World
3 7




I N F O  P A G E S






C o n t e n t s
The International Institute for
the Study of the Modern World




movements in Muslim societies
and communities. The ISIM’s
research approaches are
expressly interdisciplinary and
comparative, covering a large
geographic range which includes
North Africa and the Middle East,
Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia,
South and Southeast Asia, and
(Muslim communities in) the
West. Broad in its scope, the ISIM
brings together all areas of
e x p e r t i s e .
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ISIM Events
Arrival of ISIM Visiting Professor,
Abdellahi A. An-Naim
D a t e: 1 October 2000
Inaugural Lecture: Muslim Jurists'
Quest for the Normative Basis of
S h a r ica
Muhammad Khalid Masud, ISIM chair, Leiden
U n i v e r s i t y
D a t e: 20 October 2000
V e n u e: Leiden
ISIM Annual Lecture by Talal Asad
D a t e: 30 October 2000 
V e n u e: Leiden
Guest Lecture by Gilles Kepel
D a t e: 2 November 2000
V e n u e: Leiden 
Inaugural Lecture: M u s l i m s ,
Minorities and Modernities
The restructuring of heterodoxy in
the Middle East and Southeast Asia
Martin van Bruinessen, ISIM chair, 
Utrecht University
D a t e: 21 November 2000
V e n u e: Utrecht, The Netherlands
ISIM Master class by Abdellahi 
An-Naim: Key Issues in Human Rights
D a t e: 27-30 November 2000
V e n u e: Leiden
Atelier: Africa and Islam: Moral
Discourses and Construction of
I d e n t i t i e s
Date: February – May 2001
Summer Academy: 
The Local Productionof Islamic
K n o w l e d g e
In cooperation with the Working Group
Modernity and Islam
D a t e : 3-14 September 2001
V e n u e: Istanbul, Turkey
Workshop: The Application of
Islamic Law in Muslim Courts
In cooperation with Cornell University
D a t e : October 2001
V e n u e : The Netherlands
For more information on these and other ISIM Events:
ISIM Secretariat
Tel: +31-71-527 79 05
Fax: +31-71-527 79 06
i s i m @ r u l l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
U R L: http://www.isim.nl/
